STATUS OF POLICING IN INDIA REPORT

Volume I
2020–2021

Policing in Conflict-Affected Regions

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Policing in Conflict-Affected Regions

COMMON CAUSE
A ROMANCE WITH PUBLIC CAUSES SINCE 1980

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Cover photo: A policeman stands beside the wreckage of a security patrol vehicle that
was damaged in a landmine blast in the eastern Indian state of Bihar. October 23, 2010.
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List of Abbreviations

AFSPA	Armed Forces Special Powers Act
AR	Assam Rifles
BPRD	Bureau of Police Research and Development
BSF	Border Security Forces
CCTV	Closed-Circuit Television
CISF	Central Industrial Security Force
CPI	Communist Party of India
CRPF	Central Reserve Police Force
CSDS	Centre for the Study of Developing Societies
DGP	Director General of Police
FI	Field Investigator
FIR	First Information Report
ID	Identity
IPC	Indian Penal Code
IPS	Indian Police Service
ITBP	Indo-Tibetan Border Police
J&K	Jammu and Kashmir
LWE	Left-Wing Extremism
MHA	Ministry of Home Affairs
NCRB	National Crime Records Bureau
NE	North East
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NHRC	National Commission for Human Rights
NREGS	National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme
NSA	National Security Act
NSG	National Security Guards
OBC	Other Backward Classes
PAN	Permanent Account Number
PIB	Press Information Bureau
PTI	Press Trust of India
RIC	Royal Irish Constabulary
SC	Scheduled Caste
SCA	Special Central Assistance
SF	Security Force
SIM	Subscriber Identification Module
SLL	Special and Local laws
SP	Superintendent of Police
SPIR	Status of Policing in India Report
SPO	Special Police Officers
SPSS	Statistical Package for the Social Sciences
SSB	Sashastra Seema Bal
ST	Scheduled Tribes
UAPA	Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act
UT	Union Territory

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Acknowledgements

Status of Policing in India Report 2020-2021:
The Context and Introduction

A Naxalite cadre in Dantewada district of Chhattisgarh. February 4, 2010. ©Outlook/Tribhuvan Tiwari

Status of Policing in India Report 2020–2021: The Context and Introduction

The Status of Policing in India Report 2020-21 gathers and evaluates original data on policing under extraordinary circumstances. It has been divided into two parts: First, a study of policing in conflict-affected areas and second, a study of policing during the Covid-19 pandemic. The studies present policy-oriented insights into everyday working of the police in India. The idea, once again, is to improve the rule of law and justice delivery mechanism by making the police responsive to the needs of a resurgent, democratic India. It is brought to you by Common Cause and the Lokniti Programme of the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS) and is backed by our philanthropic partners, Tata Trusts and the Lal Family Foundation.

The SPIR studies were launched in 2018 as a part of the police reforms initiative of Common Cause, an organisation dedicated to democratic interventions for a better India. Established in 1980, Common Cause works for an India where every citizen is respected and fairly treated. We follow a rigorous, yet collaborative approach and focus on systemic changes. It is in this backdrop that SPIRs create a series of baseline studies to assist policymakers and political leaderships at the federal and state levels in identifying the need-gaps and improving capacities, sensitivities, efficiency and accountability of the police forces.

The present study was particularly challenging as the surveys were completed during what is described as the world's strictest lockdown in the aftermath of the Covid-19 pandemic. The lockdown also triggered a most unusual reverse migration from the big cities back to villages. Millions of migrant workers and their families trudged long distances, from a few hundred to a thousand plus kilometres, on foot, on bicycles, or on any conceivable means of transportation. All this posed unique challenges for policing, which we have tried to capture along with our original mandate of policing in conflict states of India.

On the face of it, the two parts appear disparate but both the ideas—of policing in conflict states and during the pandemic—are about policing under unusual and extraordinary circumstances. The first part of the SPIR 2020-21 is focused on districts and states affected by some form of conflict, extremism, or insurgency while the second part looks at the cops' preparedness against disasters in general and health emergencies in particular. Both the studies combine perceptions and performance about policing, in essence, a continuation of the SPIR 2018 and 2019. The earlier reports were focused on citizens' trust and satisfaction with the police and their adequacy, attitudes and working conditions. The present study also surveys both the police personnel and common citizens using separate teams and questionnaires in different geographies.

Our teams at Common Cause and Lokniti-CSDS have overcome countless challenges in one of the most difficult years in history. The biggest challenge for the surveyors of the twin studies at 45 districts in 19 states was to venture out at all during the pandemic and to hold one-on-one sessions with forbearance and commitment. The limits of our endurance, resources and abilities to take personal risks were truly stretched. But, in the end, it all worked out to the highest standards of rigour and academic integrity.

SPIR 2020-21 (Vol I) Why conflict areas?

The reason for bringing out a comprehensive report on the conflict areas was to explore how policing is carried out in disturbed areas and if there are any lessons in it for policymakers. It is well-known that everything about policing at these places—from jurisdictions to the line of command—is affected by the presence of the Army or the para-military forces under stringent legal provisions. It is equally true that the presence of armed underground outfits changes the nature of politics and society in conflict areas.

Extremism, insurgency and their variants, ranging from militancy to terrorism, exist in a complex web of violence and counter-violence. One form of violence is often justified by one set of actors and stakeholders as a necessity to counter another type of violence. The state agencies, security forces and even the media have to work under constant

pressure and polarisation of public opinion. Even the judiciary and other democratic institutions are often accused of acting in a partisan manner.

A conflict-affected society invariably finds utterly opposite ways of looking at the day-to-day events. It is common for civilians to be killed by the extremists or insurgents on the suspicion of being police informers while it is equally common for some to become victims of police repression as suspected extremists or their sympathisers. The official side often argues that those taking to the gun deserve no sympathy or fair trial. An equally compelling argument is that the custodians of law cannot be allowed to use unconstitutional methods, whatever be the compulsion.

The state agencies liken the situation in a conflict state to a 'war,' which provides an indirect justification for the use of exceptional methods or legislations. The shadow of violence is present everywhere and a sense of lurking fear is palpable. This also leads to a crisis of credibility and trust on both sides which forms part of the enquiry in this study. We hope this will be significant for the policymakers to understand these challenges better not only for long-term conflict resolution but also for regaining citizens' confidence in the police forces. The real challenge in conflict states, therefore, is to maintain the safety and security of citizens without violating the norms of democracy.

As such, the police are the most visible face of the state, but in disturbed areas, they tend to become the *only* face of the state. It is an onerous task to uphold the rule of law while working under constant pressure in life-threatening locations. And yet, their actions define the state of democracy and the rule of law much more than any other branch of

States in which the survey was conducted

Jammu & Kashmir*

Bihar

Assam

Nagaland

Manipur

Tripura

Jharkhand

Chhattisgarh

Odisha

Telangana

Andhra Pradesh

*The survey could not be completed in J&K

the government. Democracy and development also thrive in an environment of peace, harmony and security. How a society lives up to democratic principles depends on how it tackles demands of security, justice and human development.

The citizens' trust in their government is also built on the accountability of institutions and authorities. And that is why we need a fine balance between effective and accountable police, more so in disturbed areas where statutes provide for the speedy trial of certain offences giving more powers to law enforcing agencies. The state-specific disturbed areas Acts also curtail the citizens' rights and liberties under certain circumstances. The police, for that reason alone, have to be more responsible and mindful of their constitutional obligations while following orders.

The scope of the study

The present study also looks at how conflict situations affect normal crime, its investigation and resolution. It unravels the attitudes of police personnel, their working conditions, training and preparedness as also their relationships with various stakeholders of the conflict. Woven around the constitutional principles, the main themes concern crime and safety; perceptions about militancy and armed groups; the impact of conflict on the day to day functioning of the police; issues of vulnerable communities; and the norms of human rights etc.

The first part of the study covers 27 districts in 11 states and Union Territories. The face-to-face surveys include both the police personnel and the civilians in the four North-eastern states, and large parts of central India affected by left-wing extremism. (A list of districts surveyed has been given in Appendix 1) The districts have been selected from amongst the list of disturbed areas provided by the Ministry of Home Affairs and where incidents of violence have been reported consistently in the presence of the Army or the paramilitary forces. The report also analyses official data released by government agencies.

The surveys could not be completed in selected districts (except Udhampur in the Jammu region) of the erstwhile state of Jammu and Kashmir, now a Union Territory, because of frequent violence and curfews. Our state coordinators waited for several months in the hope of getting the conducive time and opportunity for face-to-face interviews. We were told that a sensitive study on the functioning of the police will be too risky for the surveyors to handle. An attempt was made to conduct the survey online but the idea had to be shelved due to the non-availability of 4G or consistent broadband networks. We were also mindful of the fact that an online survey may exclude the poor

and the vulnerable. The findings of a truncated survey conducted in the Udhampur district have been analysed separately in Annexure 2 given at the end.

The task was by no means easy in most other districts surveyed in this report because of the precarious law and order in the conflict regions. An important aspect of the study is to take into account the external and internal security of the country. The government collects its own data in these regions but the common citizens' perspective is often missing in such efforts. The survey data compiled here fills that gap but we also try to make sense of the official data in order to draw the larger picture.

The study design through chapters

The first chapter, Conflict in Numbers, is an analysis of the official data on conflict states. It examines the existing quantitative literature on the subject and presents a bird's eye view of the official statistics collated by the National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB). The official numbers relate to policing in areas experiencing left-wing violence or the regions going through insurgency-related violence. The official numbers also provide a reference point for the survey-based data in the rest of the study with the exception of the Kashmir valley.

The study takes the conflict into account while examining the contours of policing in the area. The premise of the analysis is that policing is enmeshed with, and influenced by, violence caused by the conflict. The attempt here is not to theorise the conflict or to present its geopolitical history for which separate studies would be required. We are also conscious of the fact that the official data about conflict tends to be full of omissions, particularly about instances of human rights violations. Hence the analysis here is not about the conflict per se but it is about policing as seen and experienced by the two key stakeholders—the common people and the police personnel. The empirical data in the chapter tries to get a snapshot of crimes and violence in the selected districts to measure them against the state and national averages.

The Second Chapter, on the attitude of the police and the common people towards the conflict, examines their perceptions about the violent groups and the state's response to them. As such, the opinions tend to be polarised in the conflict regions in the presence of special laws and central forces. However, it is counter-intuitive to find the opinions of the police and people converge on the cause taken up by the conflict groups or the means adopted by them. The chapter also examines the citizens' levels of trust in the parties of the conflict and brings out the range of opinions on the problems of the regions and how to deal with them.

On the adequacy of the police and security forces, their training, resources, equipment, and the legal cover available to them, the Third Chapter examines their overall preparedness in the conflict regions. It also looks at the perceptions of the common people about the above-mentioned challenges. One such difficulty, in the eyes of the police personnel, is the pressure they have to face from the media, activists and the general public regarding the legality of their activities. The survey questions cover the citizens' view of the corruption in the police and their levels of efficiency, and if there is a connection between the two.

Chapter Four, the Relationship between the People and the Police in Conflict Regions, is on the interactions between the two under the shadow of the gun. Incidents of violence, such as bloody encounters or crossfires, make the relationship between the police and people inherently tense. The chapter examines people-police confrontations around public protests and civilian demonstrations. It looks at the perceptions around fairness and discrimination by the police and the sense of fear and lack of trust among the civilians about things like surveillance and excessive use of force.

People in conflict regions have different opinions about and experiences of dealing with different law enforcement agencies deployed there. Chapter Five, Perceptions about the Police vis a vis Paramilitary Forces or the Army, brings these out through a survey of both the common people and police personnel. In areas affected by left wing extremism, the local police are believed to be better equipped to deal with situations owing to their better understanding of the culture, terrain and local languages. In light of this, the survey tries to capture the perceptions of the local people and police personnel, levels of their trust in one another and differential treatment given by the government to different agencies. The next chapter (Chapter 6), Posting to a Conflict Region: Opinions of Police and Common People, captures the risks (both physical and mental), anxieties, and special needs of the personnel deployed in these regions, by their own assessment.

The last two chapters, Chapter 7 and 8, are devoted to perhaps the most important aspects of policing in conflict regions: professionalism and accountability. These sections try to understand the perceptions of the people and the police regarding the conflict, their experiences with the stakeholders and the best way to resolve or control the conflict. Both the common people and the police personnel have been candid in their opinions about the overall conflict, the status of crime, corruption and human rights in the region, and their reasons and solutions. It brings to light the fact that the issues of efficiency, accountability and op-erational independence go hand in hand. The concluding chapter recapitulates an analysis of the findings of the SPIR 2020-21 (Vol. I).

Police reforms: A continuous process

At Common Cause we believe that the idea of police reforms should not be treated as a one-time event. It should be a systemic and steady process built into methods of governance. The personnel must be trained and sensitised consistently and their capacities must be built to suit the needs of a diverse, multi-ethnic and multi-cultural society like India. Citizens, institutions and civil society need to be vigilant at a time when the misuse of the police is growing incrementally to stifle dissent and freedom of expression. We need to study attitudes and measure changes to be able to determine the direction in which the country and society are headed. For instance, society needs serious introspection if common people applaud extrajudicial killings by the police. The SPIR series of studies are a step in that direction.

During and after the Covid-19 pandemic, the police in India have been a topic of debates and discussions. At many places they have gone out of the way to help citizens but, at the same time, police atrocities have increased throughout the country. They have used illegal arrests, torture and discrimination in the name of maintaining law and order amid a health emergency. One way of looking at this is to acknowledge that most police personnel have not been sensitised or given special training to deal with any kind of disasters, leave alone a public health-related disaster. No wonder, they ended up doing what the system prepares them to do. We are back to the issues like lack of training, sensitisation and building of systems, oversights and capacities.

Special care has been taken in the studies to collect responses from all rungs of police personnel and all sections of people. The SPIR surveys are aimed at creating verifiable baseline literature on policing in India to highlight the need gaps for policymakers and stakeholders. The data highlights state-wise comparisons in order to encourage healthy competition between states and their leaderships. We sincerely hope that the data presented in these reports will have a long shelf-life as a tool of advocacy and decisive policy change.

Vipul Mudgal
Director, Common Cause

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India's Conflict in Numbers: An Analysis of Official Data on Conflict States

An underground Naxalite leader, Boyda Pahan, so-called Sub-Zonal Commander of the CPI (Maoist), surrendered along with his three associates with their weapons before the Jharkhand Police at the Police Line in Ranchi, October 12, 2020. ©PTI

Key Takeaways

- The rates of cognisable crimes in the conflict-affected districts and states surveyed are lower than the national average, when seen as an average of five years. While the average rate of IPC crimes in the selected districts is 178 crimes per lakh of population, the corresponding all-India figure is 237 crimes per lakh.

- The conflict-affected districts have an over four times lower rate of 33 SLL crimes per lakh of population against the all-India average of 146 SLL (Special and Local Laws) per lakh.

- The rates of violent crimes (murder, grievous hurt, kidnapping and abduction) are much higher in the conflict-affected districts compared to the national average. While the national rate of kidnapping and abduction is 7 per lakh population, the corresponding rate for the selected districts is 10 per lakh. In the insurgency- affected states, the rate is thrice the national average, at 21 incidents of kidnapping and abduction per lakh population.

- Attempt to murder and murder are the most frequent crimes attributed to Naxalites in the LWE-affected areas (33% and 13% respectively), followed by crimes committed under UAPA, at 19 percent. Three out of four crimes attributed to the NE insurgents fall under the UAPA Act.

- The level of violence and tension in J&K region has significantly come down as compared to 1990s and early 2000s. There was a perceptible decline in the number of incidents and also in the number of civilians, security forces personnel and terrorists killed.

- Post 2012, insurgency in the NE states has declined rapidly and the violent incidents have dropped from 1025 to 223 in 2019. In 2019, as many as 21 civilians and four security personnel lost lives in the Northeast region.

- Among all extremist/insurgency-affected areas, the number of incidents of violence has been the highest in the LWE-affected regions.

India's Conflict in Numbers: An Analysis of Official Data on Conflict States

Crime, law and order, conflict—three terms that are clearly separate from each other and yet intersect significantly. It is in this realm of the intersection of the three on which we base our study and attempt to present a picture of the nature and practice of policing in areas that are embroiled in conflicts of different natures, be it extremism, insurgency or militancy.

Independent India's history of domestic conflict dates back right to its infancy, with many internal disturbances and tensions that surfaced soon after 1947. Every conflict, every issue and every region, have their unique geopolitical history and experience. However, the lived impact of sustained violence and conflict on the common people often brings out unfortunate similarities.

Before beginning a discussion such as this, it becomes pertinent to define certain categories and terminologies. While the exact contours of what defines a "conflict-affected area" or "armed conflict" are issues that continue to be debated globally to date, some commonalities within the many definitions are that a conflict area is one which seen a sustained history of armed violence, political and social insecurity or repression and institutional weakness. The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) defines an armed conflict as a 'contested incompatibility which concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in one calendar year'. However, for the purpose of this study, we use a much simpler indicator: the continued presence of either the Army and/or paramilitary forces in certain regions and states because of armed violence against the state.

In order to define the scope of a study, often it is more effective to demarcate what it is not. The present study is not an exploration of either the concept of 'conflict' or the impact that it has directly on the people or the state. Rather, this study focuses on the perceptions, experiences and opinions of two key stakeholders—the common people and the police personnel—on how policing, crime investigation and law and order situation are impacted by the crisis prevalent in the form of conflict in that region. Since law and order tend to be intertwined with the conflict, it becomes relevant to also address the perceptions and opinions about the conflict itself vis-à-vis policing in the region.

Police as an institution has been an inherent part of democratic systems across the globe, regardless of the political realities of the region. Yet, in conflict-affected areas, it functions in almost a paradox. On the one hand, it acts as a security force of the state in the face of the conflict, aside from assuming the more general roles of policing, thus amplifying both its responsibility as well as power. On the other hand, however, its traditional role is also curtailed in the presence of other, stronger agencies and parties, be it the Army or the paramilitary forces or other entities that assume power and control over a region. Within this contradiction, this study maps the layout, nature and forms of policing in extreme circumstances from the points of view of both the general public as well as the police personnel themselves.

While this study consciously abstains from theoretical or other discussions around the types of conflicts in different parts of the country, we have tried to address the unique nature of the conflicts studied to bring out the experiences and forms of policing there. Broadly, for the purpose of this study, three conflict-affected regions were identified: (a) areas that are prone to Naxalism/Maoism or what is officially often referred to as Left-Wing Extremism-related violence; (b) regions which are prone to insurgency or separatism-related violence and also fall under the ambit of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA), 1958; and (c) Jammu and Kashmir, a region which is not only under AFSPA and is prone to insurgency but is unique due to the presence of foreign-origin or foreign trained protagonists of violence.

However, due to the prevalent tensions and prohibitions in the Union Territories of Jammu and Kashmir, the surveys could not be completed in that region (aside from Udhampur). Attempts were made to conduct face-to-face interviews with the common people and police personnel from Kashmir but upon contacting several agencies and field experts in the area, we were informed that the environment was not conducive for conducting a survey on such a sensitive issue, particularly because of the recent changes in the statehood of the region and the restrictions that were put in place as a consequence. Further, online surveys were also not an option because of both the restrictions on internet usage in the regions that were in place until February 2021 as well as because online surveys would not be representative of groups such as women, poor sections of the society, etc. Thus, while in this chapter, official data for this region has been analysed, the following chapters which present the survey findings do not cover this region. The survey data from Udhampur (Jammu) has been analysed separately and annexed under Appendix 2 of the report.

In this chapter, we first look at some of the findings from empirical, quantitative studies on policing and criminality that have been conducted by various academics in the country. It is not meant to be a review of the literature around the theory and practice of policing, rule of law and the access to justice in conflict-affected regions. Our focus is only on quantitative studies around these themes. This chapter then goes on to present a picture of the crime situation in the selected districts using official data from the National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB), comparing the districts data to the state averages and the national average. The final section of this chapter presents a time-series analysis of the official statistics on conflict-related violence—the number of incidents as well as civilians, insurgents and security personnel killed.

Before we dive into these numbers, it is important to keep in mind the acute limitations of official data, particularly in the context of conflicts. In such contexts specifically, official data is better known for what it hides rather than what it reveals. Conflict regions are ridden with instances of severe human rights violations and often, under the pretext of the conflict, the state assumes extraordinary powers which bypass the need for normal adherence to the rule of law. In many instances, prevalent laws in the regions such as AFSPA or the Public Safety Act, etc. themselves have provisions for wide-ranging powers to security personnel, thus reducing the scope of citizens' rights. At the same time, the impact of conflict on civilians is not only in the form of actual violence, but can have many shades, which affect the political, economic, social and cultural lives of the people of the region. All these realities cannot be captured in numbers. Therefore, official data will only go so far as to provide a glimpse into the reported number of incidents of violence but cannot in any way be taken to capture the ground realities.

Review of quantitative studies on policing in conflict areas

Academic literature of and around policing in the country is limited and fairly recent. While much has been said about the need for re-structuring and reforms in the criminal justice system and the police as an institution, empirical studies on the issue, particularly at the national level, are scarce. Similarly, although theoretical and academic literature on the then socio-political history of conflicts and their impact on the people are rich, not much is available on the intersection of conflict and the criminal justice system in the way of empirical, quantitative data.

This section of the chapter looks at some quantitative studies around these concepts, which form an important base to develop a context for the present report.

Perception-based surveys on conflict

Empirical studies on the issue of conflict and the working of the police and criminal justice system in India fall broadly within three categories: (a) those which look at the impact of the conflict situation on the lives of the common people; (b) those which study the functioning, experiences and working conditions of the security forces in these areas; and (c) those which study larger trends of crime and conflict in these areas. Presumably owing to constraints such as permissions, etc. in sensitive areas, survey-based researches of the police personnel or security forces in conflict areas is mostly limited to those conducted or sponsored by the Ministry of Home Affair's (MHA) wing of research and training, the Bureau of Police Research and Development (BPRD).

A 2012 BPRD study titled **'Police Performance Indices in Extremist and Non-Extremist Affected Areas of India: An Introspection'** includes state reports from Assam, West Bengal, Maharashtra, Chhattisgarh, Uttar Pradesh, Tripura, Jammu and Kashmir, Odisha, Nagaland, Meghalaya and Manipur. All the state reports separately include survey data from the police personnel, both at the constabulary as well as officers' levels, posted in these regions on issues such as working conditions, effect of conflict, political pressures, infrastructural facilities and areas of improvement. The reports also include socio-economic as well as personal profiles of the police personnel and questions such as their reasons for joining the police force, etc. While each state report is separate, here we have combined some of the findings from all the state reports as follows:

- An interesting finding is that while in some extremist areas, one of the biggest reasons given by officers for joining the service was financial problem, few officers from the non-extremist regions stated this as a reason. This trend is apparent in states such as West Bengal, Chhattisgarh, and Assam.
- In many states studied in the 2012 BPRD report, personnel from extremist areas are more dissatisfied with their duty hours than those from non- extremist regions, particularly in states affected by LWE-related conflict
- There is a high level of agreement in personnel across extremist areas on the need for an update on use of new arms or combat methods. In West Bengal and Nagaland, for instance, 100 percent of the personnel believe there's a need for an update in the use of new arms.
- While different kinds of problems were highlighted by respondents from different states, the resounding response from all states was that of a lack of proper infrastructure and systemic incapacity. For instance, a significant proportion of personnel from West Bengal believe that there is lack of manpower and poor communication system in extremist areas. In Chhattisgarh and the extremist region of Odisha, personnel are overwhelmingly of the opinion that there is a wide gap between police and public. Personnel from extremist regions of Tripura are more likely to believe that there is a poor communication system in these regions, compared to those from non-extremist regions. While in J&K, personnel from Srinagar (extremist region) are more likely to state the need for rigorous training than those from Jammu (non-extremist region). In Manipur, three out of four officers from extremist-affected areas believe that defective recruitment policy is the reason for not controlling the extremist problem well. A large majority of personnel from extremist areas of West Bengal, Odisha and Nagaland feel that they are not equipped to counter insurgents.
- Officers from extremist areas are overwhelmingly of the opinion that crime rate increases due to insurgency, compared to those from non-extremist areas.
- Personnel, particularly officers, from all extremist areas (except in Tripura) are less likely to believe that there is a cordial relationship between the police and the public, compared to those from non-extremist regions.
- Compared to those from non-extremist regions, personnel from extremist areas of West Bengal, Jammu and Kashmir, Manipur and Odisha are more likely to believe that there is political pressure on the police.

While these findings are certainly relevant, the study suffers from some methodological limitations which make it difficult to extrapolate the findings to a larger level. One such limitation is that in the reports, only one extremist and one non-extremist area is selected for comparison, which cannot be said to be representative even at the state level. In some reports, the comparisons are made between extremist locations of one state with non-extremist location of another, such as the comparison between Dantewada, Chhattisgarh and Thane, Maharashtra. The different contexts of both the locations can skew the results significantly. Further, the report from Uttar Pradesh only studies the location of Lucknow, thus making any kind of comparison impossible.

Another study commissioned by BPRD in 2011, titled, 'Social, Economic and Political Dynamics in Extremist-Affected Areas' attempted to identify the socio-economic factors and their dynamics in the extremist-affected areas. The study included surveys with common people and field professionals such as academicians, former militants, police officers, media personnel, NGO activists and retired and serving government officials and covered districts from five Northeast states and three Left Wing Extremism (LWE)-affected states.

The study found that in the Northeast, both common people (89.4%) as well as professionals (88.4%) overwhelmingly believe that unemployment and prevailing insecurity in the region lead to the growth of extremism in the region. However, state-specific dynamics also emerged, such as in Assam, three out of four common people and professionals cited illegal migration as an additional crucial factor contributing to extremism. Further, the study pointed towards dissatisfaction with the central and state government in controlling extremism in the Northeast. Three out of five respondents blamed the central government for 'neglecting' the issue, while nearly 70 percent security officials and professionals believe that leakage of developmental funds and extortion are the major funding sources for extremist in the region. They further believe that extremists receive political patronage. According to this survey, nearly four out of five common people and professionals from the NE believe that extremists do not represent the interests and aspirations of the people. Further, the study claims that just about 8.6 percent respondents claim to have faced misbehaviour by security force personnel in the Northeast. However, a majority of respondents from this region believe that special security legislations have encouraged the growth of extremism.

In the LWE-affected areas, similar to the NE, unemployment and social insecurity were cited as major contributors to the growth of extremism, along with other factors such as failure to bring about land reforms and economic backwardness of the state. Here, again, nearly more than

84 percent respondents believe that Naxalites do not represent the interests or aspirations of the civilians. However, in the LWE-affected areas, a more sympathetic attitude towards the Naxalites was displayed by the people. One out of two respondents opined that Naxalites cannot be construed as terrorists. Further, three out of four common people believe that Naxalites resort to violence because of the ineffectiveness of peaceful methods of protest. The survey further found that majority of the respondents from Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand wanted the presence of all three—Army, police and the paramilitary forces. In the LWE-affected states as well, dissatisfaction with government's efforts to control extremism was echoed loudly by the people. In Jharkhand, more than 80 percent common people were completely dissatisfied, in Andhra Pradesh only 35 percent people were marginally satisfied, while in Chhattisgarh, one out of two people were dissatisfied.

Some limitations of this study are the small sample size of respondents and the poor sampling frame, wherein respondents were selected at random. Thus, while the study brings out some interesting findings, these cannot be understood to be representative.

Another survey of common people in Naxalite areas was conducted by the Centre for Study of Developing Societies in 2010. The **'State of the Nation Survey'** conducted in 32 Naxalite-affected districts found that amongst the local population, the awareness about Naxalism is high. Contrary to popular opinions, people from those areas do not feel very unsafe due to the conflict and the threat perception due to Naxalism is low, with only 10 percent of the respondents reporting feeling unsafe. While only 10 percent respondents sympathised with Naxalites, the respondents largely identified the Naxalites not as bad or anti-social elements, but as poor and deprived. People majorly identified reasons such developmental deficits, social inequality and a sense of helplessness contributing to the growth of conflict in the region. Notably, the respondents were 10 times more likely to choose the government over Naxalites.

On the other hand, people from Jammu and Kashmir hold a negative opinion of the special security laws and the abuse of power by the police. The Observer Research Foundation, in a 2018 study, titled **'The Road to Peace in Kashmir: Public Perception of the Contentious AFSPA and PSA'** on public perceptions of the Armed Forces (Jammu and Kashmir) Special Powers Act (AFSPA), 1990 and the Public Safety Act, 1978 conducted a survey of 2300 respondents from Kashmir using snowballing sampling method. According to this study, people felt that there was a wide-spread use of extra-judicial powers by the police. They were further of the opinion that the police use arrests

as a tool for extortion and that unrestrained behaviour by security forces leads to a rise in militancy in the region.

Thus, the above studies show that the shades of conflict, policing and perceptions vary greatly not only between different stakeholders, but also based on the nature of conflict and the region. However, an important aspect that is missing in most of these studies is that of the gender-based impact of conflict and policing in these regions.

Human Development Society, in a report titled **'Role of Women in Conflict Management: A Study of Insurgency in Valley Areas of Manipur'** surveys female civilians from Manipur on the issues relating to the conflict and its resolution. They find that 91 percent of the women are aware of the conflict and one out of two believe that underdevelopment, unemployment and economic disparities are the main reasons behind the conflict in the area. Only 17 percent women believe that the steps taken by the government are adequate to address the issue, while 57 percent believe that steps taken by NGOs, women's organisations and individuals are adequate to resolve the issue. However, the survey fails to delve into questions specifically related to the gender-based impact of the conflict.

Statistical analysis of factors contributing to the conflict

Both of the above studies cite unemployment, social and financial insecurities as major contributors to the extremist violence prevalent in these regions. In fact, in the 2012 study, a significant proportion of police officers of all ranks from extremism-affected states mentioned financial problem as the primary reason for them joining the police force. Here, thus, it is noteworthy to discuss a study conducted by Oliver Vanden Eynde (2018) on the **'Targets of Violence: Evidence from India's Naxalite Conflict'**, which attempts to empirically understand the relationship between local agricultural shocks and Maoist attacks using district-year panel of fatal Maoist incidents in India between 2005 and 2011. Based on the academic debate linking income shocks in underdeveloped areas to violent conflicts, his hypothesis is that because the rebels are financially dependent on 'taxation' of the local people's mainly agricultural income, the rebels' income also falls if the local income falls. He further made a distinction between localities where mining also becomes a source of income for the rebels and in these localities agricultural shock due to rainfalls would not affect Maoist activities to a great extent.

Eynde finds in his study that lower rainfall reduces violence against government's security forces, in the absence of mining activities. However, in areas where mining activity is a source of income for the rebels, this relationship

reverses: lower rainfall increases chances of conflict against security personnel. This could presumably be a result of higher recruitments by the rebels from the local population in the face of income shocks in the region because of lower rainfall. The study further found that the trend is different with respect to violence against civilians. Violence against civilians increases in response to poor rainfall in both mining as well as non-mining districts. This supports the presumption that increased violence during periods of agricultural shock are a mode of influencing the locals by the rebels.

However, his analysis does not show a strong statistical relationship between security forces' attacks on Maoists and poor rainfall. While there is a violence against Maoists during periods of low rainfall, presumably because of better opportunity of the government to get local informants, this relationship is statistically weak. For the larger part, security forces are less dependent on the local economy for their fighting capacity against the Maoists.

Further linking the relationship between local income and violence, Dasgupta, Gawande and Kapur (2017), investigate the conditions under which anti-poverty programmes reduce conflict in a study titled **'Do Antipoverty Programs Reduce Violence? India's Rural Employment Guarantee and Maoist Conflict'**. They assemble a district-level panel data set on Maoist conflict violence from various local-language press sources for 144 districts and compare it against the rolling out of the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS). The third factor analysed by them is the local state's capacity to effectively implement NREGS, based on administrative data and a pre-existing measurement on access to basic services. Their results show that the capacities of the states shapes the effect of anti-poverty programmes on violence to a great extent. In weak state-capacity settings, the benefits do not pass through efficiently and thus fail to act as an incentive against participation in rebellion. In high-state capacity settings, however, anti-poverty programmes help to improve livelihoods and thereby act as a promising tool to combat insurgency.

Impact of conflict on security forces
While most empirical studies on conflict in India focus either on the perceptions of key stakeholders or the factors contributing to the conflict, in an attempt to find practicable solutions to these long-standing problems. However, a study by Staniland and Stommes (2019), titled **'New data on India Security Force Fatalities and Demographics'**, looks at another important aspect of the issue—fatalities amongst security forces owing to the conflict. They bring out new data, based on both government as well as semi-government sources to understand the broad patterns of security forces' fatalities across space and time.

The authors find consistent regional imbalances in the composition of the Army and paramilitary forces. For the police force, in particular (which, according to the authors, was the least comprehensive and lowest quality data), they found that Jammu and Kashmir Police stand out as having been intensely involved in counter-insurgency operations compared to other state forces. When we look at the annual fatality rates when adjusted against the state's population, after J&K, other states that stand out are Chhattisgarh, Manipur and Assam.

In 2006, the *Indian Journal of Psychiatry* published a survey on the stress level and burnout amongst personnel from the security forces posted in low-intensity conflict operations. Titled **'Psychological Effects of Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) Operations'**, the study finds direct correlations between the psychological status of the personnel with both the duration of posting in conflict areas and the intensity of the conflict. It was found that the personnel were more stressed, fatigued and ambiguous about their aim. It also noted that nearly four out of five respondents felt that the posting in low-intensity conflict areas should be of two years only. The study also pointed towards significantly higher depression, alcohol abuse and psychiatric distress compared to personnel from other locations.

Crime and criminality in conflict areas
Another useful tool for understanding how policing functions in a conflict region is the analysis of crime data of the region. Amaral *et al.* (2014) do just that, by analysing district-level panel data from 1990-2007 to identify key determinants of violent crimes, non-violent crimes and crime against women in India. One aspect of their analysis looks at the differences in crime data between districts affected by Maoist violence and those that remain relatively unaffected by it. In their study, **'Crime and Social Conflict in India'**, they find that in districts affected by Maoist-insurgency, all types of crimes are lesser than non-affected districts. They further find that arrest rates are higher in conflict states, while police force per capita is lower, the latter presumably because they are also supplemented by the paramilitary forces and the Army. An interesting, though unexpected, finding is that higher arrest rates in conflict states are statistically associated with increased violence against women. In other words, in Maoist-affected districts, an increase in the rate of arrests would likely also cause an increase in the rate of crime against women. This finding brings into focus the particularly vulnerable position of women in conflict states, which requires an in-depth exploration and analysis. While some attempts have been made, such as in the study by Human Development Society mentioned above, not much in the way of statistical analysis is found in the Indian scenario.

Another such analysis of crime data using econometrics has been done by Vani Borooah in a 2008 study titled **'Deprivation, Violence and Conflict: An Analysis of Naxalite Activity in the Districts of India'**. Borooah's analysis confirms the findings of Amaral *et al.* His findings show that a simple raw data analysis depicts higher rates of violent crimes, crimes against women and public order in Naxalite-affected districts. However, when other variables are controlled for, such as the poverty rates, literacy rates, rurality, economic condition of the state, female work participation, etc., then he finds that Naxalite activity had a dampening effect on the rate of violent crime and crimes against women. In other words, if all other variables such as the level of poverty, literacy, rurality, etc. are constant, then a Naxalite district is likely to have a lower level of violent crime and crime against women than a non-Naxalite district. He further found that even after controlling for other variables, the probability of a district being Naxalite-affected rose with an increase in its poverty rate and fell with a rise in its literacy rate.

These are just some of the many studies on conflict and policing in India that help us set a context for the present report and understand the complexities and nuances of policing in conflict-affected regions.

Analysis of crime data

Opinion is divided on the frequency or rate of crime and criminality in a conflict region. On the one hand, field practitioners such as security personnel, seem to believe that crime increases in a region because of the presence of conflict, as also seen in the survey findings of the 2012 BPRD study reviewed above. On the other hand, statistical data suggests that crime rates in insurgency and conflict-affected regions is in fact lower than in non-conflict regions, as is found by Amaral *et al* (2014). However, the reality is often more nuanced than a simple understanding of whether the crime rates are higher or lower in the conflict states. A more qualitative as well as theoretical study would be able to answer the 'why' components of this question, i.e., whether a lower crime rate could be attributed to lower reporting of crimes because of increased fear of the security forces, or whether an alternate law and order situation exists in such regions which cannot be accounted for in the official statistics, etc. Further, the understanding of 'crime' also needs to be broken down to analyse whether overall the crime rates are lower, or are they lower also for vulnerable sections of the society, particularly those who are often at the forefront of any conflict—scheduled tribes and scheduled castes. There is also need to investigate not just the overall crime rates, but specific crime rates such as violent crimes, crimes against women, offences against the state, etc.

In this section of the chapter, we analyse the crime rates of the districts and states selected for the survey and compare them against the national averages. Data from the National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB) and the Census of India 2011 has been used to calculate and compile the rates of crimes at the district-level for the 27 districts selected for survey in this report. The data has been taken for a period of five years (wherever available)— 2015 to 2019—and has further been averaged in order to adjust for peaks and troughs in specific years due to external factors or extraordinary circumstances.

Data on various categories of crimes has been analysed, such as the total cognisable IPC (Indian Penal Code) crime rates, along with specific IPC crimes such as murder, kidnapping, grievous hurt, offences against state, etc.; total SLL (Special and Local Laws) crime rates along with specific SLL crimes such as offences against state and arms/explosives related crimes, etc.; crimes against women; crimes against Scheduled Castes (SCs); and crimes against Scheduled Tribes (STs).

This analysis needs to be read with two caveats. First, because of the inherent limitation of official data, the crime rates may not be entirely representative of the reality of a location and the non-reporting of crimes could skew the analysis to a certain extent. Secondly, this is a raw analysis of crime rates and does not take into account any demographic or other factors in the districts, other than the fact that they are conflict-affected. Thus, there could be several other reasons behind the trends that emerge which would necessitate further research around this data, which is beyond the scope of the current report. Despite these caveats, this analysis is important for setting the context of the report in that it provides a glimpse into the law-and-order situation of the districts that have been surveyed and compares it against the state and national average.

Overall crime rates under IPC and SLL

Before we begin the discussion around the crime data, it is important to understand the terminology. The term 'crime rate' refers to the number of crimes per lakh of population. Thus, while general crimes such as murder, etc, are rates per lakh of the general population, specific crimes, such as crimes against women imply the number of crimes per lakh of *female* population in that district/state[1].

The rate of total IPC offences, predictably, is lower amongst most of the selected districts and states, when compared to

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1 For the calculation of crime rates, the population (overall, women's, SC's and ST's) at the state and national levels has been taken from the NCRB report, 'Crime in India'. However, at the district-level, the calculation has been made using population data from Census 2011 because of the unavailability of this data in the NCRB reports.

Table 1.1 | District-wise rates of IPC and SLL crimes (2015-2019 average)

	States	Districts	Rate of total IPC cognisable offences	Rate of total SLL cognisable offences
LWE-affected states	**Andhra Pradesh**	Visakhapatnam	240.3	61.7
		Guntur	287.9	10.0
		AP total	229.4	38.0
	Bihar	Aurangabad	119.2	43.0
		Munger	182.1	51.3
		Jamui	141.7	29.7
		Bihar total	164.8	41.7
	Chhattisgarh	Sukma	111.7	24.4
		Rajnandgaon	219.1	133.4
		Narayanpur	165.2	141.3
		Chhattisgarh total	215.8	289.2
	Jharkhand	Giridih	128.9	24.2
		Simdega	76.5	17.8
		Latehar	103.9	34.0
		Jharkhand Total	128.3	25.7
	Odisha	Malkangiri	118.6	47.9
		Sundargarh	85.3	20.0
		Odisha total	199.1	51.8
	Telangana	Khammam	242.2	15.3
		Adilabad	144.9	26.9
		Telangana total	306.9	36.2
	J&K[1]	Udhampur	216.3	24.2
		J&K total	182.7	19.9
Insurgency-affected Northeast states	**Assam**	Kokrajhar	171.6	16.1
		Karbi Anglong	113.2	8.4
		Goalpara	284.4	9.6
		Assam total	328.2	19.0
	Manipur	Imphal east	147.3	47.4
		Chandel	38.7	30.2
		Churachandpur	40.1	10.1
		Jiribam	91.2	47.9
		Manipur total	117.1	32.2
	Tripura	West Tripura	83.0	5.4
		Dhalai	91.6	10.8
		Tripura total	118.9	10.4
	Nagaland	Dimapur	187.4	66.7
		Peren	32.1	16.4
		Nagaland total	53.2	24.0
All India			**236.7**	**145.5**
All selected districts			178.0	32.9
All selected states			206.9	55.4
Naxalite states			198.2	61.9
Insurgency-affected NE states			277.4	19.3
Jammu and Kashmir			182.7	19.9

Note: 1. The crime rates have been derived using the data on actual incidence of crime from NCRB and adjusting it per lakh of population. Thus, the crime rate depicts the total number of IPC cognisable crimes per lakh of population. 2. Vishakhapatnam district includes Vishakha Rural and Vishakhapatnam 3. Guntur district includes Guntur and Guntur Urban. 4. Data for Jiribam district available only for the year 2019. Therefore, only the current data has been used for this district.

1 Note: Data for Jammu and Kashmir has only been analysed using official data; the survey findings in the later chapters do not cover this region.

the national average. While nationally there are nearly 237 IPC crimes committed per lakh of population, amongst the selected districts, only 178 IPC crimes are registered per lakh of population, while the selected states have a rate of 207. However, we notice that this trend is not true across all the districts and there are certain exceptions, such as Vishakhapatnam and Guntur (Andhra Pradesh), Khammam (Telangana) and Goalpara (Assam), which have higher IPC crime rates than the national average, although the difference is not striking. The state of Assam, however, has a significantly higher crime rate than any other selected state or the national average, with 328 IPC crimes per lakh of population.

Further, there is a clear difference between the Naxalite states and the insurgency-affected Northeast states in their rates of crimes. However, seeing the pattern across the states, it is evident that Assam alone is pulling up the rate of crime amongst the Northeastern states and is therefore an outlier.

Similarly, in the case of SLL crimes, the rates are lower in all the selected districts than the national average (32.9 and 145.5 respectively). While IPC contributes to a majority of the registered crimes across the country, and thus has a higher rate as well in comparison to SLL, the latter includes certain special laws and provisions such as laws protecting women, children, SCs, STs, etc., and is thus important for the analysis. In the selected states, however, the SLL crime rates are much lower than the national average, particularly in the insurgency-affected Northeastern states. The only state which has a higher than national average SLL crime rate is Chhattisgarh and even here, the selected districts' rate is not higher than the national average, although it is significantly higher than other selected districts.

Violent crimes under IPC

We will now analyse the rates of some of the violent crimes which fall under the IPC. It is to be noted here that the term 'violent crimes' here does not denote the official definition of violent crimes as provided in the report 'Crime in India' by NCRB. While the official definition includes several other crimes such as rape, dowry death, arson, etc., here we restrict it to a select number of crimes—murder, grievous hurt and kidnapping and abduction.

Compared to the previous section on the total IPC and SLL crimes, when we look at the rate of violent crimes such as murder, grievous hurt and kidnapping and abduction, the trend reverses. Here, the rates in the selected districts and states are higher than the national average in most cases.

Murder particularly is considered a good indicator of crime in a region, since the chances of under-reporting

of this crime are significantly lower than any other crime. While the national rate of murder is 2.3, (i.e., 2.3 murders per lakh of population), in the selected districts, the rate increases to 3.3. Some districts particularly stand out with high rates of murder, such as Sukma (13.1) and Narayanpur (11.2), both in Chhattisgarh. The rates of murder in these two districts are significantly higher than the national rate (2.3) and the rate of murder in Chhattisgarh (3.4). Similarly, Simdega in Jharkhand, with a murder rate of 10.2 is far higher than both the state as well as national average.

In terms of the conflict-affected states that have been studied here, both the LWE-affected states, with a rate of 2.9 and the insurgency-affected states of Northeast, with a rate of 3.4, have murder rates higher than the national average. However, the erstwhile state of Jammu & Kashmir has a lower rate, at 1.1.

When it comes to grievous hurt, again some districts stand out. Against the national rate of 6.9, districts such as Goalpara (Assam), Imphal East (Manipur), West Tripura and Dhalai (Tripura) all have a rate above 10, significantly higher than the national rate. The rate of grievous hurt in Goalpara is particularly striking, at 42.1 when it comes to grievous hurt, a clear distinction is apparent between the Naxalite-affected states and the insurgency-affected states of Northeast, with the latter showing a much higher rate than the former. While in the insurgency-affected states the average is 26.6, in the LWE-affected states, at 6.4, it is actually even lower than the national average. Besides Nagaland, all three other selected states from the Northeast which are affected by insurgency have high rates of grievous hurt.

A very similar trend is seen also in the case of kidnapping and abduction. Again, the rate of kidnapping and abduction of both the selected states as well as the selected districts is higher than the all-India rate 7.4 incidents of kidnapping and abduction per lakh of population. However, here, the trend of a higher rate across nearly all the Northeastern states is not the case. Only the districts of Assam, Kokrajhar, Karbi Anglong and Goalpara, along with Dimapur district of Nagaland are pulling up the average of the selected districts.

Overall, when we look at the rates of violent crimes such as murder, grievous hurt and kidnapping and abduction, the level of crime in the conflict-affected region appears to increase, which is not apparent just from a reading of the overall IPC and SLL crime rates. This could be attributed to several factors, such as that the violent crimes by themselves could be a result of the conflict and therefore may not be representative of the general law-and-order situation of the region.

Table 1.2 | District-wise rates of violent crimes (2015-2019 average)

	States	Districts	Rate of murder	Rate of grievous hurt	Rate of kidnapping and abduction
LWE-affected states	**Andhra Pradesh**	Visakhapatnam	1.8	8.8	4.3
		Guntur	2.6	2.1	3.0
		AP total	2.0	2.4	1.7
	Bihar	Aurangabad	2.0	3.3	2.9
		Munger	3.2	1.3	7.0
		Jamui	3.3	3.6	5.1
		Bihar total	2.6	9.4	8.7
	Chhattisgarh	Sukma	13.1	0.7	2.9
		Rajnandgaon	2.4	1.5	7.1
		Narayanpur	11.2	2.3	5.6
		Chhattisgarh total	3.4	5.5	7.4
	Jharkhand	Giridih	3.1	6.5	3.8
		Simdega	10.2	0.3	1.5
		Latehar	5.8	4.6	3.0
		Jharkhand Total	4.5	5.2	4.5
	Odisha	Malkangiri	5.3	2.5	7.7
		Sundargarh	2.4	1.4	2.5
		Odisha Total	3.2	7.6	9.2
	Telangana	Khammam	1.5	2.3	3.3
		Adilabad	1.3	1.1	1.1
		Telangana total	2.5	3.4	4.2
	J&K[2]	Udhampur	1.4	1.4	5.5
		J&K total	1.1	2.3	6.9
Insurgency-affected Northeast states	**Assam**	Kokrajhar	3.8	8.8	12.3
		Karbi Anglong	2.7	8.6	14.2
		Goalpara	3.8	42.1	24.7
		Assam total	3.7	30.3	25.2
	Manipur	Imphal east	2.1	10.5	6.7
		Chandel	4.3	2.4	2.1
		Churachandpur	2.1	2.1	2.2
		Jiribam	4.6	6.8	2.3
		Manipur total	2.4	7.1	5.9
	Tripura	West Tripura	1.9	14.7	4.3
		Dhalai	3.4	19.3	6.3
		Tripura total	3.6	24.7	7.9
	Nagaland	Dimapur	4.2	5.8	13.0
		Peren	2.3	1.1	1.3
		Nagaland total	1.6	1.5	3.0
	All India		**2.3**	**6.9**	**7.4**
	All selected districts		3.3	9.0	10.4
	All selected states		2.9	8.6	8.2
	Naxalite states		2.9	6.4	6.4
	Insurgency-affected NE states		3.4	26.6	21.1
	Jammu and Kashmir		1.1	2.3	6.9

Note: 1. The crime rates have been derived using the data on actual incidence of crime from NCRB and adjusting it per lakh of population. Thus, the crime rate depicts the total number of IPC cognisable crimes per lakh of population. 2. Vishakhapatnam district includes Vishakha Rural and Vishakhapatnam 3. Guntur district includes Guntur and Guntur Urban. 4. Data for Jiribam district available only for the year 2019. Therefore, only the current data has been used for this district.

2 Note: Data for Jammu and Kashmir has only been analysed using official data; the survey findings in the later chapters do not cover this region.

Table 1.3 | District-wise rates of crimes against public order (2015-2019 average)

	States	Districts	Rate of offences against state (IPC)	Rate of offences against state (SLL)	Rate of offences against public tranquillity	Rate of arms/ explosives related acts
LWE-affected states	**Andhra Pradesh**	Visakhapatnam	0.0	0.1	1.6	0.6
		Guntur	0.0	0.0	2.1	0.2
		AP total	0.0	7.1	2.6	0.4
	Bihar	Aurangabad	0.1	0.0	5.1	1.2
		Munger	0.0	0.0	10.5	6.2
		Jamui	0.0	1.1	9.5	3.2
		Bihar total	0.0	0.1	10.5	2.1
	Chhattisgarh	Sukma	0.0	0.0	2.6	2.1
		Rajnandgaon	0.0	0.0	1.7	2.8
		Narayanpur	0.4	0.9	1.4	2.3
		Chhattisgarh total	0.0	0.0	2.8	3.7
	Jharkhand	Giridih	0.0	0.5	18.3	0.8
		Simdega	0.0	1.4	0.7	2.3
		Latehar	0.0	1.6	4.1	2.0
		Jharkhand Total	0.0	0.4	6.5	1.7
	Odisha	Malkangiri	0.0	0.0	6.1	1.5
		Sundargarh	0.0	0.0	4.1	0.1
		Odisha Total	0.0	0.0	9.2	1.3
	Telangana	Khammam	0.0	0.0	6.3	0.3
		Adilabad	0.0	0.0	2.2	0.1
		Telangana total	0.0	0.2	8.7	0.7
Insurgency-affected Northeast states	**J&K[3]**	Udhampur	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.3
		J&K total	0.1	1.4	13.5	2.3
	Assam	Kokrajhar	0.2	2.5	6.6	3.8
		Karbi Anglong	0.4	0.1	1.0	2.5
		Goalpara	0.1	0.5	1.3	1.5
		Assam total	0.1	1.0	7.8	1.3
	Manipur	Imphal east	0.0	20.3	6.1	1.7
		Chandel	0.0	12.1	1.8	2.4
		Churachandpur	0.2	1.8	1.0	2.7
		Jiribam	0.0	2.3	2.3	0.0
		Manipur total	0.3	13.1	4.2	1.4
	Tripura	West Tripura	0.0	0.0	4.9	0.2
		Dhalai	0.0	0.1	2.6	0.1
		Tripura total	0.0	0.3	5.3	0.2
	Nagaland	Dimapur	0.5	0.2	0.3	16.3
		Peren	0.0	0.0	0.0	6.3
		Nagaland total	0.3	0.4	0.3	5.3
	All India		**0.1**	**0.6**	**5.7**	**5.1**
	All selected districts		0.0	0.6	4.8	1.4
	All selected states		0.0	1.4	7.7	1.6
	Naxalite states		0.0	1.3	7.5	1.6
	Insurgency-affected NE states		0.1	1.7	7.0	1.4
	Jammu and Kashmir		0.1	1.4	13.5	2.3

Note: 1. The crime rates have been derived using the data on actual incidence of crime from NCRB and adjusting it per lakh of population. Thus, the crime rate depicts the total number of IPC cognisable crimes per lakh of population. 2. Vishakhapatnam district includes Vishakha Rural and Vishakhapatnam 3. Guntur district includes Guntur and Guntur Urban. 4. Data for Jiribam district available only for the year 2019. Therefore, only the current data has been used for this district.

3 Note: Data for Jammu and Kashmir has only been analysed using official data; the survey findings in the later chapters do not cover this region.

Offences against state and public order-related crimes

This sub-section focuses on the crimes against national security and public order, which is relevant particularly in the context of conflict-affected regions. The basic presumption here is that in such locations, cases of crimes such as sedition, use of illegal arms, explosives, etc. would be higher than in non-conflict regions.

Before we read through the numbers, a brief explanation of the crime categories given below is warranted. Under IPC, the offences against state refers to crimes such as sedition, waging war against state, etc. (Sections 121, 121A, 122, 123 and 124A of the IPC). On the other hand, 'offences against state' under SLL refers to offences under the Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act, the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA) and the Official Secrets Act.

Offences against public tranquillity include offences such as rioting, unlawful assembly, offences promoting enmity between different groups and affray. The arms/explosives related offences include those under the Arms Act, the Explosives Act and the Explosive Substances Act.

It must be noted that under this sub-section, several other crime-heads were also analysed, such as offences related to elections, harbouring an offender, circulation of fake news, etc. However, because of the extremely low crime rates under those heads, no analysis was possible.

The crime rates for offences against the state, both under the IPC as well as the SLL provisions are also extremely low. However, considering the relevance of these categories for the conflict-affected regions, the data on these two categories has been provided here. While under IPC, the rate is uniformly low for all selected states and districts, some districts stand out in case of offences against the state under SLL. Against the national rate of 0.6, Imphal East has a rate of 20.3, while Chandel district has a rate of 12.1 offences against the state under SLL provisions. While in the case of Imphal East, the rate has consistently remained high over a period of five years, in Chandel, it has decreased from 16 in 2015 to 4.2 in 2019. Districts such as Simdega and Latehar (Jharkhand), Jamui (Bihar), Kokrajhar (Assam), Churachandpur and Jiribam (Manipur), all have a rate of offences against state under SLL which is higher than the national rate. The state averages which stand out are Andhra Pradesh (7.1) and Manipur (13.1).

In the crime category of offences against public tranquillity, the districts of Jamui and Munger from Bihar and Giridih from Jharkhand have especially high rates of crimes, at 10.5, 9.5 and 18.3 respectively. However, the average of all the selected districts under this crime category is lower

than the national average (of 5.7). On the other hand, when we look at the total rates of the selected states, it stands at 7.7, higher than the national rate. Jammu and Kashmir and Bihar in particular have high rates of offences against public tranquillity.

Under the arms and explosives related acts, aside from Dimapur (Nagaland), with a rate of 16.3, no other district shows rate much higher than the national rate (of 5.1). In fact, the averages of the selected states and districts are significantly lower than the national average under this offence.

Thus, when it comes to crimes related to national security and public order, while the overall trend shows a low crime rate in conflict-affected regions, a more careful reading of the numbers throws up certain exceptions to this rule and shows the trends in regions where such provisions have been used liberally. Considering that the legal provision under some of these Acts are much stricter than regular legal statutes and that the state assumes certain extraordinary powers through these Acts, its liberal usage, even in specific districts, necessitates a deeper scrutiny into the ground realities.

Crimes against women, SCs and STs

The incidence of crimes against women in the conflict-affected areas are generally lower than the national average, which confirms the findings of Amaral *et al* (2014) and Borooah (2008). However, here again, some districts stand out as exceptions, in particular Kokrajhar and Goalpara from Assam, with rates of 80.5 and 111 respectively, against the national rate of crimes against women (of 57.7). A few other districts such as Malkangiri (Odisha), Vishakhapatnam and Guntur (Andhra Pradesh) also have higher than national-average crime rates against women. Amongst the states, Assam, with a rate of 126, particularly increases the average of the insurgency-affected Northeast states.

In terms of the crimes against SCs and STs, it is the LWE-affected districts and states which have a much higher rate than the Northeastern states, presumably because of the demographic composition of the population across these regions. In most Northeastern states, the population of STs is predominant, because of which there can be fewer cases of crimes against SCs or STs by non-SCs or non-STs. However, in the Naxalite states, the state averages are higher than the national average for these crimes, albeit marginally. Districts with extraordinarily high rates of crimes against SCs are Vishakhapatnam (AP), with a crime rate of 62.2 (against national rate of 21) and Munger with a rate of 55.3 crimes against SCs per lakh of SC population in the district. Aside from Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand all the selected LWE-affected states have higher than national rates of crimes against SCs.

Table 1.4 | District-wise rates of crimes against women, SCs and STs (2015-2019 average)

	States	Districts	Rate of crimes against women	Rate of crimes against SCs	Rate of crimes against STs
LWE-affected states	**Andhra Pradesh**	Visakhapatnam	65.2	62.2	5.4
		Guntur	75.6	23.2	22.1
		AP total	57.1	28.0	14.8
	Bihar	Aurangabad	15.4	24.0	0.0
		Munger	29.4	55.3	0.0
		Jamui	22.8	36.9	0.5
		Bihar total	25.1	38.8	4.2
	Chhattisgarh	Sukma	11.5	NA	0.6
		Rajnandgaon	42.7	9.4	3.8
		Narayanpur	44.8	12.1	4.1
		Chhattisgarh total	52.1	13.2	8.0
	Jharkhand	Giridih	39.6	17.9	3.4
		Simdega	25.8	2.2	0.9
		Latehar	29.7	5.6	3.5
		Jharkhand Total	31.7	15.0	3.1
	Odisha	Malkangiri	67.8	3.9	1.7
		Sundargarh	26.9	28.1	10.9
		Odisha Total	77.7	27.1	8.1
	Telangana	Khammam	52.2	13.3	5.8
		Adilabad	29.4	8.8	4.6
		Telangana total	77.4	29.0	15.0
	J&K[4]	Udhampur	42.8	0.4	0.0
		J&K total	40.8	0.1	0.0
Insurgency-affected Northeast states	**Assam**	Kokrajhar	80.5	0.0	0.1
		Karbi Anglong	40.0	0.4	0.1
		Goalpara	111.0	0.0	0.0
		Assam total	126.0	0.4	0.4
	Manipur	Imphal east	18.8	0.0	1.4
		Chandel	4.3	0.0	0.0
		Churachandpur	3.1	0.0	0.0
		Jiribam	14.1	0.0	0.0
		Manipur total	15.6	0.4	0.1
	Tripura	West Tripura	26.8	0.1	0.1
		Dhalai	40.0	0.0	0.7
		Tripura total	42.4	0.9	0.2
	Nagaland	Dimapur	22.0	0.0	0.0
		Peren	2.6	0.0	0.0
		Nagaland total	5.9	0.0	0.0
	All India		**57.7**	**21.0**	**6.7**
	All selected districts		45.8	20.6	4.1
	All selected states		54.2	27.2	6.2
	Naxalite states		47.8	29.4	7.8
	Insurgency-affected NE states		104.4	0.5	0.2
	Jammu and Kashmir		40.8	0.1	0.0

Note: 1. The crime rates have been derived using the data on actual incidence of crime from NCRB and adjusting it per lakh of population. Thus, the crime rate depicts the total number of IPC cognisable crimes per lakh of population. 2. Vishakhapatnam district includes Vishakha Rural and Vishakhapatnam 3. Guntur district includes Guntur and Guntur Urban. 4. Data for Jiribam district available only for the year 2019. Therefore, only the current data has been used for this district. 5. Census data on SC population in Sukma district was not available, therefore the rate could not be calculated.

4 Note: Data for Jammu and Kashmir has only been analysed using official data; the survey findings in the later chapters do not cover this region.

In general, the reported rates of crimes against STs are lower, at the national, state as well as district levels, with 6.7 as the national rate of crimes against STs. Amongst the districts, Guntur stands out for a high rate of crimes against STs (at 22.1). In the case of total rates of crimes against STs in states, aside from Bihar and Jharkhand, all the selected LWE-affected states have a higher than national crime rate.

Crimes committed by naxalites and insurgents

Since the last three years, the report Crime in India by NCRB has included a section on the crimes committed by Naxalites/LWEs and insurgents in the Northeast. However, this data is only available at the state-level and therefore a district-wise analysis of the selected districts cannot be done here.

In this sub-section, therefore, the data for the selected states has been analysed using a three-year average.

The data shows that all types of crimes committed by either the Naxalites/LWEs or the extremists in the Northeast were very low, and at the all-India level, taking an average of the last three years, the rate of crimes committed by NE insurgents is 0, while the rate of crimes committed by Naxalites is 0.1 overall. The actual number of such crimes (3-year average) is 399 and 686 respectively at the national level.

However, some states are worse-hit than most others. Amongst the states selected for this study, the worst-hit states by crimes committed by Naxalites are Chhattisgarh, Manipur, Assam and Jharkhand. On the other hand, for crimes committed by insurgents from Northeast, the worst hit state is Manipur. Overall, the incidence of crimes committed by Naxalites/LWEs are much more in number, compared to those committed by insurgents from Northeast.

In Table 1.6, we look at the types of crimes committed by both the insurgents and the Naxalites at the all-India level.

It is evident from the above table that attempt to murder and murder are the most frequently committed crimes by the Naxalites (33% and 13% respectively), followed by crimes committed under UAPA, at 19 percent. On the other hand, three out of four crimes committed by the Northeast insurgents, according to official data, fall under the UAPA Act. Crimes such as rape, kidnapping, hurt, theft, criminal intimidation, damage to public property and cybercrimes are rarely committed by the Naxalites as well as insurgents, and individually these crime categories comprise less than one percent of the total crimes committed by them.

Analysis of conflict-related incidents' data

This section of the study attempts to gauge the volatility of the conflict-affected regions with the help of official data. Each region has its own long history with multiple spirals which have been reshaping the 'conflict' in the region. In such cases, it becomes important to constantly map the trend and understand the direction and magnitude of development. Time series analysis could be an effective way to take such study forward provided that robust and consistent data is available.

It is important to note that, considering the status of these regions in terms of external and internal security of the country, multiple independent organisations have been collecting the data with their disparate data collection

Table 1.5 | Crimes committed by Naxalites and Northeast Insurgents (2017-2019 average)

State	Crimes committed by Naxalites/LWEs		Crimes committed by Northeast insurgents	
	Incidence of crime (average)	Rate of crime (average)	Incidence of crime (average)	Rate of crime (average)
Andhra Pradesh	16.7	0.0	0.0	0.0
Bihar	11.7	0.0	0.0	0.0
Chhattisgarh	431.3	1.7	0.0	0.0
Jharkhand	29.7	0.1	2.7	0.0
Odisha	6.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Telangana	7.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Jammu & Kashmir[5]	0.0	0.0	41.3	0.3
Assam	62.7	0.2	22.7	0.1
Manipur	28.0	1.1	285.7	11.1
Tripura	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Nagaland	0.0	0.0	10.3	0.4
All India	**685.7**	**0.1**	**399.3**	**0.0**

5 Note: Data for Jammu and Kashmir has only been analysed using official data; the survey findings in the later chapters do not cover this region.

Crime category		Crimes committed by Naxalites		Crimes committed by insurgents from NE	
		Number of cases (2017-19 avg)	Proportion to the total cases of crimes	Number of cases (2017-19 avg)	Proportion to the total cases of crimes
IPC Crimes	Murder	87.7	12.8	11.7	2.9
	Attempt to murder	228.7	33.3	9.3	2.3
	Rape	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0
	Kidnapping & abduction	5.7	0.8	0.7	0.2
	Hurt/Grievous hurt	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0
	Theft	0.7	0.1	0.0	0.0
	Loot	24.0	3.5	0.7	0.2
	Extortion	17.3	2.5	23.7	5.9
	Arson	47.3	6.9	0.7	0.2
	Criminal intimidation	3.3	0.5	0.0	0.0
	Offences against the state (IPC)	11.3	1.7	9.7	2.4
	Other IPC crimes	44.3	6.5	0.3	0.1
SLL Crimes	Arms Act	10.0	1.5	30.7	7.7
	Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act	127.7	18.6	308.3	77.2
	Explosives and Explosive Substances Act	37.0	5.4	3.3	0.8
	Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act	5.7	0.8	0.0	0.0
	Information Technology Act/ cyber terrorism	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	Other SLL crimes	34.3	5.0	0.3	0.1
	Total crimes (All India)	**685.7**	**100.0**	**399.3**	**100**

methods. The Ministry of Home Affairs also has provided special attention to these regions. It has dedicated divisions namely – Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh Affairs, Left Wing Extremism Division and Northeast Division that look specifically into the law-and-order situations, provide assistance to states and keep important data to track the overall progress of their respective divisions.

After going through the available data sets and taking note of their limitations, data published by the MHA was considered for further analysis. Since it's the same data set that has been used by the government as one of the tools to keep track of these regions, analysis of it could also give a better understanding of government policies and action plans. For this study, data published by the MHA in its Annual reports, answers given during the parliamentary sessions etc were used for further analysis.

Jammu and Kashmir region[2]

The level of violence and tension in Jammu and Kashmir region has significantly come down as compared to 1990s and early 2000s. There was a perceptible decline in the number of incidents and also in the number of civilians, security forces personnel and terrorists killed.

The nearly 30-years-long timelines of Jammu Kashmir can be divided into four different sections to understand its historical trends of violence. The first phase began from the early 1990s to mid-90s, when the militancy started picking up pace in the region. Incidents of violence gradually started increasing every year and it peaked in 1995 (Figure. 1.1). A little less than six thousand incidents were reported in that year. In these six years, 6,451 extremists were killed by the security forces but at the same time, a little less than six thousand civilians and security personnel lost lives.

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2 Data for Jammu and Kashmir has only been analysed using official data; the survey findings in the later chapters do not cover this region.

Figure 1.1 | Jammu and Kashmir: Incidents of violence

Figure 1.2 | Jammu and Kashmir: Casualties

— Civilians killed   — SF killed   — Extremists/terrorists kiled

The number of incidents dropped for the first time in 1996, the beginning of the second phase. In this phase, numbers (of incidents) never went up or down drastically and remained plateaued for the next four years. Civil casualties showed a significant decline in this phase as the number went down from 1341 (in 1996) to 847 (in 2000) but the fatalities of security forces and extremists remained high.

The biggest single year jump in the number of incidents was observed in 2001 when the number of violent incidents went up by 47.1 per cent from 3074 to 4522. The year witnessed multiple skirmishes between the security forces and extremists. Successive attacks on the

Amarnath pilgrimage and terror attack on the Indian Parliament forced the state to launch special operations against extremists in Kashmir. Highest extremists, as well as security forces fatalities, were reported in 2001 (Figure. 1.2). Nearly 1000 civilians also died this year. With this begins the third and the longest phase, from 2001 to 2013. In these 13 years, the region experienced a steady decline in the number of incidents and overall casualties. The year 2013 perhaps, was one of the most peaceful years for the Jammu and Kashmir region when 170 violent incidents were reported and 68 civilians and security forces lost their lives. For the first time after 13 years, in 2014, the number of violent incidents went up. Since then, it has shown a

slight increment. In 2019, 594 incidents of violence were reported from the Jammu and Kashmir region in which 39 civilians and 80 security personnel lost their lives.

Northeastern states

Looking at the volatile history of the region, the Northeast was considered as the most insurgency affected part of the country after Kashmir.

A closer look at the data from recent years shows a sharp decline in violent incidents. Post 2012, the insurgency activities have seen a rapid decline and the violent incidents have dropped from 1025 to 223 in 2019. The decline can

be seen in the civil casualties as well. In 2019, as many as 21 civilians and four security personnel lost lives in the Northeast region, which is much lower than the casualties in other insurgency-affected areas.

There is an exceptional security force to extremist fatality ratio in the region. From 2001 to 2019, forces killed 5,836 extremists and lost 1032 of its personnel, with the average fatality ratio i.e., for nearly every six extremist killed, one security personnel was killed. In some years the ratio went beyond 1:10. In 2012 particularly, security forces managed to kill 222 extremists and lost only 14 of its officers on duty.

Figure 1.3 | North East: Incidents of violence

Figure 1.4 | North East: Casualties

LWE affected regions

From 2001 to 2019, the country experienced 26,497 violent incidents in states affected by Left Wing Extremism. As many as 7,172 civilians and 2,586 security personnel died in those incidents. It is important to understand that no other insurgency or militancy activity in any part of the country has caused this much harm in the past two decades. This makes left-wing extremism perhaps one of the biggest concerns for the Indian state. In the 2000s, especially in the latter half of the decade, reports of LWE related incidents started growing gradually. It peaked in 2009 and 2010, when over 2200 incidents were reported (Figure. 1.5). These same years reported the highest-ever civil casualties caused due to the LWE. As many as 591 and 720 civilians died in LWE related incidents in 2009 and 2010 respectively (Figure. 1.6). However, post 2010, LWE related incidents have been consistently showing a declining trend. The number has gone down from 2213 to 670 in the past 10 (2010 to 2019) years.

Figure 1.5 | Left Wing Extremism: Incidents of violence

Figure 1.6 | Left Wing Extremism: Casualties

The most worrisome part about LWE is the casualties — of both civilians as well as security personnel. As the graph (Figure. 1.6) indicates, barring a few exceptions, civilian casualties have always been significantly higher every year. The average security forces to extremists fatality ratio is the lowest in LWE affected region (1:1.1). Between 2007 and 2014 the average fatality ratio was 1:0.7 i.e., security forces fatalities were higher than the extremist fatalities. From 2016, however, a steep decline in civilian and security forces casualties has been observed.

Overall, all the conflict regions of the country have shown a significant improvement in the past two decades. Between 2001 and 2019, over 68,500 incidents of violence were reported from Jammu and Kashmir region, Northeastern states and LWE-affected regions of the country. About 75 percent of them were reported in the first decade i.e., between 2001 and 2010 and nearly 45 per cent of them were reported in the first five years of 2000s. The highest number of incidents were reported in 2001. The year experienced more than 19 violent incidents and nearly

Figure 1.7 | Overall: Incidents of violence (2001–2019)

Figure 1.8 | Incidents of violence: Region wise distribution

eight casualties (civilians and security force personnel) every day. However, the condition has been improving gradually over the past 19 years and it can be seen in the overall trend. The trend shows (Figure. 1.7) a steady decline in numbers and it somewhat remained the same during different political regimes. Except 2009, 2014 and 2018, in all the other years, the number of incidents reported remained lower than their respective previous year. In 2019, the number of violent incidents came down to nearly four per day. The combined casualties of civilians and security forces were 346. i.e., less than one per day.

It is important to note that between 2001 and 2005, militant activities from the Jammu and Kashmir region were the major contributors in the overall number. Out of a total of 30,742 violent incidents reported in those five years, 16,516 or 54.2 per cent were reported from Jammu and Kashmir. Whereas in the past five years i.e., between 2015 to 2019, out of 8,469 total incidents, only 2,080 or nearly 25 per cent were reported from Jammu and Kashmir. In the last five years, the region affected due to left-wing extremism experienced more instances of violence compared to the other two regions. It is to be noted that 4,548 or 53.7 per cent of incidents were reported from LWE-affected states in the last five years.

As the Figure. 1.8 shows, in the early 2000s, yearly figures of overall incidents of violence were impacted heavily because of Jammu and Kashmir. The region always had the maximum share. But it went on decreasing constantly ev-

ery year contrary to the region affected due LWE where the incidents of violence went on increasing. Since 2009, it has the highest share in the overall yearly figures.

In the span of 19 years, 42,147 lives were lost in multiple violent incidents in Jammu and Kashmir, LWE region and Northeastern states. Out of those, 23,283 (55.2 per cent) were civilians and security force personnel. Overall, 16,880 civilians were killed in different conflict-related incidents of violence over a span of 19 years. Highest civil casualties were observed in the LWE affected region (7172) followed by the Jammu and Kashmir region (5061). As many as 18,864 extremists were killed during anti-insurgency initiatives by security forces. More than half of them (54 per cent) were killed in Jammu and Kashmir.

Much like incidents of violence, casualties of violence have also shown a steady decline in the past 19 years (Figure. 1.9). Civilian casualties, which remained well over 1000 between 2001 and 2008, came down to 210 in 2019. In 2001, 836 security force personnel had lost their lives in action. The year 2019 marked the lowest security force casualties in the past three decades. Only 136 security officials died in anti-insurgency activities this year. However, as the graph indicates, security force casualties always remained lower than the civilian and insurgent fatalities.

It is important to understand that between 2010 and 2014 (and in 2004), civilian casualties were the highest among all the categories. Data indicates that this has been

Figure 1.9 | Casualties during the violence (2001–2019)

observed, especially between 2010 and 2014, because of the increase in LWE related violence. More civilian casualties were reported in the LWE region during this period. The dominance of the security forces over extremists was quite evident in these 19 years. Average security forces to extremist fatality ratio was 1:2.9 and it consistently remained above 1:2.4 in most of the years. It went as low as 1.5 in 2011 when total 2,727 incidents of violence were reported. As many as 1,760 of them were reported from LWE region where 469 civilians and 142 security force personnel lost their lives. Security forces to extremists fatality ratio in the region was 1:0.68, which means that security personnel fatalities reported in 2011 were much more than the insurgent fatalities.

The region-wise categorisation of fatality data gives a more detailed picture of the conflict in these regions and shows a stark contrast between them. Between 2001 and 2019, in LWE region, average security forces to extremist fatality ratio was 1:1.1, which effectively means, that the security forces lost a personnel for every extremist they killed. The proportion of civilians killed was also much higher in the region. For Jammu and Kashmir, where the maximum number of security personnel lost their lives compared to other regions in the last 19 years, the average security forces to extremists fatality ratio was 1:3.7. The proportion of civilians killed during violent incidents has also come down in recent years.

Conclusion

Overall, the official data on conflict states, crime in these regions and the number of incidents of violence between the state and the insurgents/Naxalites is far from adequate for in-depth analysis. The data, though valuable, is limited in its capacity to present the entire picture of either the law-and-order situation in these regions or the violence and its impact on the local people.

Official data, whether on crime or incidents of violence, has an inherent limitation of frequently being under-reported. However, even within these limitations, there are possibilities of mapping the broader trends and patterns. For instance, from the analysis of crime data, it becomes evident that even as the levels of overall crimes as reported by the police departments are low, but the rates of violent crimes such as murder, kidnapping and abduction and grievous hurt are higher than the national average. Again, even though for the selected districts the crimes under UAPA and other provisions considered as offences against the state are low, yet, according to NCRB's own data, three out of four crimes committed by the insurgents in Northeast fall under the UAPA provisions (when seen as a three-year average).

These trends suggest the need for a deeper probe into the reality of policing in conflict areas, one which requires the experiences and lived realities of the key stakeholders to be taken into account—the common people. This study, in the following chapters, attempts to do just that, by analysing the findings from the surveys with the common people and the police personnel from the conflict regions.

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2

Attitudes towards Conflict and Conflict-Groups

A demonstrator kicks a vehicle that was set on fire during a protest at Golaghat district in the Northeastern state of Assam.
August 20, 2014. ©REUTERS/Stringer

- In Conflict-affected regions, 46 percent common people and 43 percent police personnel believe that the demands of Naxalites/insurgents are genuine but their methods are wrong. The scheduled tribes are more likely to believe so, with one out of two ST persons agreeing with the statement.

- A significant majority of the common people (59%) believe that the Naxalites/insurgents should be punished for their criminal activities.

- According to common people, inequality, injustice, exploitation, discrimination are the biggest reasons behind Naxalite/insurgent activities, followed by poverty and unemployment.

- Thirty-seven percent common people fear physical assault by the Naxalites/insurgents; 35 percent people fear physical assault by the police; 32 percent people fear physical assault by the paramilitary/Army.

- One out of five common persons as well as police personnel feel that killing a dangerous Naxalite/insurgent is better than a legal trial.

- Fifty-nine percent common people and 50 percent police personnel believe that it is wrong to ignore human rights in the name of national security. However, 34 percent common people and 42 percent police personnel also fully agree with the statement that the police should eliminate criminals while dealing with Naxalites/insurgents.

- Amongst those personnel who believe that some specific groups are more likely to be engaged in Naxalism/insurgency, one out of four believe that Adivasis are more likely to be involved in Naxalism/insurgency.

- One out of five people from the LWE-affected regions personally know of cases of physical torture by the police; one out of five people from LWE-affected regions also know of cases of minors being arrested/detained by the police or of police being violent towards minors.

Attitudes towards Conflict and Conflict-Groups

One man's hero is another man's villain as the famous saying goes. The views of the people living in the conflict-affected regions tend to be deeply divided. How they perceive their heroes and villains depends on their backgrounds, circumstances and world views. There was no surprise, therefore, that the people and the security forces personnel we contacted in conflict-affected regions shared divergent views on key aspects of policing, policy issues like special laws, and their opinions of one another. This was neither unusual nor unexpected. The police or security forces are often quoted in the media as saying that people living in the conflict-affected regions support insurgent groups and their means. Conversely, a majority of people believe that the police and the security forces falsely implicate the vulnerable people/groups in cases of Naxalism or insurgency. Successive governments have introduced special and stringent laws such as the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act (UAPA) 1967, Chhattisgarh Special Public Security Act, 2006 or the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) 1958 and deployed large formations of security forces to combat Naxalism in LWE affected areas as well as sustained separatist insurgencies in the North East. Local inhabitants often perceive the state responses as heavy-handed and hold these measures responsible for affecting their day to day life. The trajectory of violence can be traced back to different roots in the LWE and insurgency-affected regions. While the former is attributed to economic inequality and lack of development, the latter is a direct fallout of a perceived sense of marginalisation by indigenous tribes people of the North East. Sustained political dialogues have resulted in the signing of agreements with the leaders of at least some insurgent movements in parts of the North East but the conflict in the regions of LWE violence in central and western India is sought to be resolved by successive governments largely through armed combat and not through negotiations as a matter of state policy.

The groups claiming to be at war against the state and opposed to its 'policy of repression' have their own arguments. They believe that the state policies of appropriating the agricultural lands of the rural poor and tribal groups in the name of development hurt their interests and livelihoods. Despite obviously slim chances of a victory against the mammoth state machinery, armed and organised underground groups still exist to fight for their land (Nigam, 2009). The support for Naxalites is strong among the rural poor, especially among those who were socially 'untouchable' and follow the idea of rural rebellion against the government (Krul, 2009).

This chapter discusses these points in four broad sections. The first section investigates the perceptions of the people and the police personnel towards the conflict-groups. The second section discusses what the people think about the police, paramilitary forces, conflict groups and their activities. The third section focuses on the opinions of the people and the police on ways to deal with Naxalites and insurgents in the conflict-affected regions. The fourth section probes whether the police think that any particular social section is more likely to join Naxalism/insurgency and hence, treat it differently to pursue their idea of curbing the conflict.

Perception of people and police personnel towards conflict and conflict-groups

In most of the cases, the violent movements in the respective States started with people-centric agendas and the socio-economic situation of people in the affected areas. For instance, the Naxalbari upsurge, led by left-wing parties in the mid-sixties, was a peasant movement in West Bengal. It was the cornerstone of left-wing extremism and Naxalism in India. On the other hand, the insurgent movements in North East India enjoyed the support of local people owing to their strident opposition to cultural assimilation. In the formative years, citizens avowed loyalty to the North East insurgents as they voiced popular sentiments against poor governance, alienation, lack of development and an apathetic attitude of the central government. However, the influence of the insurgents has seen a steady decline in recent years. The inter and intra group clashes have also contributed to their weakened status (Kumar 2018).

In the present study, we tried to ascertain people's opinions about the conflict-groups and their activities. The opinion of the police personnel was also juxtaposed with that of the common man living in the region. Three statements were provided each to the people and police personnel to capture their opinions. These statements were: *"the Naxalites/insurgent groups spread unnecessary violence", "the Naxalites/insurgent groups struggle for the rights of the poor", and "their demands are genuine but their methods are wrong."*

Both the people and police personnel have sharp differences in opinions on Naxalites/insurgent groups as well as their adopted methods. Forty-two percent police personnel said that the Naxalites/insurgent groups spread unnecessary violence, whereas 22 percent people echoed this thought. One-fifth (20%) of the people believed that conflict-groups struggle for the rights of the poor, whereas nine percent police personnel also felt the same. At the same time, 46 percent people and 43 percent police personnel said that the demands of Naxalites/insurgents are genuine but their methods are wrong. The responses revealed that the police personnel, along with the common people, in their own ways understand the demands of the rebels. A little over two in every five police personnel sympathise with the demands of conflict-groups but oppose their methods (*Figure 2.1*).

Figure 2.1 | A little over two-fifths of the police personnel as well as common people sympathise with the demands of conflict-groups but oppose the methods used by them

Note: Rest of the respondents did not answer. All figures are rounded off.

Question asked: (1): The Naxalites/insurgent groups spread unnecessary violence; (2): The Naxalites/insurgent groups struggle for the rights of the poor; (3): Their demands are genuine but their methods are wrong. Which statement do you agree?

The people and the police personnel in the insurgency and LWE-affected regions shared different opinions on this question. A little less than half (47%) of the police

personnel in the LWE-affected districts believe that conflict-groups spread unnecessary violence. In insurgency-affected regions, a little over one-third (36%) of the police personnel agreed with this statement. Forty-eight percent police personnel in the insurgency-affected districts believe that their demands are genuine but their methods are wrong. On the contrary, two-fifth (40%) of the police personnel in the LWE-affected districts agreed with this. More people (53%) in the insurgency-affected districts feel that demands made by conflict-groups are genuine but their means are wrong as compared to people (42%) living in the LWE-affected districts. This means that more people in the conflict of the North East tend to condone the insurgent violence when compared to their counterparts in the LWE areas. Close to a quarter (22%) of the people living in the LWE-affected regions believe that Naxalites struggle for the rights of the poor. However, 17 percent people in insurgency-affected reason think the same for insurgents (*Table 2.1*). According to the state-wise analysis, almost three in 10 people in the disturbed areas of Andhra Pradesh and Chhattisgarh believe that Naxalites struggle for the rights of the poor. This figure was 10 percentage points higher than the average support for this statement.

Table 2.1 | A little over half of the people in the insurgency-affected districts support the idea that demands made by conflict-groups are genuine but their means are wrong

Which statement do you agree with the most?	LWE-affected regions		Insurgency-affected regions	
	Common People (%)	Police Personnel (%)	Common People (%)	Police Personnel (%)
"The Naxalites/insurgent groups spread unnecessary violence"	24	47	20	36
"The Naxalites/insurgent groups struggle for the rights of the poor"	22	10	17	7
"Their demands are genuine but their methods are wrong"	42	40	53	48

Note: Rest of the respondents did not answer. All figures are rounded off.

Some factors such as police personnel's ranks, place of posting, or whether police personnel are posted in their own district or not affect their opinion on conflict groups and their methods. Despite that, not many police personnel believe that the Naxalites/insurgents fight for the rights of the poor. However, we can observe the differences of opinion when we look at the third statement on the genuineness of their demands and means. More police personnel in constabulary position believe that the demands

of the conflict-groups are genuine, but their methods are wrong. This is in comparison to the higher-ranked police personnel; 44 percent to 39 percent respectively. Half of the police personnel who were posted in their own districts believe in the genuineness of the demands of conflict-groups. However, only 37 percent police personnel from other districts said so. Police personnel at an outpost or posted with armed battalions, who spend more time in the field were less likely to approve the third statement. This is in comparison to police personnel posted in police stations (*Table 2.2*).

Table 2.2 | Half of the police personnel posted in their home districts support demands made by conflict-groups but oppose their means

Police Personnel (%)		
	"The Naxalites/ insurgent groups spread unnecessary violence"	"The Naxalites/ insurgent groups struggle for the rights of the poor"	"Their demands are genuine but their methods are wrong"
Overall	42	9	43
Rank			
Constabulary	42	9	44
High rank	46	8	39
Posting in Home District			
Posted in their home district	38	7	50
Not posted in home districts	47	10	37
Place of posting			
Police Station	47	8	46
Police Outpost or Armed Battalion	45	12	38

Note: Rest of the respondents did not answer. All figures are rounded off.

As discussed earlier, the movements launched by the conflict-groups were people-centric. They also drew sustenance from the locals, especially the poor and marginalised. Therefore, we tried to see people's responses across various caste groups and economic classes.

More people from scheduled caste and other backward classes believe that conflict-groups struggle for the rights of the poor as compared to other caste groups. Nineteen percent scheduled tribes also believe the same but not as much as the SCs and OBCs. However, we studied this phenomenon across conflict zones. STs in LWE-affected regions were more likely to support the Naxalite/insurgency activities, as compared to the STs in insurgency-affected regions; 22 percent to 16 percent respectively. At the same time, close to half of the ST respondents also believe that their demands were genuine but methods wrong. The support for this statement was higher among STs, as compared to other caste-groups. There is also a link between the economic status of the respondents and their opinion on the conflict-groups and their methods. Rich people are more likely to believe that demands were fine but not the methods, as compared to the lower economic classes. On the other hand, people from poor and lower economic classes are more likely to believe that conflict-groups struggle for the poor. Simultaneously, close to one-fourth of the poor as well as lower-class people believe that conflict-groups spread unnecessary violence (*Table 2.3*). It is possible that people from this segment suffer a lot because of the violence unleashed by the conflict-groups.

Not many people supported Naxalites/insurgent groups and their actions. Only one-fifth (20%) of the people believed that groups engage in Naxalism/insurgency related activities to improve the lives of locals, and hence, do not

Table 2.3 | One out of two ST person believes that the demands of conflict groups are genuine but their methods are wrong

Common People (%)		
	"The Naxalites/insurgent groups spread unnecessary violence"	"The Naxalites/insurgent groups struggle for the rights of the poor"	"Their demands are genuine but their methods are wrong"
Overall	22	20	46
Caste groups			
Scheduled Caste	25	21	42
Scheduled Tribe	18	19	50
Other Backward Classes	22	21	43
Other	30	17	47
Economic class			
Poor	23	23	40
Lower class	23	20	44
Middle class	22	19	50
Rich	19	11	60

Note: Rest of the respondents did not answer. All figures are rounded off.

deserve punishment. Close to three in every five (59%) stated that Naxalites/insurgent groups should be punished for their violent activities and crimes. Twenty-one percent of the surveyed people did not share this opinion *(Figure 2.2)*.

Figure 2.2 | Three-fifth (59%) of the people believe that Naxalites/insurgent groups should be punished for their violent activities and crimes

People's perception on Naxalites/insurgent groups' violent activities and punishment for such activities (%)

■ *"Naxalites/insurgent groups take up Naxalism/insurgency related activities as they want to improve people's lives, therefore, they should not get any punishment"*

■ *"Criminal activity, done with any objective, is wrong, and the Naxalites/insurgent groups should be punished for it"*

■ *No response*

Note: All figures are rounded off.

Question asked: (1): Naxalites/insurgent groups take up Naxalism/ insurgency related activities as they want to improve people's lives, therefore, they should not get any punishment; (2): Criminal activity, done with any objective, is wrong, and the Naxalites/insurgents should be punished for it. Which statement do you agree with the most?

People living in the LWE-affected districts showed a somewhat sympathetic attitude towards the Naxalites. More than one-fifth (22%) respondents believed that conflict groups engage in violence to improve people's lives, and hence shouldn't be punished. Only 16 percent echoed this sentiment in insurgency-affected districts. Sixty-nine percent respondents in the insurgency-affected districts believe that crime in any form is punishable. They also believed that insurgents should be punished for taking up arms and engaging in criminal activities. Fifty three percent people in the LWE-affected districts supported punishing conflict groups for their criminal activities, 16 percentage point

less than the proportion in insurgency-affected districts*(- Figure 2.3)*. Clearly, despite divergent viewpoints, people at large do not condone violence or criminal activities.

Both the police personnel and common people were asked about a possible reason for Naxalism/insurgency in their areas. However, close to two in every five (37%) people did not express any opinion on this. Seventeen percent police personnel and 11 percent common people attributed the unrest to unemployment. Common people frequently cited injustice and inequality (14%) as the reason for conflict. For police personnel, the second major reason was poverty and hunger (15%). Thirteen percent common people named poverty and hunger, and 11 percent police personnel felt injustice and inequality were responsible for Naxalism/insurgency. Corruption, lack of education, unsettled political issues, atrocities against people by the government, and protection of land/identity of people were also stated as reasons for Naxalism/insurgency. In essence, reasons for LWE/insurgency were more likely to be those connected with economic inequalities, deprivation, lack of job opportunities and poor social indicators rather than demand for autonomy, political ideologies or even police atrocities *(Table 2.4)*.

Figure 2.3 | People living in the LWE-affected districts showed a somewhat sympathetic attitude towards the conflict-groups

Common People's Response (%)

■ LWE-affected Regions

■ Insurgency-affected Regions

Note: All figures are rounded off.

Table 2.4 | According to common people, inequality is the biggest reason for Naxalism/insurgency

Major reason for Naxalism activities in your area	Common People (%)	Police Personnel (%)
Inequality/injustice/exploitation/discrimination	14	11
Poverty/hunger	13	15
Unemployment	11	17
Education	5	10
Corruption	4	4
To protect their land/identity	3	3
Demand for autonomy/freedom	3	2
Unsettled political issues	2	4
Atrocities against people by the Government	2	2
Any other	6	14
No response	37	18

Note: All figures are rounded off.

Question asked: In your Opinion what is the major reason for Naxalism/insurgency related activities in your area?

Citizens' trust (deficit) in conflict groups, police or paramilitary/army in conflict-affected regions

The then Union Home Minister P Chidambaram once said that there is a "trust deficit" in the government among people of conflict-hit areas. Instead, people repose their faith in the conflict-groups (*Outlook*, 2010). He further stated that "certain people in Maoists-affected areas rely more on 'structures of powers which oppose the country' and have less faith in the good intentions of the government". We

investigated the accuracy of the statement in the present study. Police personnel were asked about people's trust in the Naxalites/insurgent groups in the conflict-affected areas. If we combine the categories 'a lot' and 'somewhat', close to one-third (31%) believe that people in those locations trust the Naxalites/insurgent groups. Nine percent said that the people have a lot of trust in the Naxalites/insurgent groups and a little over one-fifth (22%) believed that people have somewhat trust (*Figure 2.4*).

Figure 2.4 | One out of three police personnel believe that people have trust in Naxalites/insurgents

Perception of police personnel regarding people's trust in Naxalites/insurgents (%)

■ A lot   ■ Somewhat   ■ Not much   ■ Not at all   ■ No response

Note: Rest of the respondents did not answer. All figures are rounded off.

Question asked: In your opinion, to what extent do people in this area trust the Naxalites/insurgents- a lot, somewhat, not much or not at all?

Figure 2.5 | Police personnel from LWE-affected regions more likely to believe that people trust Naxalites

Police Personnel's Response (%)

■ LWE-affected regions
■ Insurgency-affected regions

Note: Rest of the respondents did not answer. All figures are rounded off.

Data reveals that more police in the LWE-affected regions believe that people have a lot of trust (13%) in the Naxalite groups as compared to the insurgency-affected regions. Only four percent police personnel said that people have a lot of trust in the insurgent groups there. Twenty percent police personnel in the insurgency-affected districts said people have a little trust in conflict-groups and 37 percent said they do not trust them at all. The figures in the LWE-affected districts are 21 percent and 38 percent respectively *(Figure 2.5)*.

In conflict-affected areas, common people are fearful of various kinds of harm coming their way, triggered by the presence of conflict-groups, police and paramilitary/Army. People in conflict-affected regions are more scared of the Naxalites/insurgents, followed by police and paramilitary/Army. Conflict-groups have been allegedly involved in abduction and extortion rackets and have been accused of extorting money from the public, government servants and business houses. With little protection available from the state government, people have often found it convenient to bribe the militant groups for peace, rather than risk death and abduction (Kumar 2018).When we look at people's fear of being beaten up, 12 percent fear the Naxalites/insurgents a lot, 11 percent fear the police, and eight percent fear the paramilitary forces. Thirty-three percent fear (by clubbing 'a lot' and 'somewhat' fear) abduction by Naxalites/insurgent groups, 32 percent and 26 percent fear arrest/detention by the police and the paramilitary forces respectively. People in the conflict-affected areas also fear forced entry into their houses. Thirty-four percent are fearful of (by clubbing 'a lot' and 'somewhat' fear) Naxalites/insurgent groups, 27 percent of the police, and 22 percent of the paramilitary personnel forcibly entering their homes. People

also seem to be afraid of (by clubbing 'a lot' and 'somewhat' fear) property destruction by the conflict-groups (28%), police (21%), and paramilitary/Army (18%). Twenty-nine percent people also fear extortion by the conflict-groups, false implication in Naxalism/insurgency-related cases by the police (24%) and the paramilitary/Army (20%). In addition, people fear killing and sexual violence by all the armed actors involved—the conflict-groups, police and paramilitary/Army *(Tables 2.5, 2.6, 2.7)*.

Table 2.6 | Thirty five percent people fear physical assault by the police

Fear of Police	Common People's Response (%)			
	A lot	Somewhat	Not much	Not at all
Beating people	11	24	20	39
Arrest/detention	10	22	19	43
Police coming to your house	8	19	19	46
Destruction of property	6	15	16	54
False implication in Naxalism cases	8	16	17	49
Sexual harassment	7	12	14	56
Killing	7	13	15	55

Note: Rest of the respondents did not answer. All figures are rounded off.

Question asked: Often people have fear of police for what they might do on the pretext of searching for Naxalites. What about you how much do you fear of ….? List of items are given in column 1.

Table 2.7 | One out of five persons fears false implication by the paramilitary/Army in Naxalism related cases

Fear of Paramilitary/Army	Common People's Response (%)			
	A lot	Somewhat	Not much	Not at all
Beating people	8	24	16	49
Arrest/detention	7	19	18	52
Paramilitary coming to your house	7	15	21	53
Destruction of property	6	12	16	60
False implication in Naxalism cases	6	14	15	58
Sexual harassment	7	12	12	62
Killing	8	12	12	62

Note: Rest of the respondents did not answer. All figures are rounded off.

Question asked: Often people have fear of Paramilitary/Army for what they might do on the pretext of searching for Naxalites. What about you how much do you fear of …?List of items are given in column 1.

Table 2.5 | Thirty seven percent common people fear physical assault by the Naxalites/insurgents

Fear of Naxalites/ Insurgents	Common People's Response (%)			
	A lot	Somewhat	Not much	Not at all
Beating people	12	25	16	44
Abduction	13	20	17	47
Naxalites /Insurgents coming to your house	13	21	15	47
Destruction of property	11	17	15	50
Extortion	12	17	17	49
Sexual harassment	10	14	15	55
Killing by Naxalites/ insurgent groups	12	14	15	51

Note: Rest of the respondents did not answer. All figures are rounded off.

Question asked: Often people are scared of Naxalites/Insurgents due to different reasons. What about you, how much do you fear of the Naxalites/Insurgents? List of items are given in column 1.

The trust-deficit could be a direct result of the police always suspecting people living in conflict-affected regions. Locals often have to prove their identity to the police. Twenty-one percent respondents said that they had to show the police

their ID card or documents once or twice in the last 2-3 years without committing any offence. Fifteen percent had to do so when asked by the paramilitary/Army *(Table 2.8)*.

Table 2.8 | Four out of five people had to show their ID cards or documents to the police in the last 2-3 years

Common People's Response (%)		
	Police personnel asked for ID Card or documents	Paramilitary/Army personnel asked for ID Card or documents
Never	69	76
1-2 times	21	15
Many-times	4	2

Note: Rest of the respondents did not answer. All figures are rounded off.

Question asked: During the last 2-3 years, how many times have been in a situation when you are in a public place, you were not committing any offence,

a. but police personnel asked for your ID Card or documents?

b. but a Paramilitary/Army personnel asked for your identity card/ documents

Opinions of people & police personnel on dealing with Naxalites/insurgents

In the previous SPIR studies, we have seen both the police as well as the common people's attitudes towards use of police violence against alleged criminals as well as their willingness to follow proper legal processes. According to SPIR 2019, one out of five police personnel feel that killing a dangerous criminal is better than a legal trial. Three out of five police personnel feel that it is justified for the police to be violent towards criminals. Further, in SPIR 2018, half the respondents condoned the use of violence by the police.

While such attitudes are widespread in the non-conflict zones, here we investigate people's and police's perceptions on how to deal with conflict-groups and what should be the course of action against them. Some people believe that they should be treated just as regular criminals and tried by the rule of law. Some people also believe that they should be eliminated instantly. Both people and police personnel were asked to share their views on the correct treatment to be meted out to conflict groups. Both the police personnel

and common people supported fair legal trial for Naxalites or insurgents. Three in every four (75%) police personnel and a little over two-third (66%) of the common people supported legal trial for Naxalites or insurgents. Around one-fifth police personnel and ordinary citizens supported the idea of elimination of the Naxalites/insurgents *(Table 2.9)*. Thus, the views of both the people and the police on this aspect are not very different from the non-conflict states.

Table 2.9 | One out of five police personnel as well as common persons feel that killing a dangerous Naxalite/ insurgent is better than a legal trial

Which statement do you agree with the most?	Common People (%)	Police Personnel (%)
"For the greater good of the society sometimes, killing dangerous Naxalites/Insurgents is more effective than giving them a legal trial"	19	21
"No matter how dangerous a Naxalites/Insurgents is, police should try to catch them and follow proper legal procedures"	66	75
No response	15	4

Note: All figures are rounded off.

Question asked: (1): For the greater good of the society sometimes, killing dangerous Naxalites/insurgents is more effective than giving them a legal trial; (2): No matter how dangerous a Naxalites/insurgents is, police should try to catch them and follow proper legal procedures. Do you agree with 1 or 2?

Support for direct elimination was higher in LWE-affected regions among both the police personnel and common people as compared to insurgency-affected regions. One-fourth of the police personnel and one-fifth of the people in the LWE-affected region recommended the elimination of dangerous Naxalites for the greater good of the society. Only 15 percent police personnel and 18 percent common people supported the direct elimination of insurgents. Four in every five police personnel in North East states affected by the insurgency supported the idea of fair trials for the insurgents *(Table 2.10)*.

Table 2.10 | One out of four police personnel from LWE affected regions feels that killing dangerous Naxalites is better than a legal trial

	LWE-affected regions		Insurgency-affected regions	
	Common People (%)	Police Personnel (%)	Common People (%)	Police Personnel (%)
"For the greater good of the society sometimes, killing dangerous Naxalites/Insurgents is more effective than giving them a legal trial"	20	25	18	15
"No matter how dangerous a Naxalites/Insurgents is, police should try to catch them and follow proper legal procedures"	62	70	72	81

Note: Rest of the respondents did not answer. All figures are rounded off.

However, close to half (48%) of the police personnel supported the idea of harsher punishment for the Naxalite/insurgent groups. The same proportion of police personnel (48%) also said that conflict-groups should be treated just like other criminals. Police personnel in the LWE-affected region were more likely to support treating Naxalites similar to other criminals, with similar justice meted out to them. Police personnel in the insurgency-affected regions supported harsher punishments for insurgents, compared to regular criminals *(Table 2.11)*.

Table 2.11 | Half of the police personnel feel that Naxalites/insurgents should be given a harsher punishment compared to other criminals, while the other half feels that they should be punished just like other criminals

Which statement do you agree with the most?	Police Personnel (%)		
	Overall	LWE-affected region	Insurgency-affected region
"Since there is equality before law, Naxalites/insurgent groups should be punished just like the other criminals"	*48*	50	45
"Even though there is equality before law, Naxalites/insurgent groups should be given much harsher punishment compared to the other criminals"	*48*	48	48

Note: Rest of the respondents did not answer. All figures are rounded off.

Question asked: (1): Since there is equality before law, Naxalites/insurgent groups should be punished just like the other criminals. (2): Even though there is equality before law, Naxalites/insurgent groups should be given much harsher punishment compared to the other criminals. Do agree with 1 or 2

Higher ranked police officials preferred harsher punishment, compared to their constabulary ranked counterparts. Also, police personnel who have spent less than five years in the disturbed areas were in favour of harsher punishment, compared to those spending more than five years. Police personnel at outposts or posted with armed battalions were more likely to support harsher punishment for the Naxalites or insurgents *(Table 2.12)*.

The debate around national security and human rights and what should take precedence remains contentious. We have tried to compare and contrast the views of both the people and police personnel on this issue, by asking them to choose one among two statements. Half of the police personnel prioritised human rights and believed that human rights should not be ignored in the name of national security. At the same time, 44 percent police personnel said that national security is more important than human rights. Human rights were more important for the common people. Fifty-nine percent endorsed that human

rights should not be ignored in the name of national security. This is in contrast to 25 percent people who said human rights can be ignored in favour of national security *(Figure 2.6)*.

Table 2.12 | More experienced police personnel more likely to believe that Naxalites/insurgents should be treated the same as other criminals

	Police Personnel (%)	
	"Since there is equality before law, Naxalites/insurgent groups should be punished just like the other criminals"	"Even though there is equality before law, Naxalites/insurgent groups should be given much harsher punishment compared to the other criminals"
Overall	48	48
Rank		
Constabulary	49	48
High rank	44	52
Year in service		
Less than 5 years	44	52
5 years and above	54	41
Place of posting		
Police Station	50	46
Police Outpost or Armed Battalion	38	58

Note: Rest of the respondents did not answer. All figures are rounded off.

Figure 2.6 | Common people more likely to believe that human rights is more important than national security, compared to police personnel

Note: All figures are rounded off.

Question asked: (1): National security is of primary importance, and Human Rights can be ignored to ensure national security; (2): It is wrong to ignore Human Rights in the name of national security. Do you agree with 1 or 2?

Despite the above findings on higher support for human rights, opinions of both police personnel and common people bucked the trend on occasions. Both supported direct elimination of criminals under certain conditions. However, support for elimination was higher among police personnel as compared to common people. Fifty-one percent police personnel and 43 percent common people fully supported the elimination of criminals by police in self-defence. Forty-one percent police personnel and 37 percent common people fully supported the elimination of criminals by police in dealing with dangerous criminals. In the case of brutal crimes, 39 percent police personnel and 40 percent common people supported the elimination of criminals by the police. Both the police (42%) and the people (34%) also supported direct elimination of criminals engaged in Naxalite/insurgent activities without a legal trial *(Table 2.13)*.

In SPIR 2018, the survey with common people across 22 states revealed that one out of two persons feels that there is nothing wrong in the police being violent towards criminals. In the present survey of conflict states, when people and police personnel were asked about the violent behaviour of the police towards arrested Naxalites/insurgents, areas of broad agreement emerged. Both the police

personnel and common people showed considerable support for the violent behaviour of the police when we look at combined figures of 'complete' and 'somewhat' support. However, the police's violent behaviour was slightly more acceptable for the protagonists of political violence (Naxalites/insurgents), as compared to other criminals. Twenty-four percent people fully supported police violence towards Naxalites/insurgents and 19 percent people for other criminals. Seventeen percent police personal completely supported the violence against arrested Naxalites/insurgents and 15 percent against other criminals. On an average two in every five people, as well as police personnel, did not support the violence (if we club the categories of 'somewhat' and 'completely wrong') *(Table 2.14)*.

Police and the common people are divided over the use of aggressive, precautionary or predictive, and often controversial measures by the police to control Naxalism/insurgency. These include tapping the phones, preventive arrests, surveillance, etc. Support for these activities was higher among police personnel as compared to common people. Twenty-nine percent people and 51 percent police personnel fully supported tapping the phones of Naxalites/insurgents. Thirty-six percent people and 29 percent police personnel fully opposed the measure. However, both

Table 2.13 | Two out of five police personnel strongly believe criminals should be eliminated while dealing with Naxalites/insurgents

	Fully		Somewhat		Not much		Not at all	
	People (%)	Police (%)	People (%)	Police (%)	People (%)	Police (%)	People (%)	Police (%)
In self-defence for the police	43	51	30	29	10	9	11	7
In dealing with dangerous criminals	37	41	27	32	13	12	15	12
For brutal crime	40	39	24	28	15	15	14	14
In dealing with Naxalites/Insurgents	34	42	24	25	15	14	15	14

Note: Rest of the respondents did not answer. All figures are rounded off.

Question asked: To what extent do you support police eliminating the criminals -Fully, Somewhat, Not much or Not at all?

Table 2.14 | One out of four person believes that it is completely right for the police to be violent towards Naxalites/insurgents

Use of violence	Arrested Naxalites/insurgent groups		Other criminals	
	Common People (%)	Police Personnel (%)	Common People (%)	Police Personnel (%)
Completely right	24	17	19	15
Somewhat right	34	37	30	34
Somewhat wrong	17	18	22	22
Completely wrong	14	22	17	23
No response	11	6	12	6

Note: All figures are rounded off.

Questions asked: a. Do you consider when for the safety and security of the society, police gets violent with the arrested Naxalites/insurgent groups right or wrong? b. Do you consider when for the safety and security of the society, police gets violent with the arrested other criminals right or wrong?

	Fully support		Somewhat support		Somewhat oppose		Fully oppose	
	People (%)	Police (%)	People (%)	Police (%)	People (%)	Police (%)	People (%)	Police (%)
Tapping phones of common people	12	15	20	31	17	19	36	29
Tapping phones of suspected Naxalites/insurgents	29	51	31	38	12	6	11	1
Surveillance through Drone cameras	28	45	30	36	11	7	11	5
Arresting sympathisers of conflict-groups	24	39	26	37	16	13	11	5
Complete ban on internet in conflict-affected regions	21	31	20	22	16	14	22	24

Note: Rest of the respondents did not answer. All figures are rounded off.

Question asked: For controlling Naxalism/insurgency, do you support or oppose these actions by the police? List of items is given in column 1.

the police and people fully endorsed surveillance through drone cameras and arrests of Naxalites/insurgent sympathisers. There were mixed opinions among both the police and the common people on banning the internet in the conflict-affected areas *(Table 2.15)*.

Opinions of people and police personnel on social groups: likeliness of getting into naxalism/insurgency and targeting specific people in conflict regions

There is systemic bias against certain social groups who the police believe are more likely to join or support Naxalism/insurgency activities. Sixteen percent police personnel believe that people of some social groups are more likely to get into Naxalism/insurgency activities *(Figure 2.7)*.

Figure 2.7 | One-fifth of the police believe that some specific groups are engaged in Naxalism/insurgency

Police personnel believe that some specific groups are engaged in Naxalism/insurgency (%)

15

16

69

■ No ■ Yes ■ No response

Note: All figures are rounded off.

Question asked: In this area, are there any particular people, or social group, which are more likely to get into Naxalism/insurgency activities?

Amongst those police personnel who believe that some groups are more likely to get into Naxalism/insurgency activities, 26 percent feel that tribals or indigenous people are more likely to get into Naxalism/insurgency. Eleven percent police personnel said that poor are more susceptible in getting involved in Naxalism/insurgency activities. However, close to two-fifth (38%) police personnel did not respond to this question *(Table 2.16)*.

Table 2.16 | One out of four police personnel believe that tribals or Adivasis are likely to be engaged in Naxalite/insurgent activities (amongst those who feel that people's identities make them more susceptible to join Naxalite/insurgent activities)

Groups engaged in Naxalism/insurgency activities in conflict area	Police personnel (%)
STs / Adivasis/ Indigenous people	26
Poor	11
OBCs	4
Young people	6
SCs / Dalits	4
Left-wing / Communists / Marxists	2
Rich	3
Any other	6
No response	38

Note: All figures are rounded off.

Question asked: (If engaged) So who are these people, or which is this social group?

In conflict-affected areas, people are at the receiving end of violence perpetrated by the police/security forces. A little over one-fourth (24%) of the people knew someone who was a victim of physical torture either by the police or paramilitary/armed forces. The same proportion (24%) of people said that they knew about an innocent person being held by either the police or the paramilitary/Army

Table 2.17 | People from LWE-affected regions more vulnerable to violence by the police or paramilitary/Army compared to those from the insurgency-affected areas of NE

Common People (%)			
	Overall	LWE-affected region	Insurgency-affected region
Police held someone for Naxalism/insurgency related charges in spite of being innocent	13	15	10
Paramilitary/Army held someone for Naxalism/insurgency related charges in spite of being innocent	11	12	9
Victim of fake encounter by the police	8	10	6
Victim of fake encounter by Paramilitary/Army	6	7	5
Was victim of physical torture by the police	15	18	10
Victim of physical torture by Paramilitary/Army	9	10	9

Note: All figures are rounded off.

Question asked: Do you know of anyone who was…? (Items are given in column 1.)

for Naxalism/insurgency-related charges. People also shared their knowledge about victims of fake encounters by the police (8%) and the paramilitary/Army (6%) *(Table 2.17)*. People living in the LWE-affected districts were more vulnerable to violence by the police and paramilitary forces, as compared to people living in the insurgency-affected districts. This is especially true of physical torture and arrests of innocent people by the police *(Table 2.17)*.

Women have an especially vulnerable status and tend to be targeted both by the conflict-groups and security forces in the conflict-affected areas. Twenty-two percent people said they knew a woman either arrested by the police or detained by the Army/paramilitary. People also spoke of women being sexually assaulted by the conflict-groups (10%), police (7%) and the Army/paramilitary (5%). Ten percent also spoke about women being abducted by the Naxalites/insurgent groups *(Table 2.18)*. There are several research studies detailing the physical harassment and sexual violence against women by the police and conflict-groups (Kraska and Kappeler 1995; Shekhawat and Saxena 2015; Kamra 2013). Findings from this survey indicate that women in LWE-affected areas were more vulnerable to sexual violence and abduction by the Naxalites.

Militants/insurgents have been accused of abducting innocent children and training them to be Maoists/insurgents (Shekhar, 2017). Conversely, police and security forces also target the youth for their 'alleged' involvement with conflict-groups. Therefore, youngsters (below 18 years) face violence and detention in conflict areas by both the warring factions—conflict-groups as well as security forces. Close to one-fourth (23%) of the people in conflict areas knew of arrests of minors by police or detention by the Army/paramilitary. One-fifth (21%) said they knew of an incident where minors faced violence by the police and the Army/paramilitary. Ten percent people witnessed

Table 2.18 | Seven percent of the common people believe that women are sexually violated by the police in conflict regions while eight percent believe that women are sexually violated by the Naxalites/insurgents

Common People (%)			
	Overall	LWE-affected region	Insurgency-affected region
Arrested/detained by the police	16	17	16
Sexual violence by the police	7	8	5
Detained by the Army/paramilitary	6	7	6
Faced sexual violence by the Army/paramilitary	5	5	5
Abduction by the Naxalites/Insurgents	10	13	6
Faced sexual violence by the Naxalites/Insurgents	8	11	4

Note: All figures are rounded off.

Question asked: a: Do you know of any woman who has…? Items are given in column 1.

incidents where minors faced violence by the Naxalites/insurgent groups. Ten percent also recounted the abduction of minors by the Naxalites/insurgent groups. The frequency of these incidents was higher in LWE-affected regions as compared to the insurgency-affected areas *(Table 2.19)*.

The criminal justice system remains a grey area when it comes to children in conflict with the law. Debates in the highest levels of the judiciary have failed to clarify the ambiguities inherent in the term juvenile. As a result, crimes of underage subjects still evoke contrarian reactions from both the law enforcers and common people. Both groups were asked whether children (two age groups 7-15 years and 16-18 years were given to the respondents) should

Table 2.19 | Children from LWE-affected areas more likely to face violence by security forces and Naxalites

Violence towards minors	Common People (%)		
	Overall	LWE-affected region	Insurgency-affected region
Arrested/detained by the police	16	18	13
Violence by the police	15	20	7
Detained by the Army/paramilitary	7	8	6
Faced violence by the Army/paramilitary	6	8	4
Abduction by the Naxalites/Insurgents	10	12	6
Faced violence by the Naxalites/Insurgents	10	13	5

Note: All figures are rounded off.

Question asked: Do you know of any child below 18 years who has....?
Items are given in column 1.

be treated as adult criminals or like juvenile delinquents. Eighty-three percent police personnel believed that children in the age group 7-15 should be treated like juveniles/children. Fifty-two percent police personnel had a similar opinion for children between 16 and 18 years old. Eleven percent police personnel wanted to treat 16-18 years old as adult criminals. In comparison, 17 percent of the common people said they should be treated as adult criminals *(Table 2.20)*.

Table 2.20 | Police personnel more likely to believe that juveniles involved in Naxalism/insurgency should be treated the same as adults, compared to the common people

	Children between 7-15 years		Children between 16-18 years	
	Common People (%)	Police Personnel (%)	Common People (%)	Police Personnel (%)
Like Juveniles/Children	64	83	39	52
Like adult criminals in extreme cases	13	8	27	32
Just like adult criminals	7	4	18	11

Note: Rest of the respondents did not answer. All figures are rounded off.

Question asked: a. If the Children between 16-18 years of age get into Naxalism, should they be treated like Juveniles/Children OR just like adult criminals?

b. If the children between 7 to 15 years of age get into the Naxalism, should they be treated like Juveniles/Children OR just like adult criminals?

Conclusion

This chapter compares and contrasts the attitude of the police and the common people towards the ongoing conflict as well as conflict-groups. Large majorities of the police and the public do not support any act of violence. At the same time, they support the cause and the demands of the conflict-groups though not the means adopted by them. Forty-six percent of the common people and 43 percent of the police personnel believe that the cause of the conflict groups is legitimate but the means adopted by them are wrong. People from insurgency-affected regions are more likely to hold this opinion, compared to those from LWE-affected regions. According to the common people, the major reasons for the people joining Naxalism/insurgency are inequality and discrimination, while police are more likely to believe that unemployment is a major reason.

The chapter also measures citizens' trust levels in the police, paramilitary/Army, and conflict-groups. It is apparent that people are more fearful of Naxalites/insurgent groups and their activities than the police or the paramilitary/Army. However, data also suggests that people in these conflict regions are also somewhat afraid of the police and security forces. While 37 percent people are afraid of physical assault by the Naxalites or insurgents, 35 percent are afraid of physical assault by the police. One out of five persons fears false implication by the paramilitary/Army in Naxalite/insurgency related cases.

Overall, both the police and people supported fair trial for the conflict-groups and broadly agreed that they should be treated like other criminals. However, troublingly, nearly one out of five common persons (19%) as well as police personnel (21%) are of the opinion that killing a dangerous Naxalite/insurgent is better than a legal trial.

Furthermore, a pattern emerges when social groups are factored into this equation. Both the police and public believe that some social groups (Adivasis and poor) are more likely to join Naxalites/insurgents. This prejudice coloured the police's treatment of these groups while dealing with Naxalism/insurgency-related cases. These groups also face violence perpetrated by security forces and conflict groups.

This chapter brings into focus not only the perceptions of the common people and the police personnel regarding the conflict in their region and the people involved but also delves into the fears, problems and human rights violations faced by the locals owing to the conflict. Aside from studying the levels of fear and trust, the chapter also assesses the overall perceptions of both the groups regarding the

socio-economic contours of the conflict and the opinions on methods which should be adopted while dealing with the alleged perpetrators of the conflict.

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3

Controlling the Conflict: Challenges in Policing

Security personnel drink water while patrolling in the Maoist forest area near Bangapal village, about 440 km south of the central Indian city of Raipur on March 18, 2007. ©REUTERS/Parth Sanyal

Key Takeaways

- A big majority of the police personnel surveyed (60%) believe that strict laws like UAPA, NSA etc. are important for controlling Naxalite/insurgent activities. Significantly, however, only 30 percent of the common people believe so.

- Forty-two percent of the common people from the insurgency-affected areas of Northeast believe that security laws such as UAPA are very harsh and should be repealed.

- Over three out of five common people believe that Naxalite/insurgent activities have decreased in their locality.

- A clear majority of personnel from the LWE-affected regions, (nearly 60%), have frequently been unable to perform their duty or control conflict because of shortage of staff and lack of safety.

- One in three police personnel believes that Naxalites/insurgents run a parallel taxation or justice system. However, only 18 percent and 14 percent common people respectively believe that Naxalites/insurgents run a parallel taxation system and a parallel justice/law and order system.

- Two out of five common people believe that police is corrupt in conflict regions and one out of two believes that police in conflict regions earns extra money from illegal sources. Such sentiments are stronger among middle class and rich people.

Controlling the Conflict: Challenges in Policing

Even as security forces, including the police, have intensified their fight against left-wing extremism and insurgency and have achieved better results in the recent past, their success has come at the cost of serious charges of excesses and human rights violations. The security forces too had to pay a price in terms of their own fatalities (*The Week*, 2019) and have borne the brunt of logistical challenges (Mehta, 2019). Public and media scrutiny shadow them everywhere more closely in conflict-affected regions as compared to other areas. Also called into question are their policies and practices regarding staffing, equipment, dubious or stage-managed encounters, use of draconian security laws or human rights violations. This chapter shares the survey's findings related to some of these challenges from the point of view of both the local police posted in the conflict-affected areas as well as the civilians living there. It throws light on the tools that help the police deal with the conflict situation, such as help from surrendered cadre of insurgents or extremists and informers. It also brings to our attention the hindrances faced by them such as pressure from the public, the media and activists and scarce resources and amenities at their disposal. Findings related to perceptions of both the police personnel and common people regarding tough security laws such as the UAPA and NSA, as well as the parallel taxation and justice system of the LWE extremists and insurgents have been shared in this chapter. The chapter also brings out the citizen's perception of how corrupt the police are, as corruption and inefficiency tend to go hand in hand.

Help from surrendered cadre, local informers and their effectiveness

Apart from pursuing a combative Counter-Insurgency (COIN) strategy, governments deal with left-wing extremism and insurgency by encouraging and facilitating the surrender of Naxalites and insurgents. Both the central and affected state governments have a 'Surrender-cum-Rehabilitation Policy' for militants and Naxalites willing to give up violence and enter into the mainstream. Under such a policy, surrendering extremist cadres are given an imme-

diate financial grant locked in for a few years subject to good behaviour. They are also given training in a chosen trade or vocation and paid a monthly stipend till they find a government job. There's even provision for financial incentives for surrendered weapons. The official reason cited for this is "to wean away the misguided youth and hardcore militants/Naxalites who have strayed into the armed underground movements and find themselves trapped into that net" and "to ensure that the militants/Naxalites who have surrendered do not find it attractive to join militancy/Naxal movement again." (MHA, 2015; PIB, 2018). Once they surrender, some of these men and women also provide inputs and intelligence to security forces or join specialised units set up by the state (*Statesman*, 2019; *Kalinga TV*, 2019). This job is fraught with great risks as surrendered cadres/militants and their families can be targeted by their former colleagues. According to recently released data by the Ministry of Home Affairs in response to an RTI query, as many as 4,122 left-wing extremists laid down their arms in the states of Odisha, Chhattisgarh and Andhra Pradesh between 2014 and 2020. Of those, 3,185 were in Chhattisgarh alone, while Andhra Pradesh and Odisha recorded 617 and 320 surrenders, respectively (*The Hindu*, 2020). In this context, the Common Cause–Lokniti, CSDS-survey asked police personnel in the conflict-affected regions if and to what extent the surrendered Naxalites or insurgents/militants were able to help them. In response, around one in every three (32%) police personnel, which is a substantial proportion, reported that such help was indeed being provided *(Table 3.1)*. Police personnel posted in the insurgency-affected regions of the North East and in the LWE-affected areas of mainland India were almost equally likely to report this, with 35 percent echoing this response in the former and 31 percent in the latter. Within these regions, police personnel interviewed in conflict-affected parts of Assam and Odisha particularly stood out. Surprisingly, not too many police personnel interviewed in Chhattisgarh reported receiving help from former cadres, even though Chhattisgarh has seen the highest number of surrenders.

Table 3.1 | One out of three police personnel claim that surrendered extremist cadre help the police in conflict regions

Surrendered Naxalites/ Insurgents Helping the Police	Police Personnel saying 'yes, it happens' (%)	Police Personnel saying 'no, it doesn't happen' (%)	Police Personnel who didn't respond/ didn't know (%)
Overall	*32*	*48*	*20*
LWE-affected regions	31	50	19
Insurgency-affected regions of NE	35	44	21

Note: All figures are rounded off.

Question asked: In this area, do you have Naxalites/insurgents who are helping the Police after they surrendered?

There was however a significant difference in the opinions of personnel posted in the two types of conflict-affected regions on the effectiveness of help by the surrendered cadres. Police personnel in the LWE-affected regions were a good 10 percentage points more likely than their counterparts in the insurgency-affected regions to view the help of surrendered cadre as being 'highly effective,' 30 percent as opposed to 20 percent *(Table 3.2)*. Those in the latter were more likely to view it as being 'somewhat' effective'. This apart, very few personnel posted in both types of conflict-affected areas viewed the assistance by surrendered cadre as being ineffective. Only 12 percent said so.

Table 3.2 | One out of four personnel believe that surrendered extremist cadres are very effective in controlling conflict

	Effectiveness of Surrendered Cadres: Police Personnel Response (%)			
	Very effective	Somewhat effective	Not much effective	Not at all effective
Overall	*26*	*60*	*11*	*1*
LWE-affected regions	30	53	13	1
Insurgency-affected regions of NE	20	69	10	-

Note: Rest of the respondents did not answer. All figures are rounded off.

Question asked: (If reported that help is taken from surrendered cadre) How effective have they been to the Police in controlling the Naxalism/ insurgent activities -very, somewhat, not much, or not at all?

Interestingly, the more experienced a police person was in terms of number of years spent at the present posting, the more likely he/she was to report that help by surrendered cadres was 'very effective' *(Figure 3.1)*. While only a quarter of the personnel who had spent less than 10 years at the posting reported that surrendered insurgents and Naxalites were helping a lot, among those who were in their pres-

ent posting for more than a decade, over two-fifths thought so. However, the more experienced police personnel were also least likely to report that surrendered cadres were helping the police – only 29 percent said that, compared to the overall average of 32 percent. In other words, even as the more experienced police personnel showed a lower tendency to report that surrendered cadres were helping the police, the ones who did do so vouched most about its effectiveness.

Police informers or *mukhbirs* have an even riskier job. Over the years, many *mukhbirs*, who act as an important source of tactical information to the police, have been killed and subjected to torture by Naxalites, insurgents and militants (the latter in Jammu and Kashmir). Despite being deployed covertly in intelligence gathering for the police and security forces, they are extremely vulnerable. This is so because they are devoid of physical protection and weapons, and may have no history of wielding weapons unlike surrendered cadres. We therefore asked police personnel about how effective *mukhbirs* were in helping to deal with the extremist activities. Overall, around one in every six (16%) viewed them as being very effective and two-fifths (41%) as being somewhat effective *(Table 3.3)*. Thus, a significant 57 percent of the personnel viewed them as being effective. On the other hand, only 23 percent said that they were either not much or not at all effective, with the rest either reporting absence of such informers or not answering the question at all. The perception that informers were playing an effective role was much stronger in net terms (percentage of total effective minus percentage of total ineffective) among police personnel in the insurgency-affected regions of the North East than among their counterparts in the LWE-affected regions. Police personnel in LWE-affected areas were in fact nearly twice as likely to believe that informers were not effective as those in the insurgency-affected areas, 29 percent to 15 percent respectively.

Table 3.3 | One out of six personnel believe that local informers are very effective in controlling conflict

	Effectiveness of Local Informers: Police Personnel Response (%)				
	Very effective	Somewhat effective	Not much effective	Not at all effective	No local informers here
Overall	*16*	*41*	*11*	*12*	*5*
LWE-affected regions	16	36	11	18	6
Insurgency-affected regions of NE	17	49	12	3	4

Note: Rest of the respondents did not answer. All figures are rounded off.

Question asked: How effective have local informers (or Mukhbirs) have been to the Police in controlling the Naxalism/insurgent activities in this area - very, somewhat, not much or not at all?

Figure 3.1 | Personnel with more experience at the posting location more likely to believe that surrendered extremist cadres are very effective in controlling conflict in the region

Personnel who have spent <5 years at the posting   Spent 5-9 years at the posting

Spent 10 or more years at the posting

Note: Rest of the respondents did not answer. All figures are rounded off.

Question asked: (If reported that help is taken from surrendered cadre) How effective have they been to the Police in controlling the Naxalism/insurgent activities -very, somewhat, not much, or not at all?

The survey indicates an inverse relationship between number of years at a current posting and the perceptions of effectiveness of local informers by the police. So, more experienced police personnel, spending a longer period at the posting were far more skeptical about the effectiveness of local informers than their less experienced colleagues. The survey revealed that those who had spent more than a decade at their current posting were two and half times more likely to view such informers as being not effective at all. This is in comparison to those who had spent five to nine years at their current posting and those who had served for less than five years *(Figure 3.2)*. This is in contrast to our finding with respect to police perception of the effectiveness of surrendered cadres *(see Figure 3.1)*. There, personnel who had served greater time at their current posting had a higher tendency to view surrendered cadres as being effective than relative newcomers to the area. Given that experienced personnel have a better understanding of the ground situation, their assessment reinforces that surrendered cadres are far more effective in the fight against Naxalism and insurgency than *mukhbirs*.

We also asked about local informers as part of the parallel survey among common people of the same conflict-affected areas. Respondents were asked whether they knew of Naxalites or insurgents harassing a former informer. Only

14 percent or around one in every seven civilians reported that they knew of such a case *(Table 3.4)*. This figure was, however, not consistent across both types of conflict-affected regions. In the LWE-affected regions it was higher than average, at 17 percent and in the insurgency-affected areas it was much lower, at just 8 percent. Within the LWE-affected areas, Jharkhand particularly stood out with 45 percent common people reporting knowledge of such cases, followed by Bihar and Odisha at 19 and 18 percent respectively.

Table 3.4 | Eighty-six percent common people not aware of any cases of harassment of informers by Naxalites/ insurgents

Common People's Response (%)		
	Do you know of any case where Naxalites/ insurgents have harassed someone who has been an informer to the police?	
	Yes	No/ No response
Overall	*14*	*86*
LWE-affected regions	17	83
Insurgency-affected regions of NE	8	92

Note: All figures are rounded off.

Question asked: Do you know of any case where Naxalites/insurgents have harassed someone who has been an informer to the police?

Note: Rest of the respondents did not answer. All figures are rounded off.

Question asked: How effective have local informers (or Mukhbirs) have been to the Police in controlling the Naxalism/insurgent activities in this area - very, somewhat, not much or not at all?

Hindrances to investigations

Police personnel were also asked about the extent of pressures faced by them while investigating LWE or insurgency-related cases from various quarters — public, local media, activists and the courts. Most police personnel reported feeling the strongest pressure from the local people and media *(Figure 3.3)*. While 43 percent said that they faced either a lot of pressure or some pressure from the local people, 42 percent said they felt similar pressure from the local media. Close on the heels were human rights activists and NGOs, with 38 percent reporting pressure from them. Police personnel were least likely to feel pressure from the courts with 36 percent reporting of such pressure. While these are all sizeable proportions and indicate a significant amount of interference, it is interesting that a majority of police personnel reported feeling little or no pressure from each of these sections. Moreover, if we just take into account the extreme responses – a lot and none at all, we notice that the proportion of those feeling no pressure at all was two to three times greater than those feeling a lot of pressure. Also, the ones who confessed to feeling pressured were more likely to report moderate than high pressure.

Interestingly, the responses of the police personnel from conflict-affected regions on the question related to pressure from various segments is very similar to the responses of the police personnel from across 21 states surveyed in the Status of Policing in India Report 2019. As found in SPIR 2019, 14 percent of the felt a lot of pressure from the common people, 20 percent felt a lot of pressure from the local media, 14 percent felt a lot of pressure from NGOs and human rights organisations and 14 percent felt a lot of pressure from the judiciary while investigating cases involving influential people.

Disaggregating the response by regions, we find that police personnel in the LWE-affected regions were far more likely to feel pressure from the public, local media, human rights activists and courts while investigating Naxalism-related cases than their counterparts in insurgency-affected regions *(Table 3.5)*. In LWE-affected regions, police persons were most likely to report pressure from the local media and human rights activists/NGOs while investigating Naxalism-related cases. In the insurgency-affected regions of the North East, they were far more likely to cite interference from the people than from anyone else.

Figure 3.3 | Two out of five police personnel feel pressure from the public and local media while investigating Naxalite/insurgency-related cases

Police Personnel's Response (%)

	Pressure from the public	Pressure from local media	Pressure from human rights activists/NGOs	Pressure from courts
None at all	28	33	35	40
Not much	24	21	21	18
Somewhat	28	26	24	24
A lot	15	16	14	12

Legend: None at all | Not much | Somewhat | A lot

Note: Rest of the respondents did not answer. All figures are rounded off.

Question asked: While investigating Naxalism/insurgency-related cases, how much pressure do the Police feel from the following people/organisations –a lot, somewhat, not much or none at all?

Table 3.5 | Personnel from LWE-affected regions more likely to feel pressure from the public, local media, NGOs and courts than those from insurgency-affected regions of NE

Police Personnel's Response (%)				
	A lot or some pressure from the…			
	Public	Local media	Human rights activists/ NGOs	Courts
LWE-affected regions	48	53	51	46
Insurgency-affected regions of NE	36	24	20	19

Note: All figures are rounded off.

Question asked: While investigating Naxalism/insurgency-related cases, how much pressure do the Police feel from the following people/ organisations - a lot, somewhat, not much or none at all?

Police and civilians' opinions on security-related laws

We also sought police personnel's opinion on stringent security laws giving a wide range of powers of search and arrest to the police and other law enforcement agencies. These include the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act (UAPA), 1967, the National Security Act, 1980 and the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA), 1958 enacted by the centre, or the Public Security Acts enacted by some states such as Chhattisgarh, Andhra Pradesh, Telangana and Tripura. Police personnel were asked whether they thought such laws were important to control Naxalite and insurgent activities or whether they were too harsh and should be repealed. The response was overwhelmingly in favour of the security laws, with three-fifths personnel wanting them to be in place and only one in five wishing them away *(Table 3.6).*

Table 3.6 | Three out of five personnel believe that security laws like UAPA, NSA etc. are important for controlling Naxalite/insurgent activities

Police Personnel's Response (%)				
	In order to control Naxalism/insurgent/militant activities, security laws like UAPA are important	Such laws are very harsh, and should be repealed or removed.	Not heard of such laws	No response
Overall	*60*	*19*	*9*	*13*
LWE-affected regions	65	14	9	12
Insurgency-affected regions of NE	52	25	9	14

Note: All figures are rounded off.

Question asked: Now I will read out two statements, please tell me which one do you agree with the most? Statement 1: In order to control Naxalism/insurgent activities security laws like UAPA are important. Statement 2: Such laws are very harsh, and should be repealed/removed.

While the majority of police personnel in both LWE-affected and insurgency-affected regions were in favour of continuing with these laws, those posted in the former were found to be stronger votaries. They were 13 percentage points more likely to want the laws than those posted in insurgency-affected regions of the North East.

When we look at the responses to the above question by the number of years spent by police personnel at their current posting, we get an interesting finding. The more experienced police personnel (i.e., those who had served five years or more at their current posting) were found to be more opinionated on the question than the less experienced *(Figure 3.4)*. Not only were they more likely to want the laws to continue than those who had spent less than five years, they were also more likely to want the laws to go than their less experienced counterparts. The latter had either not heard of the laws or chose not to respond to the question.

The same question was posed to civilians living in the conflict-affected regions as well. Compared to the police personnel, they were far less likely to have an opinion on the question. Nearly two-fifths did not answer the question *(Table 3.7)*. Around one-third (30%) were in favour of such laws and slightly over one quarter (27%) were opposed to them. However, when we looked at the opinion of only those civilians who were aware of these laws (26% as ascertained through a separate question), we found them to be less in favour of stringent legislations than the police personnel. While 49 percent of relatively better informed civilians thought that such laws were important in controlling Naxalite or insurgent activities, a substantial 46 percent wanted them to be repealed. Interestingly, the response to this question was diametrically opposite in the insurgency-affected areas and the LWE-affected areas. In the former, civilians who were aware of the security laws were two times more likely to want them to be repealed than stay. In the latter, it was the other way round - civilians were three times more likely to want such laws to stay than be repealed.

There could be one probable explanation for civilians being not too sure and opinionated about laws like UAPA, NSA and AFSPA. A large majority felt that extremist activities in their area were no longer as prevalent or rampant as they used to be in the past *(Table 3.8)*. On being asked if Naxalite or insurgent activities in their area had increased or decreased in the last 2-3 years, over three-fifths (63%) of common people interviewed in the conflict-affected regions said that they had gone down. Only one in every 10 (9%) said that they had gone up, while the rest either reported status quo or did not offer an opinion. The perception of extremist activities having decreased was more or less equally strong in both LWE and insurgency-affected areas.

Figure 3.4 | Personnel with more experience at posting location more likely to believe that security laws like UAPA are important

Police Personnel's Response (%)

- Security laws like UAPA are important: 58, 62, 66
- Such laws are very harsh, and should be repealed or removed: 17, 21, 23
- Not heard of such laws: 10, 6, 4
- No response: 14, 11, 8

Legend:
- Personnel who have spent <5 years at the posting
- Spent 5-9 years at the posting
- Spent 10 or more years at the posting

Note: All figures are rounded off.

Question asked: Now I will read out two statements, please tell me which one do you agree with the most? Statement 1: In order to control Naxalism/insurgent activities security laws like UAPA are important. Statement 2: Such laws are very harsh, and should be repealed/removed.

Table 3.7 | Two out of three common people in insurgency-affected regions of NE who are aware of security laws want them repealed

	Common People's Response (%)		
	In order to control Naxalism/ insurgent/militant activities security laws like UAPA are important	Such laws are very harsh, and should be repealed or removed	No response
Overall (all common people)	*30*	*27*	*43*
LWE-affected regions	31	18	51
Insurgency-affected regions	29	42	29
Overall only those common people who had heard of such laws (26%)	*49*	*46*	*5*
Only those common people aware in LWE-affected regions (20%)	71	23	6
Only those common people aware in insurgency-affected regions of North East (37%)	29	67	4

Note: All figures are rounded off.

Question asked: Now I will read out two statements, please tell me which one do you agree with the most? Statement 1: In order to control Naxalism/ insurgent activities security laws like UAPA are important. Statement 2: Such laws are very harsh, and should be repealed/removed.

Table 3.8 | More than sixty percent common people believe that Naxalite/insurgent activities have decreased in their locality

Frequency of Naxalite/Insurgent Activities: Common People's Response (%)			
	Increased	Decreased	Remained same
Overall	*9*	*63*	*16*
LWE-affected regions	10	65	12
Insurgency-affected regions of NE	7	60	22

Note: Rest of the respondents did not answer. All figures are rounded off.

Question asked: In the last 2-3years, have Naxalite/insurgent activities in your locality increased or decreased?

Challenges in policing

Experience of difficult situations

Police personnel posted in conflict-affected areas were asked whether they had ever experienced the logistical challenges and life threatening situations that are a part and parcel of difficult terrain postings. Half of the police personnel had experienced situations where the Naxalites or insurgents had committed a violent crime but their team couldn't reach the scene on time due to staff shortage *(Table 3.9)*. Over two-fifths (45%) reported that they or their vehicle had been attacked by Naxalites and insurgents at least once. Nearly 43 percent reported that they had avoided going to the scene of a Naxalite or insurgent crime because it was not safe to do so, at least once during

Table 3.9 | One in four personnel have often or a few times been in situations where they could not go to the conflict/crime spot because it was unsafe

"During this posting, how often have you faced the following situations?"	Police Personnel's Response (%)			
	Many times	Few times	Rarely	Never/no response
Naxalites/insurgents committed a violent crime but your team was unable to reach the crime spot on time because of shortage of staff at the police station.	10	19	21	50
Naxalites/insurgents committed a violent crime but your team could not go there as it was unsafe even for the Police to do so.	9	14	20	57
Attack on Police or on police jeep/car by Naxalites/insurgents.	8	20	19	53

Note: All figures are rounded off.

Question asked: During this posting, how often have you faced the following situations - many times, few times, rarely or never?

their posting. Police personnel in the LWE-affected areas were far more likely to have encountered all three of these situations than those posted in the insurgency-affected areas of the North East *(Table 3.10)*.

Table 3.10 | Personnel from LWE-affected regions more likely to be unable to perform duty or control conflict because of shortage of staff and lack of safety

Police Personnel's Response (%)			
	Naxalites/ insurgents/militants committed a violent crime but your team was unable to reach the crime spot on time because of shortage of staff at the police station.	Naxalites/ insurgents/ militants committed a violent crime but your team could not go there as it was unsafe even for the Police to do so.	Attack on Police or on police jeep/car by Naxalites/ insurgents
LWE-affected regions	61	58	59
Insurgency-affected regions of NE	31	20	27

Note: Rest of the respondents did not answer. All figures are rounded off. 'Many times', 'few times', 'rarely' are combined.

Question asked: During this posting, how often have you faced the following situations - many times, few times, rarely or never?

The parallel survey among common people also tried to find out if they were aware of abduction or murder of police personnel or violence against them by Naxalites or insurgents. Only 10 percent civilians said they were aware of any such case. Interestingly, just as policemen in the LWE-affected regions were more likely to report having experienced a violent attack than those in the insurgency-affected areas *(see Table 3.10)*, people living in the former were also two times more likely to know of crimes (attack/abduction) against police personnel than those living in the insurgency-affected areas were to know of police personnel facing violence. The proportion is 13 percent to six percent respectively *(Table 3.11)*.

Table 3.11 | Ninety percent common people not aware of any cases of violence by Naxalite/insurgents against the police

Common People's Response (%)		
	"Do you know of any case where a Police person was abducted or became a victim of violence or killed by Naxalites?"	
	Yes	No/ 'No response'
Overall	*10*	*90*
LWE-affected regions	13	87
Insurgency-affected regions of NE	6	94

Note: All figures are rounded off.

Question asked: Do you know of any case where a Police person was abducted or became a victim of violence or killed by Naxalites?

Parallel governance systems run by Naxalites and insurgents

Police personnel in conflict-affected areas also grapple with the parallel system of taxation and justice put in place by extremists in certain remote areas. Naxalites have been known to collect taxes from local people in order to fund their activities which are often described as running a parallel government. In fact the writ of the government/state does not run in some areas in central India. Rather, it is the Naxalites who run the show and dispense what is their idea of justice. In the North East too, Naga insurgency has been sustained for decades with several insurgent groups and their factions running their own parallel governments and taxation systems (Chakravarty, 2015).

Given the context, we asked both the police personnel and civilians in our two parallel surveys about whether such a system existed in their area at all. One in every three police personnel posted in both insurgency as well as LWE-affected areas reported with certainty that Naxalites and insurgents illegally collected money or tax from the people of the area. About one-fourth thought that this might be happening *(Table 3.12)*.

As far as the common people are concerned, the figures were comparatively much less. Around one-fifth (18%) said a parallel taxation system of Naxalites or insurgents in their area was certainly in place and another one-sixth (16%) said it might be in place *(Table 3.13)*. Once again, the certainty among people that it was happening was almost of the same intensity in both the LWE and insurgency-affection regions. So, a similar proportion of people in both areas (18% each) reported unequivocally that such a parallel taxation system existed.

The response is different on the issue of Naxalites and insurgents running a parallel justice system in the area. Police personnel in insurgency-affected areas of the North East were far more likely to say that it was definitely happening (37%) or perhaps happening (32%) than those in LWE-affected areas – 30 percent and 20 percent, respectively. When common people were asked the same question, no such regional difference was noticed. However, in comparison to the police personnel, common people were less likely to report the existence of a parallel justice system in their area (only 14% said it was definitely there and 17% thought it was perhaps there). This was true for both LWE and insurgency-affected regions.

Table 3.12 | One in three personnel strongly believes that Naxalites/insurgents run a parallel taxation or justice system

Police Personnel's Response (%)				
	Do Naxalites/insurgents/militants illegally collect money/tax from people in this area?		Do Naxalites/insurgents/militants run their own rules and laws?	
	Yes it happens	Perhaps it happens	Yes	Perhaps
Overall	*33*	*22*	*33*	*25*
Insurgency-affected regions of NE	34	27	37	32
LWE-affected regions	33	19	30	20

Note: Rest of the respondents either said No or did not answer. All figures are rounded off.

Question asked: In this area, do the Naxalites do the following? **a.** *Illegally collect money/tax from people* **b.** *Run their own rules and laws*

Table 3.13 | Common people less likely than police personnel to believe that Naxalites/insurgents run a parallel taxation or justice system

Common People's Response (%)				
	Do Naxalites/insurgents illegally collect money/tax from people in this area?		Do Naxalites/insurgents run their own rules and laws?	
	Yes it happens	Perhaps it happens	Yes	Perhaps
Overall	*18*	*16*	*14*	*17*
Insurgency-affected regions of NE	18	21	13	21
LWE-affected regions	18	14	15	15

Note: Rest of the respondents either said No or did not answer. All figures are rounded off.

Question asked: In this area, do the Naxalites do the following? a. Illegally collect money/tax from people b. Run their own rules and laws

Civilians' perception about corruption in police in conflict-affected regions

Corruption and dishonesty among police personnel undermine their ability to enforce laws which is a serious obstacle when dealing with extremist activity in conflict-affected regions. While bribing of police officials has always been a serious concern in the fight against Naxalism and insurgency, complaints of corruption have also been made from time to time. In 2014, the CRPF in collusion with Jharkhand police personnel were found to have scripted a fake surrender cum job scam in order to boost the number of Naxalite surrenders. They convinced young people, many of them tribals, to surrender while posing as Naxalites on the promise of being inducted into the central force as reformed extremists, according to media reports. The misled youth were also made to pay huge sums of money

as part of the deal (Srivastava, 2015). It is in the backdrop of incidents like these that the civilians in conflict-affected regions were asked how corrupt they perceived the police to be. To our surprise, people's perception about police personnel regarding corruption was not as negative as portrayed in some media reports. The proportion of civilians who thought that the police in their area was not at all corrupt/not much corrupt was greater than those who felt it was very or somewhat corrupt, 50 percent to 40 percent. While this trend was more or less the same in insurgency and LWE-affected areas, there was noticeable difference in the perceived degree of corruption. Common people in insurgency affected areas were twice as likely to consider the police to be not at all corrupt than very corrupt, 25 percent to 12 percent. In the LWE-affected region they were thrice as likely to do so, 33 percent to 10 percent *(Table 3.14)*. Also, richer and middle-class respondents were far more likely to consider the police as being highly corrupt or somewhat corrupt than the poorer respondents *(Table 3.15)*.

Table 3.14 | Two out of five common people believe that police is corrupt in conflict regions

Common People's Perception (%)				
	"Police in such conflict-affected regions is…"			
	Very corrupt	Somewhat corrupt	Not much corrupt	Not at all corrupt
Overall	*11*	*28*	*20*	*30*
LWE-affected regions	10	27	22	33
Insurgency-affected regions of NE	12	31	18	25

Note: Rest of the respondents did not answer. All figures are rounded off.

Question asked: In your experience, in such Naxalism/insurgent affected areas, how corrupt are the police - very, somewhat, not much or not at all?

Table 3.15 | Middle class and rich people more likely to believe that police is corrupt in conflict regions

Class Category	Common People's Perception (%)			
	"Police in such conflict-affected regions is…"			
	Very corrupt	Somewhat corrupt	Not much corrupt	Not at all corrupt
Overall	*11*	*28*	*20*	*30*
Poor	10	26	16	36
Lower	11	25	21	33
Middle	11	33	25	23
Rich	14	38	17	18

Note: Rest of the respondents did not answer. All figures are rounded off.

Question asked: In your experience, in such Naxalism/insurgent affected areas, how corrupt are the police - very, somewhat, not much or not at all?

In the Status of Policing in India Report 2018 common people across 22 states were surveyed and it was found that 27 percent civilians rated the local police as "very corrupt",

34 percent rated them as somewhat corrupt, 22 percent thought that they were not much corrupt and 11 percent were of the opinion that they were not at all corrupt. Comparing those responses with the responses of civilians in conflict-affected regions, we find that the perceptions are widely different - people from mainland states are more likely to perceive the police as being corrupt than those from conflict-affected regions.

In order to probe further, we asked common people whether the police were more likely to earn money from illegal sources, given that it was a conflict-affected area. The responses were not as positive compared to earlier questions on police corruption. Most people (53%) said that the police in their area were indeed more prone to making money from unlawful sources and only 33 percent thought otherwise. The rest remained silent *(Table 3.16)*.

Table 3.16 | One out of two common people believe that police in conflict regions likely to earn extra money from illegal sources

	Common People's Perception (%)			
	"Police in conflict-affected regions like this is usually more likely to earn extra money from the illegal sources"			
	Fully agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Fully disagree
Overall	*18*	*35*	*11*	*21*
LWE-affected regions	19	36	9	19
Insurgency-affected regions of NE	15	33	15	23

Note: Rest of the respondents did not answer. All figures are rounded off.

Question asked: Police in Conflict-affected Regions like this is usually more likely to earn extra money from the illegal sources'. Do you agree or disagree with this statement?

Table 3.17 | Middle class and rich people more likely to believe that police in conflict regions earns extra money from illegal sources

	Common People's Perception (%)			
Class Category	"Police in conflict-affected regions like this is usually more likely to earn extra money from the illegal sources"			
	Fully agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Fully disagree
Overall	*18*	*35*	*11*	*21*
Poor	16	29	9	23
Lower	16	35	12	23
Middle	20	40	14	16
Rich	22	39	11	16

Note: Rest of the respondents did not answer. All figures are rounded off.

Question asked: Police in Conflict-affected Regions like this is usually more likely to earn extra money from the illegal sources'. Do you agree or disagree with this statement?

The perception that the police in their area had a high tendency to earn money through illegal sources was greater among civilians in LWE-affected areas in net terms (agree minus disagree) than in insurgency-affected areas. Once again, economically well-off respondents were far more likely to believe that the police in their area was prone to making money from illegal sources than those worse-off *(Table 3.17)*. The poorer people had a more positive opinion of the police, at least regarding corruption. When looked through the lenses of caste and community, Hindu Adivasis were least likely to believe that the police were earning extra money through unlawful means and Hindu upper castes and Muslims were most likely to do so *(Table 3.18)*.

Table 3.18 | Hindu upper castes and Muslims more likely to believe that police in conflict regions earns extra money from illegal sources

	Common People's Perception (%)			
Caste/Religion of the Respondent	"Police in conflict-affected regions like this is usually more likely to earn extra money from illegal sources"			
	Fully agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Fully disagree
Overall	*18*	*35*	*11*	*21*
Hindu Upper Caste	23	39	13	18
Hindu OBCs	18	37	9	22
Hindu Dalits	20	36	10	18
Hindu Adivasis	14	26	12	26
Muslims	20	49	13	12
Christian	14	33	15	17
Others	22	40	8	18

Note: Rest of the respondents did not answer. All figures are rounded off.

Question asked: Police in Conflict-affected Regions like this is usually more likely to earn extra money from the illegal sources'. Do you agree or disagree with this statement?

Conclusion

To sum up, five broad conclusions emerge from the survey data presented in this chapter.

First, there is a widely-held belief among police personnel that surrendered cadres of Naxalites and insurgents are of better assistance to the local police in dealing with extremist activities than local informers or *mukhbirs*. Although only one in every three police personnel reported that surrendered cadres were of help, a large majority viewed them as being very or somewhat effective. This was particularly true of those serving for a long period in conflict-affected areas. On the other hand, the proportion of those viewing local informers being effective was comparatively lower. Further, more experienced police personnel were less likely to vouch for the effectiveness of local informers than their less experienced counterparts.

Second, police personnel posted in conflict-affected regions face the highest pressure from the local residents and local media while investigating cases. The proportion of police personnel reporting pressure from local media and residents was more or less similar in the LWE-affected areas. In the insurgency-affected areas public pressure posed to be the biggest obstacle, ahead of media or any other segment. In both insurgency and LWE-affected regions, courts were perceived to be exerting the least amount of pressure. Also, police personnel posted in LWE-affected regions felt most pressured, and by a large margin. This could also be because the police in conflict-affected regions are able to exercise more control and relative autonomy than those posted in areas not affected by conflicts.

Third, police personnel posted in conflict-affected regions highly supported some of the stringent or draconian security laws enacted by the central and state governments. While the proportion in favour of the laws was far greater than that opposed to them, it was particularly true for LWE- than insurgency-affected regions. In both the regions, police personnel who were more experienced and had served a number of years at their current posting were more likely to be opinionated (both positive and negative) on the issue of laws than their less experienced colleagues, many of whom did not express an opinion. A fairly large proportion of police personnel (over one-fifth) did not have an opinion on the issue. When asked about these laws, civilians/common people were found to be even more evasive. More than two-fifths did not answer the question, mostly because many of them were unaware of the laws or of their controversial provisions. However, among those who were aware, support for the laws was only slightly greater than opposition to them. This too was largely on account of high support for these legislations in the LWE-affected regions. Compared to the personnel, common people have a far more negative opinion on harsh security laws like UAPA and NSA. This is understandable, given that they often have to face the fallouts of these controversial legislations.

Fourth, common people residing in conflict-affected regions have quite a poor idea of the threat faced by the police personnel. This was the perception although one in 10 civilians interviewed said they knew of a case of abduction or a murder of a police person or even a violent attack on one in their area. This perception contrasts with the responses of the police personnel. Nearly two-fifths of police personnel reported having experienced an attack by Naxalites and insurgents at least once during their time in the area. A similar divergence in responses between civilians and police can be seen regarding questions on the existence of parallel taxation and justice systems run by extremists. Civilians were two to three times less likely to confirm their existence than the police personnel.

Fifth, most people, quite surprisingly, did not view the police as being corrupt in both LWE and insurgency-affected regions. However, most also agreed that police personnel in their area were making money from illegal sources at the same time. This view was stronger among economically well off respondents. From the differing responses to the two questions, it thus appears that people in conflict-affected areas may have a different idea of corruption in their mind than what is generally assumed, and that the making of money via illegal channels by the police may not necessarily be seen by the public as an act of corruption but as a normal way of operating.

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4

Relationship between the Police and the People in Conflict Regions

A demonstrator drags burning tyres during a day-long strike to protest against the killing of Sudip Datta Bhowmik, a local journalist, who according to local media was shot dead by a Tripura State Rifles trooper on Tuesday, in Agartala, India. November 23, 2017.
©REUTERS/Jayanta Dey

Key Takeaways

- Police personnel (33%) are nearly twice as likely as common people (18%) to report one/two incidents of violent conflicts with the people in the last 2-3 years.

- One out of five police personnel from the LWE-affected areas say they would arrest the protestors during a peaceful protest despite a curfew.

- Thirty-six percent common people believe that the police discriminates against the poor in their drive against Naxalites/insurgents.

- More than one out of four (28%) common people believe that Adivasis are likely to be falsely implicated in Naxalism/insurgency-related charges.

- Amongst the common people from the LWE-affected regions, 40 percent believe that during criminal investigation the police would favour a rich person against a poor person, 32 percent feel that they would favour an upper caste against a Dalit; 22 percent feel that they would favour a non-Adivasi against an Adivasi; and 20 percent feel they would favour a Hindu against a Muslim.

- A higher number of the people (50%) in conflict-affected areas (LWE and insurgency-affected areas combined) have a lot of trust in the army when compared to 47 percent in the police and 43 percent in the paramilitary forces.

- In the insurgency-affected areas of the North-East, the levels of trust are lower—33 percent people have a lot of trust in the Army as against 37 percent in the police and 25 percent in the paramilitary forces.

- About one out of three common people are afraid of being beaten up by the police or being arrested or detained by the police for no reason; Nineteen percent of the people from the insurgency-affected regions have a lot of fear of the police.

Relationship between the Police and the People in Conflict Regions

In the conflict zones, people-police interactions take place in the shadow of the gun. Common people are caught in the crossfire between armed underground movements and the police or the security forces.

On the one hand, conflict-groups like the Naxalites or the insurgents dictate ideological terms on the local people, while the same people are often implicated in false cases on the other (Sharma, 2016; *The Times of India*, 2020; The Economic Times, 2015; NHRC, 2015-2016). The fear, triggered by the tense relationship between the police and conflict groups, curbs local people's freedom and casts a shadow of doubt on the people-police interactions. The National Commission for Human Rights (NHRC) has also taken note of discrimination by the police on the basis of caste or tribal identity. The challenges of policing are equally severe. The police face dual challenges of controlling Naxalism/insurgency and that of protecting local people from the violence of conflict groups.

This chapter examines the relationship between the common people and police personnel in conflict regions by making sense of their interactions and perceptions about each other. The chapter is divided into three sections. The first section is devoted to people-police confrontations at protests and unlawful gatherings. It also deals with the perceptions about 'peaceful' protests as well as attitudes and actions of the police towards people in violent conflicts. We found that people tend to believe that the protests are peaceful, while the police are deeply sceptical about protesters. The second section investigates people's perceptions about the fairness of the police in conflict regions. It addresses issues such as false implication under charges of Naxalism/insurgency, discrimination towards particular social groups, among others. The last section compares and analyses the level of trust and fear among people in their police. The police often take the local people's trust in them for granted and estimate it to be much higher than it actually is. The difference in the perceptions of trust points to a complex relationship between the two in conflict regions.

Violent encounters between the police and the people

The police and people communicate at the intersections of crime reporting, investigation, surveillance and protection. This section shines a spotlight on violent interactions between the police and common people. It will also offer insights into the frequency of these conflicts, the differences between Left-Wing Extremism (LWE) and insurgency-affected regions as well as the various kinds of force used by the police. This will help us take a deep dive into the police-public relationship. This will also form the foundation for a trustworthy people-oriented policing mechanism in the conflict-affected regions.

Civilians and police personnel have both reported that the number of violent conflicts between the two were low during the last two-three years. However, police personnel were more likely to report such violent encounters with locals, as compared to common people.

The proportion of police personnel reporting such conflicts at least once or twice during the past two-three years is almost double that of people reporting the same. Further, the proportion of police reporting such conflicts three or four times during past two-three years is three times that of people having reported the same. So, while four in 10 police personnel said that they never got into a violent interaction with locals, seven in 10 ordinary citizens reported the same *(Figure 4.1 on the next page).*

With a gap of five percentage points, female police personnel were less likely to report that they were involved in a violent conflict between the police and people.

Violent conflicts in the LWE and insurgency-affected regions

Sharp differences exist in the relationship between the people and the police in the two conflict regions – the LWE and insurgency-affected areas. A greater proportion of both ordinary people and police personnel from LWE–affected

Figure 4.1 | Police personnel are twice as likely to report one or two violent conflicts with people in the last 2-3 years, compared to the common people

Note: Rest of the respondents did not answer. All figures are rounded off.

Question asked: (To common people) In last 2-3 years, how many times have you been in a situation where there is a violent conflict between the local people and the police force never, once-twice, three-four times, or many times?

(To police personnel) In this posting, how many times have you been in a situation where there is a violent conflict between the local people and the police force-never, once twice, three four times, or many times?

regions reported having experienced violent conflicts than those in insurgency-affected regions *(Table 4.1).*

Police personnel in the insurgency-affected regions were more likely to report that they have never been in a violent conflict with the local people, compared to those from the LWE-affected regions—a gap of 16 percentage points. In contrast more than one-fifth or 22 percent police personnel in the LWE-affected regions reported to have been in such a situation at least three-four times (combining three-four times, many times and always) during last couple of years. This is in comparison to merely six percent from the insurgency-affected areas *(Table 4.1).*

The responses of the common people seem to follow a similar trend. Common people in insurgency-affected regions are less likely to report violent encounters with the police, as compared to those from LWE-affected regions.

This striking difference in responses between the LWE and insurgency-affected regions points to the divergent nature of conflicts in these two regions. Conflict groups in the LWE-affected regions are perhaps more likely to recruit common people. Insurgents, however, largely remain underground, and therefore, can be differentiated from the local people.

Table 4.1 | Police personnel and common people from insurgency-affected regions less likely to report violent encounters between the police and the locals

Number of violent conflicts between locals and police: Police Personnel's Response (%)				
	Never	**Once-twice**	**Three-four times**	**Many times**	**Always**
Overall	*44*	*33*	*6*	*8*	*2*
LWE-affected regions	38	31	9	10	3
Insurgency-affected regions	54	38	1	5	0
Number of violent conflicts between locals and police: Common People's Response (%)				
Overall	*64*	*18*	*2*	*5*	*1*
LWE-affected regions	56	19	3	8	1
Insurgency-affected regions	77	17	1	1	1

Note: Rest of the respondents did not answer. All figures are rounded off.

Question asked: (To common people) In last 2-3 years, how many times have you been in a situation where there is a violent conflict between the local people and the police force never, once-twice, three-four times, or many times?

(To police personnel) In this posting, how many times have you been in a situation where there is a violent conflict between the local people and the police force-never, once twice, three four times, or many times?

Attitude of police towards protestors

At times, protests lead to confrontation between the police and people. This can happen due to a variety of reasons. The state deploys the police for crowd regulation and management, and sometimes, even to disperse or remove people from the protest sites. Therefore, protests can potentially snowball into violent interactions between protesters and the police even though protests are understood to be a tool of democracy. The survey asked police personnel about their modus operandi for crowd control when Section 144 of IPC is imposed. Civilians were also asked about their opinions and experience of police action in such situations.

Both the police and the people agreed, in varying degree, that the police mostly use non-violent methods such as appeals or persuasions to disperse peaceful protesters when Section144 of the IPC is imposed. However, police personnel were found to be slightly more likely to report so. While nearly seven in 10, or 68 percent police personnel claimed that they usually try to disperse the crowd through appeals or persuasions, one in two, or 49 percent civilians claimed the same. Police personnel were also less likely to report that they let the protests happen, as compared to the people. While almost one in five or 16 percent common people reported so, this proportion was merely five percent among police personnel.

Further, civilians were slightly more likely to report that the police use force to disperse the crowd in such situations. Worse, 15 percent police personnel and 10 percent common people reported that in such situations the police arrest the protestors straightaway rather than as a last resort. Overall, the priority of the police lies in maintaining law and order under Section 144 and disallowing such protests *(Table 4.2)*.

In a follow-up question posed to nine percent of police personnel who reported using force to disperse the crowd, *lathi*-charge emerged as the most preferable method, followed by tear gas and water cannons.

When the responses are broken down by the types of conflict, the police personnel in both LWE and insurgency-affected regions rarely allow protests to happen. However, the number of police personnel claiming to straight away arrest the protestors is twice in LWE-affected regions than the insurgency-affected ones. In contrast, common people living in insurgency-affected regions were slightly more likely to claim that the police straight away arrest the protestors in such situations. Further, the proportion of police personnel saying they used force was double in the insurgency-affected regions, as compared to those in the LWE- affected ones *(Table 4.3)*. It implies that the police in insurgency-affected regions take more stringent measures

Table 4.2 | Police personnel more likely to believe that during protests they use peaceful methods of crowd control, as compared to the general public

	During a peaceful protest despite a curfew, what do the police do?			
	Let it happen	Try to disperse the crowd through appeal/persuasion	Use force to disperse the crowd	Arrest the protestors
Police Personnel's response (%)	5	68	9	15
Common People's response (%)	16	49	13	10

Note: Rest of the respondents did not answer. All figures are rounded off.

Questions asked: (To police personnel) Suppose there is a peaceful protest going on in a public place on some regional issue involving a large number of people despite Sec. 144 of IPC being imposed and you are deployed along with your team to control the crowd. What would you do in such a situation let it happen, try to disperse the crowd through appeal/persuasion, use force to disperse the crowd, or arrest the protestors?

(To common people) When there is a peaceful protest going on at a public place without any permission, what do police mostly do in such a situation?

during protests than their colleagues in the LWE-affected regions. This is quite ironical as police personnel say that the number of violent conflicts in past two-three years is lower in insurgency-affected than LWE-affected regions *(Table 4.1)*. The survey data suggests that the police are more likely to use forceful methods during protests in insurgency-affected regions as compared to those in the LWE-affected regions.

Significant differences emerge in the responses of the common people and the police personnel across the two geographic locations. Even though overall the police personnel are three times less likely to report than the common people that they let the protests happen *(Table 4.2)*, the contrasts are sharper across the different regions. In LWE-affected regions, the police are nearly four times less likely than the common people to report that they let the protests continue, while in insurgency-affected regions they three times less likely to say so. Similarly, while overall the police personnel are more likely than the common people to report straight away arrest of protestors – 15 percent compared to 10 percent respectively *(Table 4.2)*, personnel from LWE-affected regions are significantly more likely to report this (20%) compared to those from insurgency-affected regions (9%) *(Table 4.3 on next page)*.

To summarise, the responses of both the people and police personnel indicate that the latter in the insurgency-affected regions are more likely to use force on the people when compared to their counterparts in the LWE-affected regions.

Table 4.3 | According to police personnel, protestors are twice as likely to be arrested in LWE-affected states compared to insurgency-affected regions

	During a peaceful protest despite a curfew, what do the police do?			
	Let it happen	**Try to disperse the crowd through appeal/persuasion**	**Use force to disperse the crowd**	**Arrest the protestors**
Police Personnel's Response (%)				
LWE-affected regions	5	65	7	20
Insurgency-affected regions	4	72	13	9
Common People's Response (%)				
LWE-affected regions	19	47	12	9
Insurgency-affected regions	12	52	15	13

Note: Rest of the respondents did not answer. All figures are rounded off.

Questions asked: (To police personnel) Suppose there is a peaceful protest going on in a public place on some regional issue involving a large number of people despite Sec. 144 of IPC being imposed and you are deployed along with your team to control the crowd. What would you do in such a situation let it happen, try to disperse the crowd through appeal/persuasion, use force to disperse the crowd, or arrest the protestors?

(To common people) When there is a peaceful protest going on at a public place without any permission, what do police mostly do in such a situation?

Perceptions about the fairness of the police

While analysing people-police relationships, it is important to look at the perceptions of fairness and impartiality of the police while dealing with various social groups. The sense of fairness inspires better trust and relationship among the groups involved (Tyler, 2005).

Political conflict in the LWE and insurgency-affected regions makes the civilians more vulnerable to police action. Groups such as Adivasis and indigenous people, who continue to stay in the political, social and economic margins tend to be more vulnerable. This section examines the vulnerability of these groups by looking at the issues of fairness in policing.

Implicating people under false charges

Over 60 per cent of the common people disagreed that police implicate innocent people under false charges of Naxalism/insurgency. Further, even though only seven percent said that police make false charges, one-fifth expressed un-

certainty regarding this. One in 10 civilians did not give any response. There is not much difference in responses between LWE and insurgency affected regions on this issue *(Table 4.4)*.

Table 4.4 | Two in three common people disagreed that police falsely implicate people, while a quarter agreed or were doubtful about the same

Do police falsely implicate people?	Common People's Response (%)			
	No	**Yes**	**Maybe**	**No Response**
Overall	67	7	16	10
LWE-affected regions	67	8	15	10
Insurgency-affected regions	67	6	16	11

Note: All figures are rounded off.

Question asked: It is often alleged that the police intentionally implicate people under false charges of Naxalism/Insurgency/militancy. Do you think the police in your area do this?

Targeting social groups

The respondents were asked to share their opinions on the alleged discrimination by the police while taking action against those involved in conflict-related activities. When asked about the various social groups (poor, non-literate, Adivasi, rural, Dalit, Muslims and Christians), 40-60 percent persons responded that there is no discrimination against these social groups. However, those who believed that there was discrimination said that the victims were mostly the poor, non-literates, rural and Adivasis groups. While four in 10 people said that poor are not at all discriminated against, nearly two in five, or 36 percent people said that the poor are either highly or somewhat discriminated against. One in three or 31 percent people responded that illiterates are discriminated against in great or some degree. Further, nearly one in three or 29 percent people said the rural people are discriminated against, while one in four or 24 percent people had the same opinion about the Adivasis *(Table 4.5)*.

It is often alleged that the police falsely implicate people under charges of Naxalism/insurgency. When common people were asked how likely it is for Dalits, Adivasis, Muslims and indigenous people to be falsely implicated, more than one in four or 27 percent of common people said that Adivasis were either very or somewhat likely to be falsely implicated. For Dalits, Muslims and indigenous people, it was 22 percent, 15 percent and 13 percent of common people, respectively, who shared this opinion *(Table 4.6)*.

Table 4.5 | Common people most likely to believe that the police discriminates against the poor

How much does police discriminate against…	Common People's Response (%)			
	A lot	Somewhat	Not much	Not at all
Poor	12	24	17	42
Adivasi	9	15	17	48
Non-literate	9	22	18	45
Rural	9	20	21	45
Dalit	6	14	17	50
Muslims	4	12	17	55
Christians	3	9	18	58

Note: Rest of the respondents did not answer. All figures are rounded off.

Question asked: Often people say that while taking action against the Naxalites/Insurgents/militants, the police discriminate against some people. In your opinion, how much do the police discriminate against the following: poor, non-literate.ST, rural, SC, Muslim, Christian -a lot, somewhat, not much, not at all?

Table 4.6 | One out of four people believe that Adivasis are likely to be falsely implicated in Naxalism/insurgency-related charges

How likely are the following groups to be falsely implicated in Naxalism/insurgency related cases?	Common People's Response (%)			
	Very	Somewhat	Not much	Not at all
Dalits	9	13	19	46
Adivasis	8	19	18	44
Muslims	3	12	15	52
Indigenous People*	2	11	12	39

Note: Rest of the respondents did not answer. All figures are rounded off.

*Asked only in Assam, Manipur, Nagaland.

Question asked: It is alleged often that some people are falsely implicated by the police on Naxalism/Insurgency related charges. In your opinion, how likely is it for the following groups to be falsely implicated in such cases by the police-very, somewhat, not much or not at all?

To measure the attitude of police towards various groups, we had another situation-based question in the survey. We asked respondents to choose one among two groups more likely to be favoured by the police if criminal investigation of a case is going on.

Upper castes and rich are likely to be favoured the most when people of different groups are compared. More than one in four or 25 percent common people felt that police are more likely to favour an upper caste person, as opposed to a Dalit. About one-fifth or 18 percent felt that non-Adivasis would have an advantage against Adivasis. About one-sixth also felt that a Hindu would be favoured against a Muslim and more than one-third believed that the police would favour the rich against the poor *(Table 4.7)*.

Table 4.7 | Upper-castes more likely to be favoured against Dalits by the police; Rich even more likely to be favoured against the poor

In criminal investigation, who do the police generally favour more?	Common People's Response (%)		
Dalit vs Non-Dalit	Favour Dalit	Favour Upper caste	Favour none
	7	25	54
Adivasi vs Non-Adivasi	Favour Adivasi	Favour Non-Adivasi	Favour none
	9	18	57
Muslim vs Hindu	Favour Muslim	Favour Hindu	Favour none
	5	17	59
Poor vs Rich	Favour Poor	Favour Rich	Favour none
	10	35	43

Note: Rest of the respondents did not answer. All figures are rounded off.

Question asked: If there is a criminal investigation for cases involving following groups of people, in your opinion, who do police generally tend to favour more?

Comparison between LWE-affected regions and insurgency-affected regions

Further, people living in the LWE and the insurgency-affected regions have notably different views when asked if the police tend to favour any group during criminal investigations. Overall, people in LWE-affected regions are more likely to believe that the police are biased than those in insurgency-affected regions. Thirty-two percent people in the LWE-affected regions said that the police are biased against Dalits. In the insurgency-affected regions, this proportion is 14 percent (This should be read with caution, as the majority of insurgency-affected regions have a relatively small proportion of Hindus. A higher 'no response rate' of 22 percent in the insurgency-affected regions is also indicative of this). When it comes to discrimination between Adivasis and others, the proportion of respondents saying police favour non-Adivasis is nearly twice in the LWE-affected regions (22%), as against the insurgency-affected regions (12%). Further, police in the LWE-affected regions are more biased against Muslims, claim common citizens. This is eight percentage points higher, as compared to the insurgency-affected regions. Also, people in the LWE-affected regions are more likely to feel that police favour the rich against the poor. This is 15 percentage points higher than residents of insurgency-affected regions. Interestingly, 14 percent people in insurgency-affected regions believed that the police act favourably towards the poor, as against six percent in LWE-affected regions *(Table 4.8 on the next page)*.

Table 4.8 | People from LWE-affected regions more likely to believe that police discriminates on the basis of caste, class and religion, compared to those from insurgency-affected regions

During criminal investigation, who do the police tend to favour more?	Common People's Response (%)		
	Favour Dalit	Favour Upper caste	Favour none
LWE-affected regions	9	32	49
Insurgency-affected regions	2	14	62
	Favour Adivasi	Favour Non-Adivasi	Favour none
LWE-affected regions	9	22	54
Insurgency-affected regions	8	12	63
	Favour Muslim	Favour Hindu	Favour none
LWE-affected regions	8	20	55
Insurgency-affected regions	2	12	67
	Favour Poor	Favour Rich	Favour none
LWE-affected regions	8	40	41
Insurgency-affected regions	14	25	46

Note: Rest of the respondents did not answer. All figures are rounded off.

Question asked: If there is a criminal investigation for cases involving following groups of people, in your opinion, who do police generally tend to favour more?

It is interesting to compare the responses of people residing in conflict regions (present study) to those answering a similar question in the all-India study 'Status of Policing in India Report 2018' (herein after SPIR 2018).[1]

In SPIR 2018, the respondents were posed a similar set of questions— "*It is widely believed that police discriminate between people on the basis of different things. In your opinion does the police discriminate- on the basis of a. caste b. religion and c. between poor and rich?*"

As shown in *Table 4.9*, one in four, or 25 percent common people surveyed in SPIR 2018 reported discrimination by police on the basis of caste. This is seven percentage points lower than the present study. Here one in three or 32 percent reported that police favour either Dalits or upper-caste Hindus, indicating a higher degree of discrimination in the conflict-affected regions. Further, looking at the religious discrimination, there is not much of a difference, with people from conflict-affected regions just slightly more likely to report bias on these terms (a gap of 2 percentage points), as compared to the overall numbers. Further, SPIR 2018 found police to be slightly more biased on economic parameters, with 51 percent people reporting that police discriminate between the rich and poor (six percentage points more than the present study). The higher sense of discrimination of the present study can be attributed to the relatively thinner economic division among the respondents in conflict-regions, largely comprising villages and small towns.

1 The study titled 'Status of Policing in India Report 2018' was conducted in 22 States, wherein, 15562 people were interviewed. To know more, visit http://www.lokniti.org/media/upload_files/Report%20police%20Survey.pdf

Table 4.9 | People from conflict-affected regions more likely to believe that caste and religion-based discrimination by the police exists, compared to those from non-conflict regions

	Common People's Response (%)	
	Favour a particular group	Favour none
Caste		
Conflict-affected regions (Present Study)	32	54
Overall (SPIR 2018)	25	57
Religion		
Conflict-affected regions (Present Study)	22	59
Overall (SPIR 2018)	20	61
Class		
Conflict-affected regions (Present Study)	45	43
Overall (SPIR 2018)	51	33

Note: Rest of the respondents did not answer. All figures are rounded off.

Questions asked: Present Study: If there is a criminal investigation for cases involving following groups of people, in your opinion, who do police generally tend to favour more? SPIR 2018 (Conducted in 22 States; N=15562): It is widely believed that police discriminate between people on the basis of different things. In your opinion does the police discriminate - on the basis of a. caste b. religion and c. between poor and rich.

Trust in the police

This section looks closely at the relationship between people and the police through the prism of trust. Trust is a multi-dimensional concept, deeply sensitive to factors such

as contact with the police, corruption, conduct of fair legal process, and police effectiveness (Nalla & Nam, 2020). This section examines people's trust in the police by analysing the perceptions of both police personnel and the people. Responses have been segregated on years of experience at postings, nature of duty and gender of police personnel. Comparisons have also been made between trust reposed in the police, paramilitary and Army.

Police personnel themselves rate the local people's trust in them much higher than what is actually reported by the people. About two in five (39%) civilians reported that they have a lot of trust in the police. Three in five (63%) among the police personnel believed that the local people trust them 'a lot' (Figure 4.2).

The levels of trust displayed by the people ('a lot' and 'somewhat' combined) in the conflict states as analysed in the present study—78 percent, is slightly higher than the level of trust in local police as reported by the people in the nation-wide survey in SPIR 2018—71 percent. However, notably, the proportion of people from conflict-affected regions who said that they trust the police a lot- 39 percent, is significantly higher than those from non-conflict regions, with 23 percent of those reporting a lot of trust in the local police in SPIR 2018.

Also, police personnel with a higher number of years at their current posting are more likely to have a higher trust perception among the people. Among those police personnel who have more than 10 years' experience at their current posting, 71 percent believed that they enjoyed high trust levels among the people. Fewer police personnel with

lesser years of experience at their current posting said that people trust them highly. Sixty-three percent police personnel with less than five years at current posting said that people have high trust in the police (Table 4.10).

The nature of duties of the police also dictates their evaluations of people's trust in them. Police personnel performing indoor duties, i.e. inside police stations, tend to believe more that people trust them as compared to their counterparts performing field duties.

Table 4.10 | Personnel with more experience at conflict location and those performing indoor tasks more likely to believe that people's levels of trust in them is high

Level of Trust	Police Personnel's Response (%)			
	A lot	Somewhat	Not much	Not at all
Overall	*63*	*31*	*3*	*1*
<5 years at current posting	63	31	4	2
5-9 years	62	32	4	2
10 years or above	71	26	3	0
Police personnel performing indoor tasks	65	29	3	1
Police personnel performing outdoor tasks	61	33	4	2

Note: Rest of the respondents did not answer. All figures are rounded off.

Question asked: In your opinion, how much trust do people of this area have in the police a lot, somewhat, not much or not at all?

Figure 4.2 | Two out of five people have a lot of trust in the police

Note: Rest of the respondents did not answer. All figures are rounded off.

Question asked: (To police personnel) In your opinion, how much trust do people of this area have in the police a lot, somewhat, not much or not at all?

(To common people) In your opinion, how much trust do people of this area have in the police a lot, somewhat, not much or not at all?

Figure 4.3 | People have highest trust in the Army, followed by the police, and paramilitary forces

Common People's Response (%)

Note: Rest of the respondents did not answer. All figures are rounded off.

Question asked: How much trust do you have on the following- police, Army, paramilitary- lot, somewhat, not much or not at all?

People's trust in the police vis-à-vis other security forces

We also studied people's trust in the police by comparing it with other law enforcement agencies deployed in the conflict regions — i.e. paramilitary forces or the Army. Trust in the Army was found to be the highest, followed by the police and paramilitary forces. When common people were separately asked how much do they personally trust the three institutions — Army, police, and paramilitary forces — they said they trusted the Army the most, with 50 percent claiming to have a 'a lot' of trust. This was followed by the police (47%) and paramilitary (43%) *(Figure 4.3)*.

When data is divided on the basis of the types of conflicts, people in the LWE-affected regions showed higher trust levels, compared to those living in the insurgency-affected regions for all law enforcement agencies — police, Army and paramilitary.

The police was the most trusted institution out of three in the insurgency-affected regions, as shown in *Table 4.11*. About two in five, or 37 percent people said that they trust police 'a lot', followed by Army (33%) and paramilitary forces (25%). Further, in the LWE-affected regions, the highest trust levels are enjoyed by the Army with more than three in five or 60 percent people reporting so. This is followed by paramilitary forces (55%) and the police (53%).

When we compare this data to the results from SPIR 2018, we find that overall, in the non-conflict regions; people are less likely to have high levels of trust in the police, as compared to the Army. In SPIR 2018, 23 percent reported having a lot of trust in the local police while 54 percent said that they have a lot of trust in the Army. In the conflict

Table 4.11 | The police is the least trusted in LWE-affected regions and most trusted in the insurgency-affected region

	Common People's Response (%)			
	A lot	Somewhat	Not much	Not at all
Trust in Army				
LWE-affected regions	60	21	9	7
Insurgency-affected regions	33	41	15	5
Trust in Police				
LWE-affected regions	53	32	8	5
Insurgency-affected regions	37	44	12	6
Trust in Paramilitary forces				
LWE-affected regions	55	26	8	7
Insurgency-affected regions	25	46	17	5

Note: Rest of the respondents did not answer. All figures are rounded off.

Question asked: How much trust do you have on the following- police, Army, paramilitary- lot, somewhat, not much or not at all?

regions, on the other hand, the differences in the levels of trust between the police and the Army diminishes, with almost as many people reporting high levels of trust in police (47%) as those reporting high levels of trust in the Army (50%).

While the police force is the least trusted institution compared to others in LWE-affected regions, it is the most trusted in insurgency-affected regions. In contrast, common people in LWE-affected regions show higher trust in the Army and the paramilitary forces, than those in the insurgency-affected regions. The Armed Forces Special Powers Act, 1958 (AFSPA) could be the reason behind the lower trust in the paramilitary forces and the Army. In the sampled states of insurgency-affected regions, i.e. Assam, Manipur and Nagaland, AFSPA continues for decades and in Tripura it prevailed until its recent termination in 2015. However, AFSPA has not been implemented in any of the LWE-affected regions. The people of insurgency-affected regions therefore, might be more suspicious towards the paramilitary forces, than their police. *(More analysis on comparison of perceptions about paramilitary forces/ the Army and the police can be found in Chapter 5)*

Fear of the police

A significant proportion of respondents from general public fears that the police can take harsh actions against them on the pretext of searching for Naxalites/insurgents. They are fearful of being beaten up, arrested or detained, falsely implicated in Naxalism/insurgency cases and the police coming to their house. Fear of sexual harassment, being killed and their property being destroyed also features in their list of concerns. Overall, one in three expressed their fear of being beaten up by the police 'a lot' or 'somewhat.' A little less than one in three feared being arrested or detained on the pretext of searching for Naxalities/insurgents *(Table 4.12).*

Fear of police index

For the purpose of analysis, a fear of police index has been created based on the responses to the seven sub-questions discussed above. The respondents have been segregated into five categories on the basis of the overall fear reported by them: First, 'a lot of fear', second, 'some fear', third, 'not much fear', fourth, 'hardly any or no fear' and fifth, 'non-committal'. The last category 'non-committal' comprises those respondents who did not give any response to any of these seven questions *(Details regarding how the index is created are provided in the end notes).*

Two in five or 41 percent civilians said that they do not fear the police at all. However, the majority differed in varying degree. About one in five, or 19 percent claimed to not fear the police much, about a quarter or 22 percent people reported some fear, and more than one in 10 or 12 percent reported having a lot of fear of the police. It must be highlighted that six percent people did not respond to any of these questions (shown in the table as 'non-committal'). This, perhaps, shows their hesitation while answering such sensitive questions. However, nothing conclusive can be said about these non-committal respondents *(Figure 4.4 on next page).*

Interestingly, comparing this data to people's responses in SPIR 2018 shows that overall people have higher levels of fear of the police than those from conflict regions. The index of fear of police as created in SPIR 2018 shows that 14 percent are highly fearful of the police (compared to 12% in conflict regions) and 30 percent are somewhat fearful of the police (compared to 22% in conflict regions).

Splitting up the responses on the types of conflict-affected regions, the fear among people seems to be higher in the insurgency-affected regions than the LWE-affected areas.

Table 4.12 | About one in three people have a lot or somewhat fear of police beating them up or arresting them on the pretext of searching for Naxalites/insurgents

Fear of…	Common People's Response (%)			
	A Lot	**Somewhat**	**Not much**	**Not at all**
Being beaten up by the police	11	24	20	39
Being arrested/detained by the police for no reason	10	22	19	43
Police coming to your house	8	19	19	46
Being falsely implicated in Naxalism/insurgency cases by police	8	16	17	49
Sexual harassment by the police	7	12	14	56
Being killed by the police	7	13	15	55
Police destroying your belongings or property	6	15	16	54

Note: Rest of the respondents did not answer. All figures are rounded off.

Question asked: Often people have fear of police for what they might do on the pretext of searching for Naxalites/Insurgents. What about you how much do you fear of the following- a lot, somewhat, not much or not at all?

Figure 4.4 | Fear of police index

Common People (%)

Category	Value
A Lot of Fear	12
Some Fear	22
Not Much Fear	19
No Fear	41
Non-committal	6

Note: All figures are rounded off.

There is a gap of 11 percentage points in the index category of 'a lot of fear' *(Table 4.13)*. This conforms with the lower trust in the police in insurgency-affected regions as compared to the LWE-affected ones (highlighted in *Table 4.11*). Also, while nine percent of respondents in the LWE-affected regions were non-committal, their proportion in the insurgency-affected regions was merely one percent.

Further, focusing on the responses of people by the level of their trust in the police, an indirect correlation can be observed. Those showing higher trust are less likely to fear the police, and *vice versa*. The response rate to the fear-questions was lowest among the ones found to trust the police the most *(Table 4.14)*.

Comparison of fear between communities throws up responses along expected lines. Adivasis are slightly more afraid of the police than non-Adivasis. While two in four or 39 percent Adivasis reported a lot or some fear of the police, one in three or 33 percent claimed to fear the police among non-Adivasis. Similarly, non-Adivasis were more likely to report 'no fear of the police at all' (43%), as compared to Adivasis (35%).

Conclusion

Summing up, the police and the civilians differ in the way they perceive confrontations. The civilians believe their confrontation with the police is less violent as compared to the police personnel. Further, responses of both people and the police indicate that the violent conflicts are more frequent in the LWE-affected regions than the insurgency-affected ones. However, if there is a protest going on, the police in the insurgency-affected regions are more likely to use force than their counterparts in the LWE-affected areas.

Secondly, people think that the police is biased against the poor, Adivasis and Dalits. Data also reveals that such groups are more likely to be implicated under the false charges of Naxalism/insurgency by the police.

Thirdly, people in the LWE affected regions repose higher levels of trust in the police than those in the insurgency-affected regions. Further, people in the insurgency-affected

Table 4.13 | Common people in insurgency-affected region are more fearful of the police than those in LWE-affected regions

	Fear of Police Index: Common People's Response (%)				
	A Lot of Fear	**Some Fear**	**Not Much Fear**	**No Fear**	**Non-committal**
Overall	*12*	*22*	*19*	*41*	*6*
LWE-affected Regions	8	25	18	40	9
Insurgency-affected Regions	19	18	19	43	1

Note: All figures are rounded off.

Table 4.14 | People with high trust in police are less likely to fear them

	Fear of Police Index: Common People's Response (%)				
	A Lot of Fear	**Some Fear**	**Not Much Fear**	**No Fear**	**Non-committal**
Common people reporting a lot of trust in police	8	19	19	44	11
Some trust	15	26	20	38	1
Not Much trust	21	22	16	41	1
No trust at all	16	30	14	35	6

Note: All figures are rounded off.

regions tend to show lesser trust towards paramilitary forces/Army as compared to those in the LWE-affected regions.

Finally, the majority of people claimed to have the fear of the police in varying degree. People in insurgency-affected regions are more likely to fear the police 'a lot'—more than twice those in LWE-affected regions.

End Notes
Fear of police index

The fear of police index was constructed by taking into account 7 sub-questions asked during the survey. They are:
Q. Often people have fear of police for what they might do on the pretext of searching for Naxalites/Insurgents. What about you how much do you fear of the following- a lot, somewhat, not much or not at all?

Fear of being beaten up by the police
Fear of being arrested/detained by the police for no reason
Fear of police coming to your house
Fear of police destroying your belongings or property Fear of being falsely implicated in Naxalism/Insurgency cases by police
Fear of sexual harassment by the police
Fear of being killed by the police

In each question, the response options offered to the respondent were 'A lot' 'Some' 'Not Much' 'Not At all'.

Step 1: The response option of 'A lot' was scored as 8, 'Somewhat' was scored as 6, 'Not Much' was scored as 2, 'Not at All' was scored at 1and those who did not give a response was scored as 0.

Step 2: The scores of all questions were summed up. The summated scores of all questions ranged from 0 to 56.

Step 3: These scores were then distributed across five newly created categories that indicated the intensity of fear from police. Summated scores: 0 was labeled as 'Non-committal', scores ranging from 1 to 9 was labeled as 'No Fear', 10 to 19 as 'Not Much Fear', and 20 to 39 were labeled as 'Some Fear' and 40 to 56 were labeled as 'A lot of fear'.

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
Perceptions about Police *vis-à-vis* Paramilitary Forces or the Army

Security personnel train at a counter-terrorism and jungle warfare school in Kanker village, about 140 km south of the central Indian city of Raipur. March 19, 2007. ©REUTERS/Parth Sanyal

Key Takeaways

- An overwhelming majority of police personnel believe that paramilitary/Army is better budgeted (73%), better staffed (64%) and better equipped with resources (78%) than the police.

- Nearly half the police personnel believe that both police and paramilitary/Army are equally effective in controlling conflict in the region; One out of three personnel (34%) believe that police is more effective in controlling Naxalite/insurgent violence in the area.

- One out of two personnel believes that the police should be given a free hand in dealing with the conflict-groups.

- A significant majority of the common people (60%) believe that for their safety and security, they need the state police more than the paramilitary/Army; Common people who feel unsafe living in the region are more likely to believe so.

- Fourteen percent of the people from the LWE-affected regions have frequently (many times and sometimes combined) been contacted by the paramilitary/Army in the last 2-3 years.

- Overall, 54 percent people would prefer to contact the police (rather than the paramilitary/Army) in case of threat from Naxalites/insurgents.

- Two out of five common people believe that both police and paramilitary/Army behave well with locals and respect their culture.

- Nearly two out of five people (39%) believe that the police is corrupt in conflict-affected regions, while 20 percent believe that the paramilitary/Army is corrupt in such regions.

Perceptions about Police *vis-à-vis* Paramilitary Forces or the Army

Years of violent extremism in conflict-ridden areas have brought new attention to the issues of policing challenges, some of which have been discussed in the previous chapter. There's also a vigorous debate around the limited powers and resources at the disposal of the police forces, vis-à-vis the paramilitary or the Army, often stationed in the area for the specific purpose of dealing with armed underground violence. In this chapter we compare various law enforcement agencies, and examine the opinions of both the police personnel and civilians about how they perceive the police, in relation to the paramilitary forces and the Army. It is important to note that the police have been recently described as the "pioneers of security" in LWE-affected areas by the Chief of Defence Staff (*The Hindu*, 2020). Their role cannot be underestimated as they have much better knowledge of the terrain, language and culture of the region when compared to the paramilitary forces or the army. The local police personnel also tend to come from the same stock as the civilians and the militants/insurgents operating in the area. The chapter investigates two key questions. Firstly, whether, and to what extent, do the police think that the government is discriminatory in its attitude and treatment towards them vis-à-vis the paramilitary/Army personnel. Secondly, which law enforcement agency do the civilians trust more, and mostly turn to, in their daily lives as also when faced with extremist threats.

Police vs. paramilitary/Army: Opinions of police personnel

Since the conflict-affected regions have a strong presence of paramilitary forces[1] and often, the Army, we wanted to know the perceptions of the police personnel regarding the two. We were keen to find out how they viewed their own position and working conditions while serving in the conflict-affected area vis-à-vis the paramilitary/Army. Police personnel were asked one set of questions on the category they thought was better budgeted, staffed and armed, and

had better bullet proof gear – the police or the paramilitary/Army. An overwhelming majority of police personnel said that the paramilitary/Army personnel were in a better condition than they were *(Figure 5.1)*. The only area where the police thought they didn't fare too badly was staffing. However, a majority still felt that the paramilitary/Army fared better in this department. While the sentiment of the paramilitary/Army being better budgeted, staffed and equipped was found to be strong among police personnel in insurgency as well as LWE-affected areas, comparison of responses from the personnel in the two regions threw up interesting insights. The belief of being worse off was stronger in the regions facing insurgency. The difference in opinion was widest on the equipment of the paramilitary vis-à-vis the police. Almost 88 percent of police personnel in the insurgency-affected areas thought that the paramilitary forces were better equipped in terms of arms, ammunition and gear. In the LWE-affected areas a relatively lower 71 percent thought so *(Table 5.1)*.

Figure 5.1 | Majority of police personnel believe that paramilitary/Army is better budgeted, staffed and equipped with resources

Police Personnel (%)

*arms, ammunitions, bullet proof gear etc.

■ Police ■ Paramilitary/Army
■ Both equally ■ None

Note: Rest of the respondents did not answer. All figures are rounded off.

Question asked: In your opinion, who is in a better position with regard to the following- 'Police' OR 'Paramilitary/Army'?

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1 Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), Central Industrial Security Force (CISF), Sashastra Seema Bal (SSB), Assam Rifles (AR), Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP), National Security Guards (NSG) and Border Security Forces (BSF)

Table 5.1 | Personnel from insurgency-affected areas of NE more likely to believe that paramilitary/Army is better budgeted, staffed and equipped than police

	Police Personnel's Perception that… (%)		
	Paramilitary/ Army is better Budgeted than the Police	Paramilitary/ Army is better Staffed than the Police	Paramilitary/ Army is better Equipped than the Police
Overall	*73*	*64*	*78*
LWE-affected regions	69	63	71
Insurgency-affected regions of NE	79	66	88

Note: All figures are rounded off.

Question asked: In your opinion, who is in a better position with regard to the following - 'Police' OR 'Paramilitary/Army'?

The number of years spent by a police person at his/her current posting made a big difference in how they viewed their status vis-à-vis the paramilitary/Army. This is because police personnel with a decade or more of experience at their current posting were considerably less likely to think that the paramilitary/Army was better budgeted, staffed and equipped. This is in comparison to police personnel who had put in 5-9 years at their current posting or less than five years *(Figure 5.2)*. The survey in fact captured

a clear sequential trend with respect to this on all three aspects.

We also asked police personnel who they considered more effective in controlling extremist violence in their area – the police or the paramilitary/Army. The responses to this question were quite different from those analysed above. Nearly half of the police personnel (47%) thought that both the police and paramilitary/Army had been equally effective in controlling Naxalism/insurgency in their area. However, the proportion who thought that the police was more effective than the paramilitary/Army was over two times greater than those who thought otherwise, 34 percent, as opposed to 15 percent *(Table 5.2)*. This sentiment was echoed with more or less the same intensity among police personnel in both the LWE-affected and insurgency-affected areas of the North East. The profoundly differing responses to the police vs paramilitary questions reveal a sense of resentment among the police force. If we were to juxtapose the responses to the questions, we will find that police personnel feel that even though they are better placed to take on Naxalism or insurgency in a more effective manner than the paramilitary/Army, they are not being given due acknowledgement. They believe they are getting a worse deal on issues like staffing, budgeting and provision of arms and ammunition. This sentiment

Figure 5.2 | Personnel with fewer years of service at posting location more likely to believe that paramilitary/Army is better budgeted, staffed and equipped than police

Police Personnel (%)

74 71 69 — Paramilitary/Army is better Budgeted than the Police
66 64 51 — Paramilitary/Army is better Staffed than the Police
80 78 65 — Paramilitary/Army is better Equipped than the Police

■ Spent <5 years at the posting   ■ Spent 5-9 years at the posting
■ Spent 10 or more years at the posting

Note: All figures are rounded off.

Question asked: In your opinion, who is in a better position with regard to the following - 'Police' OR 'Paramilitary/Army'?

is affirmed through an interaction of the two variables. Among police personnel who thought that they were more effective in dealing with armed extremism, compared to their paramilitary/Army colleagues, most (two-thirds or higher) believed that the paramilitary/Army were better budgeted, staffed and equipped *(Figure 5.3)*.

Table 5.2 | One out of two personnel believe that both police and paramilitary/Army are equally effective in controlling conflict in the region

	Police Personnel's Perception (%)			
	Who is more effective in controlling Naxalite/Insurgent violence in this area - 'Police' or 'Paramilitary/Army'?			
	Police	Paramilitary/Army	Both equally	None
Overall	*34*	*15*	*47*	*<1*
LWE-affected regions	34	17	46	<1
Insurgency-affected regions of NE	35	12	49	<1

Note: Rest of the respondents did not answer. All figures are rounded off.

Question asked: Who is more effective in controlling Naxalite/Insurgent/Militant violence in this area – 'Police' OR 'Paramilitary/Army'?

The perception of the police that they were better placed to deal with extremist violence than the paramilitary/Army is also reflected in their other responses. On being asked whether the police or paramilitary/Army should be given a free hand in dealing with Naxalites/insurgents, majority of

the police personnel wanted to take it up themselves *(Table 5.3)*. While the feeling is consistent for both insurgency and LWE-affected regions, it was stronger in the former. In both regions, around one in five police personnel also said that police strength should be increased so that they have a free hand. This spontaneous response came particularly from those who had spent less than five years at their current posting.

Table 5.3 | One out of two personnel believe that police should be given a free hand in dealing with Naxalite/insurgent activities

	Police Personnel's Perception (%)			
	Who should be given a free hand in dealing with Naxalite/insurgents activities in the area?			
	Police	Paramilitary/Army	Increase police strength	No change needed
Overall	*48*	*18*	*21*	*8*
LWE-affected regions	45	24	23	4
Insurgency-affected regions of NE	54	7	18	13

Note: Rest of the respondents did not answer. All figures are rounded off.

Question asked: People have different opinions on how to deal with Naxalites/insurgents/militants. Some say Police should be given free hand to control them; while some others say control of this area should be completely handed over to the Paramilitary/Army. What is your own opinion – should the Police be given free hand OR should this area be handed over to the Paramilitary/Army completely?

Figure 5.3 | Majority of even those police personnel who believe that police is more effective in dealing with conflict in the region hold the perception that paramilitary/Army is better budgeted, staffed and equipped than the police

Police Personnel's Response (%)

Police is more effective in controlling Naxalite/Insurgent violence in this area: 74, 65, 71

Paramilitary is more effective: 85, 64, 81

Both are equally effective: 78, 64, 71

- Paramilitary/Army is better equipped than the police
- Paramilitary/Army is better staffed than the police
- Paramilitary/Army is better budgeted than the police

Note: All figures are percentages and are rounded off.

When asked whether the government treats the police and paramilitary/Army in the same or different manner in cases of fake encounters, most police personnel (53%) said it was same/equal. Only 25 percent said that there was discrimination or they were treated differently *(Table 5.4)*. When this group of 25 percent respondents was probed further, two-thirds said that the government favoured paramilitary/Army *(Table 5.5)*. This sentiment was particularly strong among police personnel who alleged bias in insurgency-affected areas. In the LWE-affected regions, although a majority of police personnel also held the same view, they were twice as likely to believe that the police was favoured over the paramilitary. This was in comparison to police personnel in the insurgency-affected regions, 31 percent to 15 percent.

Table 5.4 | One out of four police personnel believe that the government treats police and paramilitary/Army differently in cases of fake encounters

	Police personnel's perception that… (%)	
	Govt. treats Police and Paramilitary/Army in the same manner in cases of fake encounters	Govt. treats Police and Paramilitary/Army differently in cases of fake encounters
Overall	*53*	*25*
LWE-affected regions	53	29
Insurgency-affected regions of NE	52	19

Note: Rest of the respondents did not answer. All figures are rounded off.

Question asked: In your opinion, when police and paramilitary/army, both are involved in separate cases of fake encounter, does the government treat them in the same manner, or differently?

Table 5.5 | Amongst those personnel who believe that the government treats police and paramilitary/Army differently in cases of fake encounter, a majority feels that government supports paramilitary more in such cases

Police Personnel's Response (%)		
	Govt. supports Police more than Paramilitary/Army in cases of fake encounters	Govt. supports Paramilitary/Army more than Police in cases of fake encounters
Overall	*27*	*64*
LWE-affected regions	31	59
Insurgency-affected regions of NE	15	76

Note: Rest of the respondents did not answer. All figures are rounded off.

Question asked: (If 'different') So who does the Government support more Police or Paramilitary/Army?

Police vs. paramilitary/Army: Opinions of common people

Civilians' perceptions about the effectiveness of the police

and paramilitary/Army in conflict-affected regions were also sought in the survey. Civilians were asked whether the police or paramilitary/Army was needed more for their own safety and security. Three-fifths said that the police were needed more. Only one in every 10 thought that the paramilitary/Army was needed more *(Table 5.6)*. About a quarter of respondents thought that both were equally important. Those living in insurgency-affected regions of the North East were seven percentage points more likely than those residing in LWE-affected regions to think that the police was required more for people's safety. People in the LWE-affected regions were far more likely to believe that the paramilitary/armed forces alone or both police and paramilitary/Army together were required for ensuring people's safety – 37 percent thought so.

In both the conflict-affected regions, people's perception about the safety of their area determined their responses with regard to who (the police or paramilitary/Army) was better placed to deal with ensuring safety. The greater the sense of fear/insecurity among people about their own safety, the more likely they were to want the paramilitary/Army or both the paramilitary/Army and police (and not just the police alone) *(Table 5.7)*. There was a linear trend observed in both the regions on this issue. In the insurgency-affected regions, among those who felt very safe living in the area, 21 percent said that the paramilitary should have a greater or at least equal role to play in their safety. This figure rose to 35 percent among those who felt only moderately safe. It spiked further to 48 percent among those who felt unsafe and finally to 65 percent among those who felt very unsafe living in the area. This upward curve could be seen among people in the LWE-affected regions as well.

The survey also tried to gauge the extent of interaction between the people and the paramilitary forces. Around one in every five households had been approached or contacted by some paramilitary/Army personnel during the last 2-3 years. Even among such households, the contact had been rare rather than frequent *(Table 5.8)*. If we exclude the proportion of those who said that contact had been rare, then contact with the paramilitary falls to merely 9 percent. This is about the same as people's contact with the police (11%) as ascertained through another question.

In comparative terms, contact between the paramilitary/Army and common people was found to be far greater in LWE-affected areas than in insurgency-affected regions of the North East, 28 percent to seven percent respectively. Even in the former, it mostly fell in the rare category. Also, in the insurgency-affected areas, Muslim, Christian and Hindu Adivasi households were more likely to have been contacted by the paramilitary/Army at least once in

Table 5.6 | Three out of five common people believe that for their safety and security, they need the police more than paramilitary/Army

	Need State Police more than Paramilitary/Army for safety and security	Need Paramilitary/Army more than State Police for safety and security	Both	None
	Common People's Response (%)			
Overall	*60*	*10*	*23*	*4*
LWE-affected regions	57	11	26	4
Insurgency-affected regions of NE	64	8	18	6

Note: Rest of the respondents did not answer. All figures are rounded off.

Question asked: For the safety and security of the people living in this area, who do you need more - State Police OR Paramilitary/Army?

Table 5.7 | Common people who feel unsafe living in the region more likely to believe that paramilitary/Army is more important for their safety and security than the police

Feeling of Safety Amongst Common People	Need paramilitary/Army more than State Police for safety and security	Need paramilitary/Army and State Police equally for safety and security	Net/total pro-paramilitary/Army sentiment
	Common People's Response (%)		
LWE-affected regions			
Feel very safe living in the area	11	18	29
Feel somewhat safe living in the area	10	34	44
Feel somewhat unsafe living in the area	19	55	74
Feel very unsafe living in the area	7	71	78
Insurgency-affected regions			
Feel very safe living in the area	5	16	21
Feel somewhat safe living in the area	10	25	35
Feel somewhat unsafe living in the area	27	21	48
Feel very unsafe living in the area	46	19	65

Note: All figures are rounded off.

Question asked: For the safety and security of the people living in this area, who do you need more - State Police OR Paramilitary/Army?

the recent past. In the LWE-affected areas, communities contacted were Hindu upper caste, Christians and Muslims *(Table 5.9)*.

Table 5.8 | Common people from the LWE-affected regions more likely to have been contacted by the paramilitary/Army than those from insurgency-affected regions of NE

	Many times	Sometimes	Rarely	Never
	During last 2-3 years, Paramilitary/Army contacted me or family members…			
Overall	*2*	*7*	*11*	*76*
LWE-affected regions	3	11	14	67
Insurgency-affected regions of NE	1	1	5	91

Note: Rest of the respondents did not answer. All figures are rounded off.

Question asked: In the last 2-3years, how often did it happen that some Army/Paramilitary personnel contacted you or someone from your family – many times, sometimes, rarely or never?

The survey also posed a hypothetical question to civilian respondents about who they would contact first—police or paramilitary/Army—in case they were threatened by Naxalites or insurgents. At least half the respondents in both the conflict-affected regions said that they would rather contact/approach the police in such a situation *(Table 5.10)*. In the insurgency-affected area the proportion of such people was three-fifths whereas in the LWE-affected areas, it was half. Less than one in 10 civilian interviewees in both the areas said that they would only approach the paramilitary/Army. There was of course a sizeable proportion in both areas who said that they wouldn't mind contacting any of the two or that they would contact both in case they were threatened by Naxalites or insurgents. This proportion was around one-fifth in the insurgency-affected regions and around one-third in the LWE-affected regions.

Table 5.9 | Upper Castes, Muslims and Christians from LWE-affected regions and Muslims, Christians and Adivasis from insurgency-affected regions more likely to have been contacted by the paramilitary/Army in the last 2-3 years

Common People's Response (%)	
Caste/Religion of the Respondents	**Paramilitary/Army contacted me or family member at least once in last 2-3 years**
All in LWE-affected regions	28
Hindu Upper castes in LWE-affected regions	38
Christians in LWE-affected regions	33
Muslims in LWE-affected regions	30
All in insurgency-affected regions of NE	7
Muslims in insurgency-affected regions	10
Christians in insurgency-affected regions	9
Hindu Adivasis in insurgency-affected regions	9

Note: All figures are rounded off. Only those communities have been shown here whose figures were more than the overall average of the region.

Question asked: In the last 2-3years, how often did it happen that some Army/Paramilitary personnel contacted you or someone from your family – many times, sometimes, rarely or never?

Table 5.10 | Fifty-four percent people would prefer to contact the police, and not the paramilitary/Army, in case of threat from Naxalites/insurgents

Common People's Response (%)				
	In case of threat from Naxalites/Insurgents…			
	Will contact Police	**Will contact Paramilitary/ Army**	**Will contact Any/Both**	**Will contact None**
Overall	*54*	*7*	*26*	*8*
LWE-affected regions	50	7	30	7
Insurgency-affected regions of NE	60	6	20	10

Note: Rest of the respondents did not answer. All figures are rounded off.

Question asked: Suppose you are threatened by some Naxalites/ Insurgents, and you have a choice of contacting Police and Army / Paramilitary, who will you contact?

Not wanting to contact the paramilitary/Army in the event of a Naxal or insurgent threat and preferring the police instead should not be misconstrued as people's lack of faith in the former in these two regions. That is because when respondents were asked how much they trusted each of the three forces – the police, Army and paramilitary, close to a majority expressed a high degree of trust in all *(Figure 5.4)*. More than the police, the Army was found to be the most 'strongly trusted' force at 50 percent. The police were

Figure 5.4 | Common people have high levels of trust in the Army, police and paramilitary

Common People's Response (%)

Note: Rest of the respondents did not answer. All figures are rounded off.

Question asked: How much trust do you have on the following- lot, somewhat, not much or not at all? a. Police b. Army c. Paramilitary

highly trusted by 47 percent of the respondents, while the paramilitary forces by 43 percent. If we take into consideration the proportion of those who moderately trusted the Army, police and the paramilitary forces, then the measure of trust in each of the three forces rises to four-in-five. Only around one in seven people said they had either no trust or not much trust in these three forces.

Notably, in comparison to the overall responses from the 22 Indian states in the Status of Policing in India Report 2018, the level of trust in the police in the conflict states is significantly higher than the level of trust in the non-conflict states. In SPIR 2018, 23 percent civilians reported having high levels of trust in the local police, 48 percent had moderate levels of trust, 14 percent had low levels of trust and seven percent had no trust at all in the local police. In comparison, the level of trust in the Army was much greater, with 54 percent reporting a lot of trust, 20 percent moderate trust, eight percent low level of trust and six percent having no trust at all in the Army.

In the conflict states, however, we notice that the levels of trust between all three—police, Army and the paramilitary are not very different, even as most of the respondents display a high level of trust in each. This difference in the responses of civilians from the conflict and non-conflict states could be attributed to the fact that common people in the conflict states have higher possibility of having some form of interaction or encounter with the Army, which may not be the case in the non-conflict states. This possibly results in a more realistic comparison between the police and the Army for the former group.

When we analyse the data in terms of net trust ('a lot of trust' minus 'no trust at all'), common people in the LWE-affected regions were found to trust the Army, police and paramilitary far more than common people in the insurgency-affected regions *(Table 5.11)*.

Table 5.11 | People from LWE-affected areas have higher levels of trust in Army, police and paramilitary compared to those from insurgency-affected areas of NE

Common People's Response (%)			
	Net trust in Police	Net trust in Army	Net trust in Paramilitary
Overall	*41*	*44*	*37*
LWE-affected regions	48	53	48
Insurgency-affected regions of NE	31	28	20

Note: Net trust here refers to net of extremes, i.e. proportion of a lot of trust minus proportion of no trust at all. Therefore, a higher figure indicates a higher level of trust.

Question asked: How much trust do you have on the following - lot, somewhat, not much or not at all? a. Police b. Army c. Paramilitary.

Interestingly, the Army did not emerge as the most trusted force for people in insurgency-affected regions. Instead, the police came out at the top. The most plausible explanation for this could be the existence of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act, 1958 in at least three states where the survey was conducted. The Act gives the Indian armed forces vast and sweeping powers in the 'disturbed' areas.

Despite lower levels of trust in the police compared to the Army as well as similar levels of trust in the police and paramilitary forces, a key takeaway emerged. Common people had a better impression of the police than the paramilitary/ Army when it came to their behaviour towards local people, respect for local culture and customs while performing their duty and their communication with people in the local language. When asked about the force faring better with regard to behaviour towards local people, common people were three times more likely to prefer the police than the paramilitary/Army – 40 percent to 12 percent respectively *(Figure 5.5)*. Similarly, the police were preferred two times more than the paramilitary/Army with regard to respecting culture and customs of the local people – 32 percent to 15 percent. Police performed the best with regard to communicating with the locals in their own language. Nearly 57 percent common people surveyed preferred them over the paramilitary/Army on this parameter, with only eight percent preferring the latter. The favourable assessment of the police could be attributed to greater frequency of daily interaction between them and the common people, compared to the paramilitary. This has been highlighted in *Tables 5.8 and 5.10.*

We also tried to find out how people viewed the three forces in terms of corruption. People were more likely to perceive the police as being more corrupt than the paramilitary/Army. Whereas 39 percent saw the police as being very or somewhat corrupt, those perceiving the paramilitary/Army to be highly or somewhat corrupt were much lower at 20 percent *(Table 5.12)*. This difference in perception was true for both the insurgency and LWE-affected regions, although the difference was starker in the former. The poorer assessment of the police vis-à-vis the paramilitary/Army on the corruption parameter could again be attributed to higher frequency of day-to-day interaction between the police and common people, compared to the paramilitary/Army *(see Tables 5.8 and 5.10)*. Owing to frequent interactions, the chances of people having experienced police corruption are higher. Although the police were rated worse than the paramilitary on the corruption front, they were still seen as being not corrupt by a large proportion of respondents – 50 percent (20% saw it as being not much corrupt and 30% didn't view it as being corrupt at all)

The perceptions of civilians in conflict states relating to corruption within the police is significantly different from the perceptions of the common people from non-conflict states. In SPIR 2018, 27 percent respondents rated the local police as "very corrupt", 34 percent rated them as somewhat corrupt, 22 percent said they were not much corrupt and a much lower 11 percent said they were not at all corrupt. In the conflict states, on the other hand, the perceptions are inverse - with 11 percent believing the police to be very corrupt and 30 percent of the opinion that they are not at all corrupt. These contrasting perceptions point towards the difference in the nature of functioning of the police in the states with an ongoing conflict and the role of the police vis-à-vis the local community.

Conclusion

Despite being vastly different agencies with almost incomparable roles, scope of work and organisational structures, the police, paramilitary and the Army often come to a point of convergence in the regions with active conflict. This is a

Figure 5.5 | Two out of five common people believe that both police and paramilitary/Army behave well with locals and respect their culture

Common People's Response (%)

Legend: Police better | Paramilitary/Army | Both good

Note: Rest of the respondents did not answer. All figures are rounded off.

Question asked: In your opinion, who is better with regard to the following - Police OR Paramilitary/Army?

Table 5.12 | Common people likely to believe that police in conflict-affected regions is more corrupt than paramilitary/Army

Common People's Perception (%)							
	How corrupt is the police in such conflict-affected regions?				How corrupt is the paramilitary/army in such conflict-affected regions?		
	Very	Somewhat	Not much	Not at all	Very	Somewhat	Not much	Not at all
Overall	*11*	*28*	*20*	*30*	*5*	*15*	*19*	*45*
LWE-affected regions	10	27	22	33	6	13	18	52
Insurgency-affected regions of NE	12	31	18	25	4	18	22	34

Note: Rest of the respondents did not answer. All figures are rounded off.

Question asked: In your experience, in such Naxalism/insurgent affected areas, how corrupt are the following - very, somewhat, not much or not at all? a. Police b. Paramilitary/Army

lived reality of not just the security forces that are deployed in such regions but also of the common public with whom they frequently interact. This chapter, therefore, attempts to analyse the perceptions of both the police as well as the common public regarding their role and their performance vis-à-vis the paramilitary and the Army.

Some important findings that emerge from this chapter are: Although most police personnel said that they were not being given as much attention on budgeting, staffing and provision of arms and ammunition as compared to the paramilitary/Army, a large proportion were quite certain that they were either better or at least equally suited as the latter, to control extremist violence.

Police personnel also strongly believed that the police force and not the paramilitary/Army should be given a free hand in dealing with the conflict situation in their area. The civilians too echoed this thought. Most civilians felt that the police were more capable of handling the safety and security of the people than the paramilitary/Army.

Most of the civilians also said that they would rather contact the police than the paramilitary/Army in case they were threatened by Naxalites or insurgents. Civilian trust in the police was also found to be quite high, slightly higher than the paramilitary forces, but lower than the Army. When comparing the survey data of civilians from conflict states with the SPIR 2018 data on survey with the common people across 22 Indian states, we find that not only is the level of trust in the police amongst the common people higher in the conflict regions, but in these regions the people are also less likely to perceive the police as corrupt.

Reference

The Hindu. (2020). CDS lauds Odisha police for tackling LWE challenges. Cuttack, December 29. Retrieved from at https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/other-states/cds-lauds-odisha-police-for-tackling-lwe-challenges/article33440403.ece. *Accessed on January 20th, 2021.*

6

Posting to a Conflict Region: Opinions of Police and Common People

A Border Security Force (BSF) soldier wears a mask, developed by the force's medical unit to prevent mosquito bites, as he patrols the Kalatilla area, about 198 km northeast of Agartala, capital of India's northeastern state of Tripura. June 14, 2008. ©REUTERS/Jayanta Dey

Key Takeaways

- Nine out of ten police personnel are satisfied with the location of their posting. Satisfaction with posting location increases with an increase in duration of time spent at posting location; older personnel were also more likely to be strongly satisfied with their posting location.

- Satisfaction among personnel with their posting area is not associated with their risk perception of the area; despite high satisfaction with areas of posting, majority of police personnel (52%) also view their posting location as being risky or unsafe.

- Common people living in conflict regions are more likely to consider the area as being safe for police, as compared to the perception of safety of the police personnel themselves. At the same time, common people are also more likely to consider the region as being safe for their own living– 70 percent believe that the area is very safe for living.

- Adivasis, particularly those from the LWE-affected areas, are less likely to consider the place as safe for living.

- One out of two common people from the LWE-affected regions blame Naxalism for the lack of safety in the region.

- A majority of the people (53%) believe that lack of development is the biggest problem in the region.

- Over two-fifths of police personnel posted in conflict regions believe that the amount of compensation provided by the government to them or their families in the event of death or injury while on duty is insufficient.

- Nearly one out of two police personnel (49%) feels that their current posting affects their mental well-being adversely.

Posting to a Conflict Region: Opinions of Police and Common People

Policing as a line of work is fraught with dangers, and doubly so, in areas affected by extremist violence and insurgency. This is so because the role performed by the police and expectations from them in conflict areas tend to go beyond the usual tasks of law enforcement and crime prevention. They have to be prepared for combat and armed encounters. It is, therefore, likely that personnel posted in conflict-hit regions have anxieties, concerns and special needs that are different from their counterparts in other, relatively peaceful parts of the country.

This chapter attempts to understand some of those concerns and anxieties and whether they exist at all. It compiles the findings from the Common Cause–Lokniti, CSDS survey related to police persons' appraisal of their posting to conflict-affected regions and its impact on their well-being and professional abilities *(see the Methodology section for details)*. The attempt is to measure the satisfaction levels of police personnel with the location or the area of their posting. It also analyses whether their satisfaction levels are in any way related to factors such as the type of extremist activities in their area, the time spent at the current posting, and the nature of their duties.

The chapter presents the survey findings on the police personnel's perception of the levels of risk in their areas of the posting. It seeks to unravel if their perception has any relationship with their satisfaction levels or if the two are unrelated.

Aside from the police persons' own evaluation of the perils of working and living in the area, the chapter also presents findings related to the perceptions of common people residing in the same conflict-affected areas about issues of safety and security. The idea is to offer a comparative analysis of perceptions regarding the levels of risk involved in the conflict-affected locations. In the context of the growing number of suicides by police personnel, the chapter sheds light on another aspect—their own assessment of

how such postings are affecting their mental health. This section also contains the survey findings related to the training and sensitisation of police personnel, or the lack of it, in conflict-hit areas.

Reasons for posting to conflict-affected regions

Right at the outset, police personnel across the 10 states where the survey was conducted were asked whether their current posting in the conflict-affected area was a routine posting or one they had specifically requested for. The states covered were Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Manipur, Nagaland, Odisha, Telangana and Tripura. In response, 83 percent said it had come about in a routine manner, i.e., it had been assigned as part of a regular procedure, and only 12 percent said that they had specifically asked for it *(Figure 6.1)*. Around two percent spontaneously responded that it was a 'punishment posting' for them even though the question did not explicitly offer this option. It is therefore rational to infer that the actual figure of a likely 'punishment posting' could be higher among those who were routinely posted to such areas.

Although a huge majority of police personnel in both areas affected by LWE and the insurgency-affected regions of the North East (NE) said that theirs was a routine or regular posting, those in the LWE-affected areas were nearly twice as likely to say that they had specifically asked for it i.e., 15 percent as opposed to 8 percent *(Table 6.1)*. Among the LWE-affected areas, those from Chhattisgarh and Odisha particularly stood out in this regard. These were mainly Scheduled Tribe (ST) or Adivasi police personnel, constituting nearly one-third of the overall sample of the LWE-hit regions, who were most likely to have requested a special posting to the area, compared to non-Adivasi personnel. The proportion is 27 percent of the former, compared to 9 percent of the latter *(Table 6.2)*. This could be explained by the fact that much of the LWE-hit regions across the six such states surveyed, have a high concentration of Adivasi

populations. This trend of ST personnel being more likely to have specifically requested for their current posting than non-ST personnel was almost absent in the insurgency-affected regions of the North East, many of which also have significant ST populations.

Figure 6.1 | More than four out of five police personnel posted to conflict regions through routine posting

Mode of Postings to Conflict Regions (%)

- ■ Routine posting
- ■ Specifically asked for it
- ■ Punishment posting*
- ■ No response

Note: All figures are rounded off.

Question asked: Did you specifically ask for a posting in this area or was this a routine posting?

*This was a silent option in the questionnaire. Only if someone said so spontaneously was it recorded as such.

Table 6.1 | Police personnel from LWE-affected regions nearly twice as likely to have asked for posting to conflict region as opposed to those in Northeastern regions

Type of Conflict-Affected Region	Mode of Posting: Police Personnel's Response (%)		
	Routine posting	Specifically asked for it	Punishment posting*
LWE-affected regions	78	15	3
Insurgency-affected regions of NE	91	8	<1

Note: Rest of the respondents did not answer. All figures are rounded off.

Insurgency-affected regions are those in Assam, Manipur, Nagaland and Tripura; LWE-affected regions are those in Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Odisha and Telangana.

Question asked: Did you specifically ask for a posting in this area or was this a routine posting?

*This was a silent option in the questionnaire. Only if someone said so spontaneously was it recorded as such.

Table 6.2 | ST personnel in LWE regions three times more likely to ask for posting in conflict regions than non-ST personnel

Police Personnel's Response (%)			
	Routine posting	Specifically asked for it	Punishment posting*
ST police personnel in LWE-affected regions (30%)	66	27	2
Non-ST police personnel in LWE-affected regions (70%)	84	9	3

Note: Rest of the respondents did not answer. All figures are rounded off.

Question asked: Did you specifically ask for a posting in this area or was this a routine posting?

*This was a silent option in the questionnaire. Only if someone said so spontaneously was it recorded as such.

Satisfaction with the location of posting

Given that the surveyed areas were conflict-affected and many of the postings were not specifically asked for but had come about in a routine manner, there was a presumption that not many police personnel would be satisfied with their current posting. However, the responses from police personnel proved otherwise. Nearly two-thirds of police personnel (65%) interviewed in the conflict-affected regions were very satisfied with their posting locations and another one-fourth (27%) reported being moderately/somewhat satisfied *(Figure 6.2)*. Thus, overall, over nine out of 10 personnel (92%) were satisfied or happy with their current posting location. Only five percent expressed dissatisfaction and that too mostly of moderate intensity. The proportion of personnel expressing complete/strong dissatisfaction with their present posting was merely one percent.

A considerable difference in satisfaction levels of police personnel with their current posting was noticed when we disaggregated the responses by the nature of conflict prevailing in the region. Police personnel posted in the LWE-affected areas were a good 17 percentage points less likely to be fully satisfied (59%) with their posting location, compared to those posted in the North East insurgency-affected regions (76%; *Table 6.3*). However, this difference reduced drastically to five percentage points on adding the proportion of those 'somewhat satisfied' in the two areas. Once again, very few personnel posted in both types of regions expressed dissatisfaction with their current posting – only 3 percent did so in the insurgency-affected areas of the North East and only five percent in the LWE-affected regions of central, eastern and southern India taken together. Thus, it could be concluded that an overwhelming majority of personnel posted in both types

Figure 6.2 | Sixty-five percent personnel completely satisfied with the location of their posting

Level of satisfaction with posting location (%)

- Complete satisfaction
- Moderate satisfaction
- Complete dissatisfaction
- Moderate dissatisfaction
- No response

Note: All figures are rounded off.

Question asked: Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with this area of your current posting? (Probe further whether 'fully' or 'somewhat').

of conflict-affected areas were satisfied with their posting and the differences in their responses were only marginal. Police personnel in LWE-affected areas (Andhra Pradesh and Jharkhand especially) were more likely to be 'moderately satisfied' than those in the insurgency-affected areas of the North East, whereas those in the latter (Assam and Manipur particularly) were more likely to be 'fully satisfied' than those in the former.

Table 6.3 | Personnel from insurgency-affected Northeastern regions more likely to be fully satisfied with the posting location than those from LWE-affected regions

Location of Posting	Level of Satisfaction: Police Personnel's Response (%)			
	Fully satisfied	Somewhat satisfied	Somewhat dissatisfied	Fully dissatisfied
LWE-affected regions	59	31	5	1
Insurgency-affected regions of NE	76	19	3	1

Note: Rest of the respondents did not answer. All figures are rounded off.

Question asked: Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with this area of your current posting? (Probe further whether 'fully' or 'somewhat')

Strong satisfaction with the posting location was also dependent on the unit where one was stationed at in these conflict-affected regions. While 68 percent of those who were working out of a police station were 'fully satisfied' with the area of their posting, the corresponding figure among those who were stationed at police outposts was lower, at 59 percent. It was still lower, at 53 percent, among police personnel who were in an armed battalion (*Table 6.4*).

Table 6.4 | Personnel posted in police stations more likely to be fully satisfied with their posting location

Level of Satisfaction: Police Personnel's Response (%)				
	Fully satisfied	Somewhat satisfied	Somewhat dissatisfied	Fully dissatisfied
Stationed at/in…				
Police Station (75%)	68	25	4	1
Police Outpost (12%)	59	30	6	-
Armed battalion (7%)	53	31	7	3
Some other place (6%)	56	36	4	1

Note: Rest of the respondents did not answer. All figures are rounded off.

Question asked: Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with this area of your current posting? (Probe further whether 'fully' or 'somewhat')

The duration spent by police personnel at their current posting was also found to be correlated to their satisfaction levels with their posting area (*Table 6.5*). Among those who had spent a decade or more at their present posting, as many as 78 percent were found to be strongly satisfied with it. This figure dropped to 66 percent among those who had spent five to nine years at their current posting and further to 63 percent among those who had been at their present posting for less than five years.

Table 6.5 | Satisfaction with posting location increases with an increase in duration of time spent at posting location

Duration of Time at Posting Location	Level of Satisfaction: Police Personnel's Response (%)			
	Fully satisfied	Somewhat satisfied	Somewhat dissatisfied	Fully dissatisfied
Spent <5 years at the posting *(65% of the sample)*	63	28	5	1
Spent 5-9 years at the posting *(23%)*	66	27	5	1
Spent 10 years or more at the posting *(11%)*	78	20	2	1

Note: Rest of the respondents did not answer. All figures are rounded off.

Question asked: Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with this area of your current posting? (Probe further whether 'fully' or 'somewhat')

It could thus be argued that those who had spent many more years at their present posting were likely to express greater satisfaction than those who were new to the area. This is probably on account of having settled into their job or having got acclimatised to the conditions prevalent in the area. This trend was much more pronounced in the LWE-affected areas than in the North East.

We also notice a clear linear trend with respect to age. The older a police person, the more likely he or she was to be more strongly satisfied with the area of posting *(Table 6.6)*. On the other hand, younger police personnel were more likely to be moderately satisfied. In other words, the age of a police person also determined his or her satisfaction level, with older police personnel viewing the location of their present posting more positively than younger ones. Age here, however, should not be confused with work experience, as we find no such correlation on disaggregating the satisfaction data by the number of years a respondent had spent in the police force. Being more satisfied with a conflict-area posting thus may have more to do with maturity that comes with age rather than experience from time spent in the police service.

Table 6.6 | Older personnel more likely to be satisfied with posting location than younger personnel

Age of Respondent	Level of Satisfaction: Police Personnel's Response (%)			
	Fully satisfied	Somewhat satisfied	Somewhat dissatisfied	Fully dissatisfied
18-29 years	62	30	4	1
30-39 years	62	29	5	1
40-49 years	71	24	3	1
50 years and above	76	17	5	2

Note: Rest of the respondents did not answer. All figures are rounded off.

Question asked: Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with this area of your current posting? (Probe further whether 'fully' or 'somewhat')

Having their family with them also made a difference to police personnel's contentment levels with their present posting location. Forty-four percent of the police personnel interviewed said that their families lived with them currently and over two-thirds (69%) of them expressed complete satisfaction with their posting *(Table 6.7)*. In contrast, a little over three-fifths (62%) of others who did not have their families with them at their current posting said they were completely satisfied with their posting. A very similar finding was also thrown up when we disaggregated the police personnel's satisfaction with their posting location by whether it was in their home district or outside. Nearly half the personnel reported being posted in their home district and they were seven percentage points more

likely to be fully satisfied than those who were not posted in their home districts *(Table 6.8)*.

Table 6.7 | Personnel living with families at current posting more likely to be satisfied with posting location

Level of Satisfaction: Police Personnel's Response (%)				
	Fully satisfied	Somewhat satisfied	Somewhat dissatisfied	Fully dissatisfied
With family at current posting *(44%)*	69	26	3	1
Without family at current posting *(56%)*	62	28	5	1

Note: Rest of the respondents did not answer. All figures are rounded off.

Question asked: Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with this area of your current posting? (Probe further whether 'fully' or 'somewhat')

Table 6.8 | Personnel posted in home districts more likely to be satisfied with their posting location

Level of Satisfaction: Police Personnel's Response (%)				
	Fully satisfied	Somewhat satisfied	Somewhat dissatisfied	Fully dissatisfied
Posted in home district *(48%)*	69	26	3	1
Not posted in home district *(52%)*	62	27	6	1

Note: Rest of the respondents did not answer. All figures are rounded off.

Question asked: Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with this area of your current posting? (Probe further whether 'fully' or 'somewhat')

Although a very small proportion of the police personnel (5%) reported being dissatisfied with their current posting location, it may be worth sharing their reasons of dissatisfaction through an open-ended question. The top most reason was either that the area was far away from their hometown or that they were not with their family at their current posting (22% said so). This was followed closely by the reasoning that duty hours were long and they were under considerable stress due to heavy workload (21%). Interestingly, despite the area being conflict-affected, safety and security reasons were cited by only 18 percent of the dissatisfied police personnel.

Levels of risk in areas of posting

In addition to satisfaction of the police personnel with the area of their posting, the survey also sought to find out their perception about how the area fared in terms of safety for themselves and their families. A majority – 52 percent - described their area of posting as being very risky (21%) or somewhat risky (31%; *Figure 6.3*). There was, however, a sizeable proportion of about 47 percent that did not view their area as being risky. Almost 16 percent described it as

being not very risky and 31 percent as not at all risky. The fact that a majority was satisfied with their posting location while also considering it to be risky indicated prima facie that there was no tangible link between police personnel's satisfaction and their risk assessment of the area.

Figure 6.3 | One out of two police personnel believe their posting location to be risky

Level of Risk at Posting Location (%)

- Very risky
- Somewhat risky
- Not much risky
- Not at all risky
- No response

Note: All figures are rounded off.

Question asked: Considering your own safety and your family's safety, how risky do you find this area- very, somewhat, not much or not at all?

In order to be sure about this, we looked at the interaction between the two variables more closely. Those who were completely satisfied with the area of their posting were not only more likely to view the area as being very safe (not at all risky) than those who were less satisfied or even dissatisfied, they were also more likely to view the area as being very risky or unsafe than the latter *(Table 6.9)*. In other words, there is no neat relationship between satisfaction and risk perception. This lack of a neat association was true even when we flipped the interaction between the two variables to look at satisfaction levels by risk perception. Nearly 74 percent or three-fourths of those who considered their posting location to be extremely risky for their own safety said that they were fully satisfied with it. This was opposed to 57 percent satisfaction among those who saw it as being somewhat risky, 55 percent among those who didn't view it as being very risky and 73 percent among those who didn't see it as being risky at all *(Table 6.10)*. Therefore, satisfaction of police personnel with their area of posting cannot be simply attributed to the level of safety in the area as perceived by them.

Table 6.9 | Satisfaction with posting location not determined by the perceived level of risk

Level of Satisfaction with Posting Location	Level of Risk: Police Personnel's Response (%)			
	Very risky	Somewhat risky	Not much risky	Not at all risky
Completely satisfied with area of posting	24	27	14	35
Somewhat satisfied with area of posting	11	40	21	26
Dissatisfied with area of posting	23	30	28	18

Note: Rest of the respondents did not answer. All figures are rounded off.

Question asked: Considering your own safety and your family's safety, how risky do you find this area - very, somewhat, not much or not at all?

Table 6.10 | Level of risk as perceived by personnel not determined by satisfaction with the posting location

Level of Risk as Perceived by the Police Personnel	Level of Satisfaction: Police Personnel's Response (%)		
	Completely satisfied with area of posting	Somewhat satisfied with area of posting	Dissatisfied with area of posting
Area of posting is very risky	74	14	6
Area of posting is somewhat risky	57	35	5
Area of posting is not much risky	55	34	9
Area of posting is not at all risky	73	23	3

Note: Rest of the respondents did not answer. All figures are rounded off.

The survey also found police personnel posted in the insurgency-affected regions of the North East to be seven percentage points more likely to view their area as being highly risky in terms of safety than those posted in the LWE-affected regions *(Table 6.11)*. This is despite the fact that they were also more satisfied with the area of the posting than the latter (see *Table 1.3*).

Table 6.11 | Personnel posted in insurgency-affected Northeastern regions more likely to consider their posting location as risky than personnel posted in LWE-affected regions

Place of Posting	Level of Risk: Police Personnel's Response (%)			
	Very Risky	Somewhat risky	Not much risky	Not at all risky
LWE-affected regions	18	31	18	31
Insurgency-affected regions of NE	25	29	14	31

Note: Rest of the respondents did not answer. All figures are rounded off.

Question asked: Considering your own safety and your family's safety, how risky do you find this area -very, somewhat, not much or not at all?

Civilians' perceptions about safety in the region vis-à-vis police personnel's perceptions

Since the survey was also conducted among civilians or common people living in the very same conflict-affected areas as the police personnel surveyed *(see the Methodology section for more details)* we were able to do a comparative analysis of some of the common questions posed to both. One such question sought to find out how risky/unsafe the area was for the police personnel. On comparing, we found that common people residing in conflict-affected regions were far more likely (12 percentage points to be precise) to view the areas as being very safe for police personnel than the police personnel themselves, 43 percent to 31 percent respectively *(Figure 6.4)*.

This difference in perception among local people and police personnel on how safe the area was for police personnel was however not of the same magnitude in the insurgency-affected and LWE-affected regions. In the insurgency-affected Northeastern regions, police personnel were more than twice as likely to view the area as being unsafe for police personnel as compared to common people – 54 percent as opposed to 22 percent respectively *(Table 6.12)*. In the LWE-affected regions, however, the difference was merely of six percentage points between the two, suggesting a greater parity of perception between the cops and the civilians here.

Among the common people surveyed, respondents were also asked about their perception regarding how safe they themselves felt living in the area. The responses to this question were even more positive than those about how safe the area was for police personnel.

Table 6.12 | Civilians from insurgency-affected Northeast regions significantly less likely to perceive the region as unsafe for police compared to the police personnel from that region

Area is...	Common People's Perception that the area is unsafe for police (%)	Police Personnel's Perception that the area is unsafe for Police (%)
LWE-affected regions	43	49
Insurgency-affected regions of NE	22	54

Note: All figures are rounded off.

Questions asked: In your opinion, how unsafe is this locality for the police personnel who are posted here – very, somewhat, not much or not at all? Considering your own safety and your family's safety, how risky do you find this area -very, somewhat, not much or not at all? The answer categories "very risky" and "somewhat risky" have been clubbed together in this table.

Seven out of 10 viewed the area they were living in as being very safe for living and two out of 10 saw it as being somewhat safe. Only one in every 10 saw it as being unsafe for living *(Figure 6.5)*. Thus, this particular data, when juxtaposed with the comparative data on common people's and police personnel's perception about safety of the conflict-affected area for the latter, suggests the following. While on the one hand common people are less likely to view the area as being risky for police personnel than the personnel themselves, they are also more likely to view the area as being safe for their own living than for the police. This indicates that the conflict is somewhat limited between the state and political actors identified as 'extremists,' than between citizens and the extremists.

Figure 6.4 | Civilians more likely to consider the region as safe for police personnel than the personnel themselves

■ Common People's Perception (%)   ■ Police Personnel's Perception (%)

Note: All figures are rounded off.

Question asked: (To civilians) In your opinion, how unsafe is this locality for the police personnel who are posted here – very, somewhat, not much or not at all? (To police personnel) Considering your own safety and your family's safety, how risky do you find this area – very, somewhat, not much or not at all?

Common people's perception about safety of their area of living (%)

- Area is very safe for living
- Area is somewhat safe for living
- Area is somewhat unsafe for living
- Area is very unsafe for living
- No response

Note: All figures are rounded off.

Questions asked: While talking to people in the area, some people said that this area is unsafe for living and some others said it is safe. Do you feel safe or unsafe living in this area (Probe further whether fully or somewhat)?

Civilians living in the LWE-affected areas were less likely to view their area as being highly safe for living (67%) than those living in insurgency-affected areas of the North East (75%). Conversely, the percentage of those who found it unsafe was also higher in the LWE-affected areas, 11 percent to seven percent respectively *(Table 6.13)*. That being said, an overwhelming majority of civilians even in the LWE-affected areas, viewed their area as being safe for living.

Interestingly, we notice a difference in perception regarding the safety of the area between ST respondents and respondents belonging to other caste groups, particularly in the LWE-affected areas. Non-ST respondents were more likely to perceive the area as being 'very safe' for their living than ST respondents *(Table 6.14)*. In the LWE-affected areas the difference was of 20 percentage points and in the insurgency-affected areas of four percentage points. In both types of regions, ST respondents were more likely than non-STs to state that the area was moderately safe or unsafe for living. This could be on account of the fact the

both Left-Wing Extremism and insurgency activities have usually been more rampant in tribal areas than others. Hence, it is only natural for tribals to be more likely to feel unsafe, being located at the centre of the conflict.

Table 6.13 | Civilians from LWE-affected regions slightly less likely to consider their area as 'very safe' for living as compared to civilians from the insurgency-affected North-east regions

Common People in…	Common People's Response (%)			
	Area is very safe for living	Area is somewhat Safe	Area is somewhat unsafe	Area is very unsafe for living
LWE-affected regions	67	21	8	3
Insurgency-affected regions of the NE	75	18	5	2

Note: Rest of the respondents did not answer. All figures are rounded off.

Questions asked: While talking to people in the area, some people said that this area is unsafe for living and some others said it is safe. Do you feel safe or unsafe living in this area (Probe further whether fully or somewhat)?

Table 6.14 | Tribal civilians less likely to perceive the conflict-affected region as safe than non-tribals civilians

Level of Safety: Common People's Response (%)				
	Area is very safe for living	Area is somewhat Safe	Area is somewhat unsafe	Area is very unsafe for living
LWE-affected regions				
Scheduled Tribes	53	27	14	5
Non-ST	73	18	6	2
Insurgency-affected regions of NE				
Scheduled Tribes	73	18	7	2
Non-ST	77	17	4	2

Note: Rest of the respondents did not answer. All figures are rounded off.

Questions asked: While talking to people in the area, some people said that this area is unsafe for living and some others said it is safe. Do you feel safe or unsafe living in this area (Probe further whether fully or somewhat)?

Although very few civilians regarded the area they were living in as being unsafe for them, nonetheless we asked them why they thought so. Around two-fifths blamed the conflict activities in their areas, around one-eighth held the lack of development responsible for it and another one-eighth blamed it on poor law and order and crime-prevention *(Figure 6.6)*. Inefficient and corrupt government/police force was also cited as a reason by three percent respondents. However, major differences were noticed on analysing the responses by the type of region. Amongst those who felt that the region was unsafe, those in the LWE-affected regions were nearly five times more likely to blame left wing extremism than those in

Reasons cited by civilians for the region being unsafe (%)

Naxalism/Isurgency

Poor implementation of laws

Inefficient/corrupt government and police

Poor law & order/ crime/poor policing

No response

Exploitation of Adivasis by government

Lack of development /basics

Other reasons <1% each

Unemployment

Note: All figures are rounded off.

Question asked: (If 'unsafe') What is the biggest reason for your feeling unsafe in this area?

insurgency-affected regions were to blame insurgency, 50 percent as opposed to 11 percent respectively *(Table 6.15).* Respondents in insurgency-affected areas tended to cite exploitation of tribals, poor implementation of laws, and inefficiency of the police and the government as being the reasons for making the area unsafe.

There was, however, unanimity across the two regions on the problems facing their areas. On being asked what the biggest problem was for people in their area, respondents in both LWE-affected and insurgency-affected areas cited lack of development and basic necessities, in almost equal measure. Almost 54 percent said so in LWE-affected areas and 53 in insurgency-affected areas *(Tables 6.16).* Similarly, 13 percent saw unemployment as the biggest problem in

LWE-hit areas and 14 percent in insurgency-hit areas. The difference was with respect to conflict activities. While Naxalism was cited as the biggest problem facing the area by 10 percent of the civilians in LWE-affected areas, insurgency was seen as a problem by merely one percent respondents in areas hit by it.

Table 6.15 | Civilians in LWE-affected regions five times more likely to blame Naxalism for lack of safety than civilians in insurgency-affected regions are to blame insurgency

Reasons for the Region Being Unsafe	Common people in LWE-affected regions (%)	Common people in Insurgency-affected regions (%)
Naxalism/insurgency/ underground cadres	50	11
Lack of development/ schools, college, hospitals	15	6
Poor law and order/crime/ theft/lack of safety/poor policing	13	11
Inefficient/corrupt government and police	1	10
Unemployment	3	-
Exploitation of Adivasis by the government	-	14
Poor implementation of laws	<1	3
Other reasons <1% each	4	12

Note: Rest of respondents did not answer. All figures are rounded off.

Question asked: (If 'unsafe') What is the biggest reason for your feeling unsafe in this area?

Table 6.16 | More than one out of two civilians believe the lack of development is the biggest problem in their region

Biggest problem in their area of residence	Common people Overall (%)	Common people in LWE-affected regions (%)	Common people in Insurgency-affected regions (%)
Lack of development/ schools, college, hospitals, roads, water, electricity	53	54	53
Poor roads	17	14	23
Water woes	13	15	9
Electricity woes	5	6	5
Lack of health care/health infrastructure	4	5	2
Lack of education/ educational infrastructure	3	3	2
Poor drainage	4	5	3
Lack of development generally	7	6	9
Unemployment	13	13	14

Naxalism/insurgency/underground cadres	7	10	1
Poor law and order/crime/theft/lack of safety/poor policing	3	4	2
Inefficient/corrupt government and police	4	3	4
Other reasons <1% each	9	8	9

Note: Rest of respondents did not answer. All figures are rounded off.

Question asked: What is the biggest problem for the people living in this area?

Police personnel's opinion on compensation for death or injury

Considering that survey locations were conflict-affected where deaths and injuries of security personnel are common, the police personnel were asked about the compensation provided to the personnel and their families by the government for service-related death or injury. In fact, every state government has a special ex gratia for widows and dependents of policemen who die in the line of duty. In the LWE and insurgency-affected states, it is even higher for families of police *jawans* who lose their lives in Naxalite or insurgent violence. These amounts are revised from time to time. In March 2020, for instance, the Chhattisgarh Home department announced an increase in the financial aid given to the families of security personnel killed in Naxal violence in the state to Rs 20 lakh from Rs three lakh (Business Standard, 2020). This included the families of *jawans* in both the state police and central forces. In September, in neighbouring Odisha, the government hiked the ex-gratia amount, payable to the next of kin of police personnel, forest department personnel, home guards, *gram rakhis* and special police personnel, apart from other state government employees dying in Maoist violence, by Rs 10 lakh (Mohanty, 2020). States also give financial assistance to injured police personnel depending on the type of injury – whether it is terminal, major or minor.

We asked police personnel about the sufficiency of such compensations. We asked whether the financial assistance from the government received by them or their families in cases of injury or death while on duty was adequate or not. Opinion on this was more or less divided. While 45 percent of the police personnel considered it insufficient (16% said it was very insufficient and 29% said it was a little insufficient), 43 percent saw it as being sufficient - 11 percent said it is sufficient enough and 32 percent described it as somewhat sufficient *(Figure 6.7)*. Interestingly, one in every 10 personnel interviewed were found to be ignorant of any such scheme/compensation package of the government even though it existed - four percent said there was no such scheme and seven percent said they weren't aware.

Figure 6.7 | Forty-five percent police personnel believe that amount of compensation in case of death or injury is insufficient; forty-three percent believe it is sufficient

Police personnel on sufficiency of financial assistance provided to them by the government (%)

- Sufficient enough
- Somewhat sufficient
- A little sufficient
- Very insufficient
- No such scheme is there
- Not aware of any such scheme
- No response

Note: Rest of respondents did not answer. All figures are rounded off.

Question asked: How sufficient is the financial assistance given by the government to the family of a police person, in case of an injury or death while on duty – sufficient enough, somewhat sufficient, a little less or very less?

The feeling that the financial aid given by the government was inadequate was greater among constables than higher ranked police personnel – 57 percent of the constabulary viewed it as being insufficient as opposed to 49 percent of higher ranked personnel *(Table 6.17)*.

Impact of the posting on mental health of police personnel

We also tried to find out whether posting to a sensitive, violence-prone area had an impact on police personnel's mental health. This is especially relevant since suicides by security personnel are reported from time to time from conflict-affected areas. In Chhattisgarh, for instance, according to official figures, 100 security personnel belonging to both police and paramilitary are reported to have died by suicide between 2016 and early 2020[1] (Mishra, 2020). Of the 50, who killed themselves between 2018 and early 2020, 18 were from seven regions of Maoism-affected

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[1] 12 in 2016, 38 in 2017, 22 in 2018, 26 in 2019 and 2 till February 2020; For more details see https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/50-police-personnel-committed-suicide-in-chhattisgarh-in-last-two-years/story-GDn4EEYaepgffC0g5fILON.html

Table 6.17 | Constables more likely to consider the financial assistance received in case of death or injury as insufficient

Rank of Personnel	Whether Financial Assistance is Sufficient: Police Personnel's Response (%)					
	Sufficient enough	Somewhat sufficient	A little insufficient	Very insufficient	No such scheme is there	Not aware of any such scheme
Constables	11	30	30	17	3	7
Higher ranked	14	35	25	15	6	3

Note: Rest of the respondents did not answer. All figures are rounded off.

Question asked: How sufficient is the financial assistance given by the government to the family of a police person, in case of an injury or death while on duty – sufficient enough, somewhat sufficient, a little less or very less?

Bastar division alone. Not just suicides, the state has also reported at least two incidents of fratricide since 2018, in which eight security personnel have lost their lives.

In the context of suicides or fratricide of their colleagues in conflict-areas, a phenomenon also attributed to long duty hours, stress and homesickness, we asked the police personnel how much their current posting was affecting their mental health. Nearly half reported at least some effect *(Figure 6.8)*. While 16 percent said that their current posting was affecting them a lot mentally, around 33 percent said there had been at least some impact on their mental well-being. At the other end, the proportion of those who reported little or no impact on their mental health was 44 percent – 17 percent said it didn't affect them much and 27 percent reported not getting mentally affected at all. This data could be interpreted in two ways: When we merge the moderate and extreme response categories, it appears that there is a slightly greater proportion that reports an effect on mental health, than little or no effect. However, if we compare just the extreme responses indicating the severity of the impact on mental health then we find that the proportion reporting no impact on mental health whatsoever (27%) far outweighs the proportion reporting high impact on their mental health (16%). Nonetheless, 16 percent in itself is a sizeable proportion. The fact that one in every six personnel reported a strong impact of their current posting on their mental state should be cause for worry.

A deeper analysis of the mental health question pointed towards a correlation between experience and impact on mental well-being. Police personnel who had been in service for a longer period (more than 5 years) were less likely to report their posting to a conflict-affected region as having a strong effect on their mental health *(Table 6.18)*. A similar trend was noticed among those who have been at their current posting for less than five years as opposed to those who had served for longer periods. In other words, those who are relatively newcomers to either the police force or the posting in the region were more likely to report their posting having an effect on their mental health than those who have stayed longer. This experience-related finding, however, should not be interpreted as older police

Figure 6.8 | One out of six police personnel feel that the posting affects them a lot mentally

Extent of impact of the posting on mental wellbeing (%)

- This posting affects me a lot mentally
- This posting affects me somewhat mentally
- This posting doesn't affects me much mentally
- This posting doesn't affects me at all mentally
- No response

Note: All figures are rounded off.

Question asked: Considering that this is a Naxalism/insurgency affected area, how much does being posted here affect you mentally - a lot, somewhat, not much or not at all?

personnel being less mentally stressed than the younger ones. This is because when we disaggregated the data by their age groups, the oldest police personnel (those aged 50 years and above) were far more likely to report that the posting was affecting them mentally than the younger personnel *(Table 6.19)*.

There was a contrast noticed by the type of region police personnel were posted in. Police personnel posted in the LWE-affected regions were seven percentage points more likely to report that their posting was affecting them a lot mentally than those posted in insurgency-affected regions of the North East, 19 percent to 12 percent respectively *(Table 6.20)*.

Table 6.18 | Personnel with more years of service in police and those with more years at current posting less likely to report an impact of the posting on their mental health

	Police Personnel's Response (%)			
	This posting affects me a lot mentally	This posting affects me somewhat mentally	This posting doesn't affect me much mentally	This posting doesn't affect me at all mentally
Years spent in police service				
Less than 5 years	24	25	16	27
5 to 9 years	16	38	15	25
10 years or more	15	33	18	28
Years spent at current posting				
Less than 5 years	17	34	15	26
5 -9 years	16	33	21	25
10 years or more	12	28	20	36

Note: Rest of the respondents did not answer. All figures are rounded off.

Question asked: Considering that this is a Naxalism/insurgency affected area, how much does being posted here affect you mentally - a lot, somewhat, not much or not at all?

Table 6.19 | Personnel above the age of 50 most likely to report an impact of the posting on their mental health

Age of Personnel	Police Personnel's Response (%)			
	This posting affects me a lot mentally	This posting affects me somewhat mentally	This posting doesn't affect me much mentally	This posting doesn't affect me at all mentally
18-29 years	20	28	17	29
30-39 years	15	34	17	27
40-49 years	15	34	20	27
50 years and above	21	36	12	25

Note: Rest of the respondents did not answer. All figures are rounded off.

Question asked: Considering that this is a Naxalism/insurgency affected area, how much does being posted here affect you mentally - a lot, somewhat, not much or not at all?

Table 6.20 | Personnel from LWE-affected regions more likely to report an impact of posting on their mental health than those from insurgency-affected regions

Type of Region Where Posted	Police Personnel's Response (%)			
	This posting affects me a lot mentally	This posting affects me somewhat mentally	This posting doesn't affect me much mentally	This posting doesn't affect me at all mentally
LWE-affected regions	19	34	14	28
Insurgency-affected regions of NE	12	32	22	26

Note: Rest of the respondents did not answer. All figures are rounded off.

Question asked: Considering that this is a Naxalism/insurgency affected area, how much does being posted here affect you mentally - a lot, somewhat, not much or not at all?

Training

One would imagine that any police personnel posted in a conflict-affected region would get special training in aspects of policing crucial in such a region. This seems logical, given the challenging nature of the area and the tasks involved in curbing subversive activities. Studies on LWE violence suggest that a prime reason for repeated casualties of security personnel is the inadequacy in training imparted (Jha, 2009). It has also been argued by security analysts that while the central paramilitary forces have good infrastructure and resources for training, police forces in most states generally lack them. That is because the latter have traditionally been trained and groomed for maintaining law and order, crime investigation and community policing. Human rights activists, on the other hand, have pointed to the inadequacy of another kind of training. They advocate for sensitising the police in such areas in being more respectful of local customs and communities, improved interactions with women and children and to be generally mindful of human rights while carrying out their tasks. Keeping this in mind, we asked police personnel a slew of questions related to training. We enquired whether and when they had last received training in handling weapons, controlling crowds, using new technology, human rights, community and gender sensitivity etc. Shockingly, nearly half the police personnel interviewed had not received training for human rights, caste, gender and juvenile sensitisation for a long time – in many cases one-fifth/one-fourth of them had never received it *(Table 1.21)*.

Table 6.21 | Personnel more likely to be recently trained on new technology, weapons training, new laws and physical training than human rights or community/tribe sensitisation

Type of Training	Police Personnel's Response (%)				
	In last one year	2-3 years ago	4-5 years ago	Even before that	Never/ no response
New technology	26	24	15	16	19
Weapons training	25	21	15	34	6
On human rights	19	16	17	27	22
On crowd control	21	17	18	30	14
Physical training	27	17	14	35	7
On community/ tribe sensitisation	19	14	13	26	29
On new laws/ rules/orders	27	16	13	26	17
On sensitisation towards women	21	16	12	26	25
On sensitisation towards children/ juveniles	24	15	13	26	22

Note: All figures are rounded off.

Question asked: When was the last time you received training about the following things in the last one year, two-three years ago, four-five years ago, even before that or never?

This is despite the fact that 88 percent of police personnel interviewed had served the police for five years or more. On the brighter side, one-fourth of the police personnel had received training in the last one year on new technology and new laws and rules. A similar proportion had also undergone physical training in the last one year.

When it came to training on different aspects of policing, the police personnel posted in the LWE-affected regions fared much better on the whole than their counterparts in the insurgency-affected areas *(Table 1.22)*. Well over eight out of 10 police personnel in the LWE-affected areas were trained on various aspects essential to modern policing at least once and this was consistent across all the affected states. Among police personnel in the insurgency-affected areas, the proportion was much less in most cases – hovering between half and four-fifths.

Table 6.22 | Police personnel in LWE-affected regions more likely to have received training than those in insurgency-affected regions

Type of Training	Police personnel who have received this training at least at some point of time (%)		
	Overall	LWE-affected regions	Insurgency-affected regions of NE
New technology	81	93	60
Weapons training	94	99	85
On human rights	78	86	66
On crowd control	86	93	74
Physical training	93	97	87
On community/ tribe sensitisation	71	84	51
On new laws/ rules/orders	83	92	68
On sensitisation towards women	75	89	53
On sensitisation towards children/ juveniles	78	93	54

Note: All figures are rounded off.

Question asked: When was the last time you received training about the following things in the last one year, two-three years ago, four-five years ago, even before that or never?

We also asked police personnel whether they had received any special training on ways to deal with extremist activities of Naxalites or insurgents soon after they joined their current posting. Almost 56 percent said that they under-

went such training. However, there were major differences noticed in the responses of police personnel posted in the LWE and insurgency-affected regions. Those posted in LWE-hit areas were more than twice as likely to have received special training (71% as against 30%) on how to deal with extremist activities, compared to those posted to the North East's insurgency-affected areas *(Table 1.23)*.

Table 6.23 | Personnel in LWE-affected regions more than twice as likely to be provided special training for current posting as compared to personnel in insurgency-affected regions

Police personnel who received special training on being posted to their current posting (%)	
Overall	*56*
LWE-affected regions	71
Insurgency-affected regions of NE	30

Note: Rest of the respondents did not receive any training; all figures are rounded off

Question asked: When you were posted here, were you given any special training in how to deal with Naxalite/Insurgent activities?

In terms of rank, constables were slightly more likely to have received special training on joining their current posting than personnel ranked higher, 58 percent as opposed to 55 percent. However, in what should be a cause for worry, of late, there has been a decline in providing special training. The survey found only 44 percent of those who were posted to a conflict-affected region in the last one year to have received such training, as opposed to the overall average of 56 percent *(Table 1.24)*.

Table 6.24 | Less than half of those who joined their current posting less than a year ago received special training on being posted

	Police personnel who received special training on being posted to their current posting (%)
Overall	*56*
Been 1 year or less at present posting	44
Been 2-3 years at present posting	59
Been 4-5 years at present posting	52
Been more than 5 years at present posting	61

Note: Rest of the respondents did not receive any training; all figures are rounded off.

Question asked: When you were posted here, were you given any special training in how to deal with Naxalism/insurgent activities?

Conclusion

To sum up the key takeaways, the survey of police personnel posted in conflict-affected areas reveals certain surprising facts. A very large majority seems content with its posting location and that this is true for all kinds of police personnel. Even those personnel seem content whose posting came about in a routine manner, i.e., without having asked for it. The only differences are to do with the degree of satisfaction. Older police personnel, who have served at their current location for more years, and those who have their families living with them are more likely to be fully content with the area of their posting than their younger, less experienced colleagues who are living without families. The type of conflict area that one is posted in also makes a difference to satisfaction levels. Those posted in insurgency-affected areas of the North East were found to express greater levels of satisfaction with their area than those who are serving in the LWE-affected areas of central, eastern and southern India.

High levels of contentment among personnel with the area of their posting should not, however, be misconstrued as them not viewing the area as being dangerous or unsafe. We find that a large majority of personnel—even ones who were satisfied with their area of posting—also felt that the area was risky for them and their families. Similarly, a very large majority of personnel, who viewed their area of posting as being highly risky, were also found to be fully satisfied with it. In other words, the two variables, satisfaction with the area and risk perception of it, cannot be seen to be neatly related to each other.

Since the question about the levels of risk in the area for police personnel was also asked to civilians living in the very same areas through a parallel survey, we were able to do a comparative analysis of the responses. Civilians were less likely to view the area as being dangerous for police personnel than police personnel themselves. Nonetheless, we noticed an interesting difference in responses to the question when we disaggregated the answers by the type of conflict prevailing in the civilians' area. Common people from the LWE-affected regions were far more cognisant of the threat to the safety of police persons serving in their region than their counterparts residing in the insurgency-affected areas in NE India. In fact, there was a near parity in how civilians and police personnel responded to the question in the LWE-affected areas. Also, when civilians were asked about their own safety and security in the area, they were far more positive in their responses. They viewed the area as being far safer for their own selves than for the police personnel. This was true for both LWE and insurgency-affected areas.

Given that there is a higher risk to police lives in conflict-affected areas, police personnel were also probed about what they thought of the compensation provided to them and their families by the government in the event of death or injury. Opinion on the matter was more or less divided, with a slightly greater proportion viewing it as being insufficient. The difference was, however, starker when the responses were disaggregated by police rank, with constables being more likely to state that the compensation and ex-gratia meant for them was not sufficient. Also, a small but significant proportion (about one in every 10) was not even aware that such a provision existed.

In the context of a growing number of suicides and fratricides among security personnel across the country, the survey also sought to find out from the police personnel as to how they viewed their mental wellbeing. The findings were not too encouraging with nearly half the personnel reporting an adverse effect on the mental health, of which one-thirds reported a strong effect. Those who have been relatively newly posted were far more likely to report a higher level of mental stress than the ones who have been posted to conflict-regions for longer. Police personnel who were older in age were more likely to report mental stress than their younger counterparts. The tendency to report a high degree of adverse impact on mental health was also found to be greater among personnel posted in the LWE-affected areas than other areas.

The LWE-affected areas however fared much better comparatively when it came to training in different aspects of policing. An overwhelming majority of police personnel in LWE-affected areas reported having received training at least once in aspects of policing such as crowd control, use of weapons and technology, gender and community sensitisation etc. This was not the case with personnel posted in the insurgency-hit regions of the North East. A cause for worry is the declining regularity of such training being imparted. At least two-fifths of the police personnel reported having received no training since 2016.

On looking at the regional differences, we find that personnel from LWE-affected regions are more likely to have specifically asked for the posting than their counterparts in the insurgency-affected NE regions. This is particularly true for ST personnel in the LWE-affected regions. Yet, a smaller proportion of personnel from the LWE-affected region are completely satisfied with their posting than those from the insurgency-affected regions of the NE. While overall a large proportion of the personnel consider their place of posting unsafe, personnel posted in insurgency-affected Northeastern regions are more likely to consider their posting location as being risky than personnel posted in LWE-affected regions.

The common people from both the regions considered the area to be largely safe for themselves, even though civilians from LWE-affected regions were slightly less likely to feel so, particularly the tribals in the LWE-affected regions. Overall, two out of five civilians cited Naxalism or insurgency as the reason for lack of safety in the region. However, civilians from the LWE-affected areas are much more likely to blame Naxalism for the lack of safety than their counterparts in NE are to blame insurgency. Similarly, people from the LWE-affected regions are more likely to view Naxalism as one of the biggest problems in the area than the people from NE are to view insurgency as the biggest problem.

Overall, from a bare analysis of the location-wise reading of the data, it becomes evident that for the civilians, the conflict plays a more significant role in determining the perceptions of safety, risk and overall satisfaction in the LWE-affected areas as compared to the insurgency-affected areas of the NE. For the police personnel, on the other hand, those from the insurgency-affected regions appear to be on the worse end of the stick: they feel more at risk, are more likely to be posted in the area through routine posting rather than by choice and are lesser trained than their counterparts in the LWE-affected regions. Thus, conflict plays out differently not only for the different stakeholders involved—civilians and police personnel, but also in terms of the region and nature of conflict.

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7

General Policing amid Conflict

Policemen guard a fuel station during a protest against the petrol crisis caused by a damaged section of the Assam-Tripura national highway after incessant rains, in Agartala, India. July 29, 2016. ©REUTERS/Jayanta Dey

Key Takeaways

- Theft/robbery was reported by the police as the most common crime in conflict-affected regions. Naxalism accounted for 12 percent of the overall crime in the LWE-affected regions, according to police personnel.

- Common people were less likely to report the occurrence of all types of general crimes in the region as compared to police personnel.

- A majority of the common people (56%) believe that criminal activities have decreased in the region in the last 2-3 years.

- One out of four police personnel (27%) and one out of six common people (16%) believes that normal policing suffers a lot in conflict-affected regions. High ranking police officers were more likely to believe so. Further, both the police personnel and common people from the LWE-affected regions were more likely to feel that normal policing suffers due to conflict.

- One in every tenth person had come in contact with police. One of every three people who contacted the police was fully satisfied with the help provided by the police.

- Hindu upper castes and OBCs were more likely to contact the police, while Adivasis were more likely to be contacted by the police.

General Policing amid Conflict

Policing in conflict-hit areas has to work within the larger context of extremist violence but needs to function without violating the law. The security forces are not allowed to use legally questionable methods of combat. In a constitutional democracy, they have to be answerable for their actions particularly when there are allegations of crossing the line. The presence of armed underground groups not only affects normal policing but also creates a serious deficit of peoples' trust in them which, in turn, hinders the normal functioning of the police. However, despite this tenuous, and sometimes toxic, relationship, common people are often forced to interact with both in the times of crisis. Not surprisingly, they are discouraged from approaching the police which affects communication between the two. Other than general crimes such as theft and robbery, both the police and people are witnesses to multiple unlawful acts in these regions.

This chapter broadly looks into the details of these issues through four sections. The first section talks about common crimes occurring in the conflict-affected regions and their frequency. It also analyses the opinions of the people and police on whether crimes in conflict-affected areas have increased or decreased. The second section discusses in detail the extent to which the ongoing conflict affects general policing in these regions. The third section focuses on people's interaction with the police and their shared experiences in dealing with them. In section four, we report some important steps suggested by the police personnel to control crime in these specific regions.

General crime and investigation

Certain regions in India have been victims of sustained and violent conflicts defined by different names in different geographies. In these regions, crimes committed by con-

flict groups form a substantial portion of the total crimes committed along with crimes considered normal such as theft, homicides or robbery. Yet, when the police personnel were asked about common crimes in their jurisdiction in an open-ended question, theft or robbery was reported as the most common crime. Forty-three percent of the surveyed police personnel reported theft and robbery as the most common crimes. Nonetheless, only seven percent of police personnel identified Naxalism/insurgency as the common crime in their areas. Crime against women, in general; and sexual assault and rape in particular, were also reported as common crimes; 14 percent of police personnel stated these as common crimes in their areas. Other crimes such as extortion/abduction/kidnapping, murder of civilians, domestic violence, drug trafficking, cyber-crimes, accident, land and family issues were also identified in different frequencies by the police in the conflict-affected regions *(Table 7.1)*.

The reporting of crimes varies across insurgency-affected and Left-Wing Extremism (LWE)-affected regions. For instance, theft and robbery were the most common crimes reported in the insurgency-affected areas. Forty-five percent police personnel stated this. Forty-one percent police personnel in the LWE-affected districts also referred to theft as a common crime in their jurisdiction. However, Naxalism-related activities were a more prominent crime in the LWE-affected districts than the insurgency-affected ones. Twelve percent police personnel stated this as the most common crime in the LWE-affected districts whereas only less than one percent did in the insurgency-affected areas. Crime against women, in general, was reported by 10 percent police personnel in insurgency-affected districts. Only five percent police personnel in LWE-affected districts identified this as a common crime *(Table 7.1)*.

Table 7.1 | Theft/robbery is reported by the police as the most common crime in conflict-affected regions

Most common crime in the conflict-affected regions…	Police Personnel's Response (%)		
	Overall	LWE-affected regions	Insurgency-affected regions
Theft/Robbery	43	41	45
Naxalism/ insurgency	7	12	Less than 1
Crimes against women (in general)	7	5	10
Sexual Assault/Harassment/rape	7	7	7
Extortion/Abduction/Kidnapping	5	4	7
Murder of civilians	3	4	2
Domestic Violence	2	1	3
Drug Trafficking	2	2	3
Accident	2	1	4
Land Issue	2	2	1
Family Issue	2	3	1
Other	11	12	11

Note: Rest of the respondents did not answer. All figures are rounded off.
Question asked: What is the most common crime in this area?

While reporting a common crime in their jurisdictions, police personnel of different ranks shared slightly different opinions. For instance, 44 percent police personnel of constabulary ranks named theft and robbery as common crimes; whereas 39 percent high-ranked police officers identified them as common crimes in their areas. The

Table 7.2 | Constabulary-level personnel more likely to believe that theft/robbery are the most common crimes in the region, compared to higher-ranked officers

Most common crime in the conflict-affected regions…	Police Personnel's Rank	
	Constabulary (%)	High rank (%)
Theft/Robbery	44	39
Naxalism/insurgency	7	9
Crimes against women (in general)	7	8
Sexual Assault/Harassment/rape	6	7
Extortion/Abduction/Kidnapping	5	7
Murder of civilians	3	5
Domestic Violence	2	2
Drug Trafficking	2	2
Accident	2	2
Land Issue	2	2
Family Issue	2	2
Other	12	11

Note: Rest of the respondents did not answer. All figures are rounded off.

number of high-ranked police officers saw a slight upswing while identifying Naxalism/insurgency, extortion/abduction/kidnapping and murder of civilians as common crimes; with a difference of two percentage points for each category *(Table 7.2)*.

The service experience of the police personnel had a direct correlation with identifying theft and robbery as common crimes. Fifty-five percent police personnel who had spent five years or more in their current posting (in conflict-affected regions) said that theft and robbery were common crimes in their jurisdiction. In contrast, a little over one third (36%) of the police personnel with less than five years in their current posting identified theft and robbery as common crimes *(Table 7.3)*.

In another set of questions both the police personnel and common people were asked about the frequency of some specific crimes such as abduction, extortion, rape, attack on police personnel and other minor offenses in their areas. Although police personnel confirmed the frequent occurrence of these crimes in their areas; lesser proportion of common people shared this view. According to the police, the most common crime in the conflict-affected areas was minor offences like theft. Thirty percent police personnel said it was very common and 42 percent said it was somewhat common in their jurisdictions. This was followed by extortion. Ten percent police personnel said that extortion was very common and 25 percent said it was somewhat common in their area. Common people also stated that

Table 7.3 | More experienced police personnel are more likely to identify theft/robbery as the most common crimes in the region

Most common crime in the conflict-affected regions…	Police personnel's years of service in current posting (%)	
	Less than 5 years	5 years and above
Theft/Robbery	36	55
Naxalism/insurgency	7	8
Crimes against women/ (in general)	8	5
Sexual Assault/Harassment/rape	8	4
Extortion/Abduction/Kidnapping	6	4
Murder of civilians	4	2
Domestic Violence	2	2
Drug Trafficking	3	2
Accident	2	2
Land Issue	2	2
Family Issue	2	2
Other	14	7

Note: Rest of the respondents did not answer. All figures are rounded off.

crimes like theft were common in their area; 40 percent of the people (combining 'very' or 'somewhat') said so.

In police's opinion crimes such as abduction (29%), rape (28%) and attack on police personnel (25%) were also common (if we look at the combined figures of 'very' and 'somewhat' categories) in conflict-affected areas. Although to a lesser extent, common people also confirmed the occurrence of these crimes – abduction (10%), rape (10%) and attack on police personnel (16%), if we clubbed the 'frequent' and 'somewhat' occurrence *(Table 7.4)*.

However, in regions witnessing the presence of different conflict-groups, the nature of crimes and their occurrence varied. For instance, extortion was higher in insurgency-affected regions as compared to the LWE-affected regions, as reported by the police personnel. The difference was of 11 percentage points. Kumar, (2018) in his paper, has also mentioned that insurgent groups also act as organised extortion gangs and collect money. According to him, this contributes towards people's lack of trust in these groups. According to the police posted in LWE-affected regions, abduction and kidnapping were more prominent crimes there than in insurgency-affected regions. The difference was of 10 percentage points. A few studies also reveal that Naxalites abduct young children and recruit them in their groups. In other instances, they kidnap people to use as bargaining counter to negotiate their demands (Bhattacharjee 2017; Biswal 2020). Police personnel posted in LWE-affected regions were almost twice as likely to say that attacks on them were also a common crime, as compared to their colleagues in insurgency-affected regions.

In contrast, people living in the LWE-affected regions identified the regular occurrence of all the listed crimes, more than people living in the insurgency affect regions. This is with the exception of minor offences such as theft or robbery, which was highly reported by people living in the insurgency affected regions *(Table 7.5)*. Overall, lesser proportion of the common people mentioned the occurrence of these crimes as compared to the police.

Table 7.5 | Personnel from LWE-affected region more likely to report instances of abduction/kidnapping and attack on police personnel, compared to those from insurgency-affected regions

Common* occurrence of ……	Police Personnel's Response (%)		Common People's Response (%)	
	LWE-affected	Insurgency-affected	LWE-affected	Insurgency-affected
Extortion	34	45	12	8
Abduction/ Kidnapping	36	26	16	14
Rape	32	32	13	6
Attacks on Police personnel	32	16	21	8
Minor offenses	69	78	38	45

*Note: *Categories of very and somewhat are merged together. Rest of the respondents did not answer. All figures are rounded off.*

We also asked the respondents if they think crime rate has increased in recent times. A positive picture emerges when we compare people's opinion of the current crime situation in their areas as compared to the past 2-3 years. A little less than three in every five (56%) respondents believed that criminal activities had decreased in their localities. Only 13 percent said it had increased. In the insurgency affected regions, the figure was one percent lower than overall. Twelve percent people living there said that criminal activities in their area had increased as compared to the last 2-3 years. In the LWE-affected areas 14 percent people said that the criminal activities in their localities had increased. Nonetheless, close to one in every five (17%) respondents also said that it had remained the same *(Table 7.6)*.

Table 7.4 | Common people less likely to report the occurrence of all types of general crimes in the region, compared to police personnel

Frequency of these Crimes in disturbed areas	Very		Somewhat		Not much		Not at all	
	Police Personnel (%)	Common People (%)	Police Personnel (%)	Common People (%)	Police Personnel (%)	Common People (%)	Police Personnel (%)	Common People (%)
Abduction/Kidnapping	4	3	25	7	34	15	34	72
Extortion	10	5	25	11	31	18	31	64
Rape	6	2	22	8	35	15	35	71
Attacks on Police personnel	5	4	21	12	32	15	40	64
Minor offenses, like theft etc.	30	11	42	29	19	20	8	36

Note: Rest of the respondents did not answer. All figures are rounded off.

Question asked: How common are these crimes in your area? - (followed by the list mentioned in the table)

Table 7.6 | Fifty-six percent of the people believe that criminal activities in their locality have decreased

Criminal activities have……	Common People (%)		
	Overall	LWE-affected regions	Insurgency-affected regions
Increased	13	14	12
Decreased	56	57	55
Remained same	29	17	21

Note: Rest of the respondents did not answer. All figures are rounded off.

Question asked: In the last 2-3 years, have the other criminal activities in your locality increased or decreased?

When we compare this data with findings from the Status of Policing in India Report (SPIR) 2018, we notice that while the trends largely remain the same, the proportion of people who believe that crime has decreased in their locality is much lower in non-conflict regions (in the national survey of 22 states) as compared to the conflict states studied here. In SPIR 2018, as many as 37 percent people felt that crime had decreased in their locality (compared to 56% respondents from the conflict-affected regions), while 17 percent felt that it had increased in the last 2-3 years.

Effects of ongoing conflict on general policing

Does normal policing, such as maintaining law and order, get affected due to the presence of the conflict? It is reasonable to expect that since the police force is also tasked with handling LWE or insurgency, their undivided focus on the same may have adverse effect on their capacity to attend to routine crimes. More police personnel than ordinary citizens seem to think so. Close to three out of five (62%) police personnel agreed that normal policing gets affected. A little over one-fourth (27%) police personnel said it got affected a lot; and close to one third (35%) said normal policing suffered sometimes in the conflict-affected regions. On the other hand, 49 percent common people in these

Table 7.7 | One out of four police personnel and one out of six common people believe that normal policing suffers a lot in conflict-affected regions

Normal policing in Conflict-affected regions suffers….	Police Personnel's Response (%)	Common People's Response (%)
A lot	27	16
Somewhat	35	33
Not much	16	14
Not at all	17	23

Note: Rest of the respondents did not answer. All figures are rounded off.

Question asked: Because of the presence of Naxalites/Insurgents in your area, how much does the normal policing, such as maintaining law & order and crime investigation suffer- a lot, somewhat, not much or not at all?

volatile regions also believed that policing suffered due to the ongoing conflict. Sixteen percent common people said normal policing suffered a lot and 33 percent said it got affected sometimes. Close to one in every four (23%) people said normal policing had not suffered at all due to the conflict, and the proportion reduced to 17% among police personnel *(Table 7.7)*.

The same finding emerges from the districts affected by LWE violence. A little over one in three (36%) police personnel in the LWE-affected districts said that normal policing suffered a lot in their jurisdiction. In the insurgency-affected districts the proportion came down to 13 percent. Common people residing in the LWE-affected regions were more likely to believe that normal policing got affected a lot due to the presence of conflict-groups in their regions as compared to those in the insurgency affected regions. The figures were 21 percent and 9 percent respectively. Proportionally more people in LWE-affected regions believed that normal policing got affected, if we look at the combined figures of 'a lot' and 'somewhat' categories, as compared to the insurgency affected regions. In the insurgency affected districts, 24 percent police personnel said normal policing had not suffered at all; whereas, in the LWE-affected districts 13 percent said the same *(Table 7.8)*.

Table 7.8 | Police personnel and common people from LWE-affected regions more likely to believe that normal policing suffers because of conflict

Normal policing in disturbed areas suffers….	Police Personnel (%)		Common People(%)	
	LWE-affected	Insurgency-affected	LWE-affected	Insurgency-affected
A lot	36	13	21	9
Somewhat	35	35	34	31
Not much	13	21	12	17
Not at all	13	24	19	30

Note: Rest of the respondents did not answer. All figures are rounded off.

When we looked at the police personnel's opinion on the effect of the ongoing conflict on general policing on the basis of their ranks, years of service and places of posting, we observed some trends. For instance, personnel posted at police outposts or armed battalions were more likely to believe that normal policing had suffered a lot as compared to those working in police stations. However, when we look at their opinion by combining 'a lot' and 'somewhat' categories, there is not much difference. Differing opinions, however, were quite visible among police personnel of different ranks. Thirty-two percent high-ranking police officials believed that the ongoing conflict in their jurisdiction affected normal policing a lot. Twenty-seven percent among the constabulary-ranked police personnel believed

the same. Altogether, 71 percent high-ranking police officials believed that policing got affected in conflict-affected regions. In contrast, 60 percent police personnel of constabulary rank believed the same *(Table 7.9)*.

Table 7.9 | High-ranking police officers more likely to believe that normal policing suffers due to conflict, compared to the constabulary-level personnel

Police personnel believe normal policing suffers….				
	A lot	**Somewhat**	**Not much**	**Not at all**
Place of posting… (%)				
Police Station	26	36	17	16
Police Outpost or Armed Battalion	30	33	14	23
Rank (%)				
Constabulary	27	33	17	18
High rank	32	39	13	14
Year of service in current posting (%)				
Less than 5 years	28	39	14	15
5 years and above	27	27	20	21

Note: Rest of the respondents did not answer. All figures are rounded off.

People's interface with the police

In this section, we have tried to do an in-depth analysis of the pattern of interface between the people and the police. In the study, we found that only 12 percent common people had come in contact with the police in disturbed areas *(Table 7.10)*. Upper castes and Dalits had more frequent contact with the police as compared to other castes and communities. Fourteen percent upper castes and 13 percent Dalits said that they had come in contact with the police in the 2-3 years. However, Adivasis in the conflict-affected regions were least likely to contact the police; 10 percent of them had been in contact with the police. Though there was not much difference, people living in the LWE-affected regions were less likely to contact the police as compared to those in the insurgency affected regions.

Economic class of the respondents showed a pattern in the context of police contact as well. People belonging to the middle economic classes were more likely to be in contact with the police as compared to the lower economic classes. Women, as compared to men, were less likely to be in contact with the police. Thirteen percent men said that they had come in contact with the police in the past 2-3 years whereas 11 percent women confirmed the same *(Table 7.10)*.

Table 7.10 | One in ten respondents had come in contact with police

People who had come in contact with the police	Common People (%)
Overall	*12*
Caste communities	
Hindu Upper Caste	14
Hindu OBCs	12
Hindu Dalits	13
Hindu Adivasis	10
Muslims	12
Christian	12
Others religious minorities	13
Regions	
LWE-affected regions	12
Insurgency-affected regions	13
Economic class	
Poor	9
Lower class	12
Middle class	16
Rich	13
Gender	
Male	13
Female	11

Note: All figures are rounded off.

Question asked: People have some kind of contact with the police for different reasons. In the last 2-3 years, have you or any of your family members had any kind of contact with the police?

Though only 12 percent people had come in contact with the police, it was the people who contacted the police most of the times. Sixty-three percent of people who had come in contact with police said that they themselves went to the police. Only one in five (19%) were contacted by the police. Adivasis and people from other religious minorities were more likely to be contacted by the police. Twenty-two percent Adivasi respondents and 24 percent people from other religious minorities living in the conflict-affected regions said that police had contacted them. OBCs and upper castes were more likely to contact the police. People in the insurgency-affected regions were contacted more by the police than those living in regions affected by left-wing extremism. The difference was of seven percentage points. More women said that they were contacted by the police than men *(Table 7.11)*.

Some of these trends are similar to those found in the nationwide survey of common people in SPIR 2018. The study reports that only 14 percent people had any kind of contact with the police, compared to 12 percent on the conflict regions as seen in the above table. In SPIR 2018 it

was found that among those who had any contact with the police, 67 percent themselves contacted the police, while 17 percent were contacted by the police. Again, similar to the trend in conflict states, police are more likely to contact Adivasis and Muslims in non-conflict regions as well, while upper castes and OBCs are more likely to contact the police themselves, according to SPIR 2018.

Table 7.11 | Hindu upper castes and OBCs most likely to contact the police themselves, while Adivasis most likely to have been contacted by the police

Common People (%)			
	Common people contacted the police	Police contacted common People	Both
Overall	**63**	**19**	**9**
Caste-communities			
Hindu Upper Caste	71	17	7
Hindu OBCs	68	20	7
Hindu Dalits	61	18	13
Hindu Adivasis	57	22	2
Muslims	54	17	25
Christian	63	18	14
Others religious minorities	59	24	6
Regions			
LWE-affected	62	16	11
Insurgency-affected	65	23	7
Gender			
Male	63	18	10
Female	64	21	7

Note: Rest of the respondents did not answer. All figures are rounded off.

Question asked: (Follow up Question) So, did you contact the police OR the police contacted you?

The most frequent reason for contacting the police was to lodge a complaint against crimes, such as robbery, dacoity, burglary etc. Close to one in every five (21%) people who contacted the police stated this reason. Similarly, close to one in every five (19%) respondents contacted the police to resolve a family dispute. At the same time, six percent respondents categorically mentioned that they contacted the police to lodge a complaint against domestic violence. Ten percent went to lodge missing complaints of documents or phones. Five percent contacted the police to lodge a complaint of sexual assault; four percent for murder or kidnapping; three percent each approached the police regarding Naxalism or insurgency-related crimes or petty neighbourhood disputes. Six percent also approached the police for verification-related tasks *(Table 7.12).*

Table 7.12 | Only three percent people contacted the police for Naxalism/insurgency related crimes

Reason for contacting the police	Common People (%)
To lodge a complaint against property related crime such as robbery, dacoity, burglary etc.	21
Family dispute	19
To lodge a complaint of loss of mobile phone, SIM card, wallet, identity card such as voter ID, PAN card etc.	10
Domestic violence	6
Authorization, verification of documents such as passport, police verification for renting house	6
To lodge a complaint of sexual assault, sexual violence, rape, molestation	5
To lodge a complaint against physical assault such as murder, kidnapping	4
Accompanied a friend/relative	4
To lodge a complaint related to Naxalism/ Maoism /Insurgency/Underground cadres related crime	3
Petty crimes such as disputes related to car parking, water, physical fights etc.	3
Any other answer not mentioned above	6

Note: Rest of the respondents did not answer. All figures are rounded off.

Question asked: What was the reason for contact with the Police?

Most people were satisfied with the help provided by the police. A little over one third (35%) of the people who approached the police were fully satisfied with the help received, whereas, 38 percent were somewhat satisfied. Only six percent were fully dissatisfied with their interaction with the police *(Table 7.13).*

These figures are similar to the experiences of the general public in non-conflict regions as well. As seen in SPIR 2018, about 24 percent people were very satisfied with the help provided by the police, while 41 percent were moderately satisfied. Overall, the proportion of people satisfied with the help provided by the police ('very' and 'somewhat' combined) is higher in conflict regions, at 73 percent, compared to the national-level, at 65 percent.

Table 7.13 | One of three people fully satisfied with the help provided by the police

Level of satisfaction with the help provided by the police….	Common People (%)
Fully satisfied	35
Somewhat satisfied	38
Somewhat dissatisfied	11
Fully dissatisfied	6

Note: Rest of the respondents did not answer. All figures are rounded off.

Question asked: (Follow up Question) How satisfied or dissatisfied were you with the help provided by the police?

When people were asked why they were dissatisfied, a little less than one in every five (18%) respondent who contacted the police cited long waiting time or multiple visits to the police station. Time-consuming paperwork was revealed to be the second most important reason. This was reported by 12 percent of the respondents who contacted the police. Indifferent behaviour of the police was also responsible for people's dissatisfaction as 11 percent said that the police either refused to file a complaint/ FIR (6%) or refused to help people (5%). Five percent hinted at aggressive and abusive behaviour of the police and three percent were dissatisfied because the police asked for a bribe (Table 7.14).

Table 7.14 | Long waiting time was the most frequently cited reason for dissatisfaction with police

Reason for dissatisfaction while dealing with police….	Common People (%)
Was made to wait for very long / had to visit the police station repeatedly	18
There was too much paperwork involved/ Took very long to file the charge sheet	12
Police refused to file complaint/ FIR	6
Police refused to help	5
Police was abusive, misbehaved	5
Police asked for/ hinted that bribe be provided	3
The concerned official was not available	2
Any other	4
No response	46

Note: All figures are rounded off.

Question asked: (If dissatisfied) What was the main reason for your dissatisfaction?

Important steps suggested by the police to control the crime

Police personnel were asked to give suggestions on how to control crime. Fifteen percent police personnel said that laws should be stricter to keep crime in check. Eleven percent also suggested increase of patrolling to that end. Nine percent police personnel suggested increasing the staff as well as police stations to keep crime at bay. An equal proportion (9%) of police personnel suggested that people should be better educated if we want to make significant progress in curbing crime. Proper procedure of investigation was also suggested by seven percent of the police respondents while three percent suggested that police should file the FIR immediately for quick action. Other technical aspects, such as installing CCTV cameras (5%); proper training for the police (5%), improving cyber-security (2%) and appointing special teams (3%) were also revealed as important measures to control crime. People centric policing is also important to stop crime. Therefore, mutual trust between people and the police (8%) as well as hones-

ty and dedication of the police (5%) were also reported as important solutions.

Table 7.15 | Important step to control crime

Most important step that the police should take to control crime	Police Personnel (%)
Laws should be more strict	15
There should be more patrolling	11
Increase the number of staff in police and police station	9
Spread education/awareness	9
Increase Trust Among People	8
Investigation should be done properly	7
There should be more use of CCTV cameras and technology/improved security systems	5
Better training of police	5
Police should work honestly and with dedication	5
Appoint Special Teams	3
Increase employment	2
F.I.R should be registered immediately	2
Improve Cyber Security	2
Ban alcohol	2
Any other not mentioned above	9

Note: Rest of the respondents did not answer. All figures are rounded off.

Question asked: In your opinion, what is the most important step that the police should take to control the crime?

In contrast, in the nation-wide survey with police personnel in SPIR 2019, personnel from 21 states said that spreading education and awareness is the most important step to curb crime (13%), while only eight percent said that laws should be made stricter.

Conclusion

This chapter discussed general policing and the existing challenges in conflict-affected regions of India. For a nuanced understanding of these challenges, we have reported and analysed the experiences and perceptions of the police personnel posted in these locations as well as the people residing there. The findings suggest that both the conflict and its various actors affect normal policing. Police personnel were assertive in their claim that normal policing suffers a lot due to the ongoing conflict in the region. One out of four police personnel and one out of six common people believe that normal policing suffers because of the conflict.

While people interact with the police for various reasons, they shared different kinds of experiences in dealing with them. Along with the occurrence of common crimes such as theft, robbery, family disputes, etc. both the police and

common people believe that they face violence from conflict groups. Further, it is notable that according to the perceptions of both the police as well as common people, violent crimes such as kidnapping and abduction are higher in LWE-affected regions, compared to the insurgency-affected regions. Perhaps owing the different nature of conflicts in the region, the nature of policing in the two regions is also different, with police and people from LWE-regions being cognisant of the negative impact of the conflict on the law-and-order situation and routine policing in the region.

The caste and class dynamics continue to play an important role in policing in the conflict regions, as they do in the rest of India, as seen in the previous Status of Policing in India Reports (2018 and 2019). While Hindus and OBCs are most likely to contact the police themselves, Adivasis are highly likely to *have been* contacted by the police. Simultaneously, people also expressed a positive view by stating that crime in their area has decreased in the last 2-3

years. The police in the conflict affected regions are taking required steps to keep crime figures low and suggested additional ways to make improvements in that direction.

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8

Ensuring Better Policing: The Way Forward

A Hindu priest worships weapons belonging to Tripura State Rifles during the Vishwakarma Puja or the festival of the Hindu deity of architecture and machinery in Agartala, India. September 18, 2019. ©REUTERS/Jayanta Dey

Key Takeaways

- An overwhelming majority of police personnel (75%) and common people (63%) felt that addressing development and providing better facilities in the area would be very useful for reducing the conflict.

- More than one out of three police personnel (35%) feel that the government should improve the working conditions of the police. Almost a quarter also said that the government should ensure that they receive adequate training and facilities to be able to handle conflict situations.

- Police personnel are three times more likely to believe that personnel from the same district are more effective in conflict-affected areas when compared to those from the other districts.

- Almost two out of every five people said that the presence of paramilitary/Army should increase in their locality, while nearly the same proportion of people (36%) also feel that their presence should remain the same.

- About one out of three police personnel (34%) as well as common people (32%) are of the opinion that police are accountable to the general public.

Ensuring Better Policing: The Way Forward

As the earlier Status of Policing in India Reports[1] (SPIR 2018 and 2019) by Lokniti and Common Cause indicate, the relationship between the citizens and the police is fraught with challenges while police-community interactions remain tenuous, particularly for the marginalised sections. In the present study we noticed that the relationship between the citizens and the police is precarious, especially in areas experiencing sustained conflicts. The police are often called into these troubled landscapes, to handle 'law-and-order' situations, which in reality are a mix of ethnic tensions or riots, mass agitations, long standing political disputes and separatist insurgencies. The present report sheds light on how the police perceive their role in such situations and what the local people think about the police and policing in their regions. The report also hopes to be able to suggest ways to improve policing in the future, particularly about what kind of policies should be adopted in the regions where some form of conflict prevails and how to make the police more accountable. Broadly, this chapter focuses on the perceptions of the common people and police personnel on these two important questions.

The first section discusses the perception of the citizens on what should be the best way to control the conflict, while highlighting the key steps required for improving the present situation. The section further looks at the perception of police personnel on the efficiency of their local colleagues. It also studies the perception of the common people on issues of increasing the strength of the paramilitary forces or the Army in such regions.

The second section is devoted to the accountability of the police. There is a raging debate around the lack of accountability and professionalism in the Indian police force. According to our survey, both police personnel and common people agreed that the police should be accountable to the citizens. This chapter, therefore, studies people's ability to hold local officials accountable for their performance. It also reveals the lack of accountability for the perpetrators of violence, which in turn leads to human rights violations. It becomes apparent that the police force needs to be made more accountable, while measures need to be taken to make it independent of political interference.

The basis for police operations and organisation is still the colonial Police Act of 1861. The police in India were modelled on the Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC). The RIC was a force designed to maintain the rule of an alien polity and thus an appropriate model for other colonial police forces. Therefore, the Indian police became associated, especially during the twentieth century independence struggles, with the machinery of British "oppression." In British India the police were a decentralised body of state and city forces. They were, divided into the unarmed or civil police, responsible for all ordinary police duties, and the armed police, used for the suppression of the citizens.

Post-independence, the Government of India made no fundamental change to the imperial policing system. Under the Constitution, and by the inherited body of laws, the police function remained decentralised and the responsibility of the state governments (Gregory, 1981) which was consistent with the country's federal structure. A popular and widespread opinion is that any revision and modernisation of statutory powers, e.g. in the Police Act, 1861 or the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, might pose a risk to fundamental rights (Clemens, 2016).

Independent India's movement towards police reforms has been driven towards the creation of a more autonomous police force, free from the political pressures and undue interference by the government or the party in power. This line of demand, however, draws a fine distinction between complete, unquestioned autonomy to the police and what is often referred to as "operational autonomy". It is the latter which most proponents of the police reforms move-

ment have been asking for, which would render police free of undue political pressure so as to enable them to act impartially and follow due process. The landmark Supreme Court judgement of 2006, *Prakash Singh vs Union of India* gave directives to the states and union to implement reformed police acts along these lines, to ensure that appointments to key positions are made on the basis of merit and without political interference, and police personnel have fixed tenures to do away with the system of "punishment posting" wherein errant personnel who do not abide by the political authorities' directions are transferred at the whims and fancies of those in power. The directions further included safeguards against police abuse of power in the form of Police Complaints Authority, a body to be set up at every district and state level to look at complaints against police personnel. However, the current situation is that while many states have failed to abide by the Court's directions, many have adopted these norms on paper after diluting the spirit of the guidelines and in practise, not much has changed for the police as an institution.

Given the discordant law enforcement landscape, it is anachronistic that much of the existing Indian laws stipulating police powers are still based on the colonial Police Act. Therefore, it is not premature in 2020 to discuss the fundamental rights-based concept of police powers in India based on its constitution. At the same time, the need to modernise the Indian police force and enhance its accountability cannot be stressed enough. It requires scrutinising the current law of the land, which grants the police vast powers to encroach upon the fundamental and civil liberties.

Measures for curbing the conflict

This section discusses police personnel's opinion on useful steps to reduce volatility in the two types of conflict-affected regions. These include the LWE-affected regions, comprising parts of Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Odisha, and Telangana, and the insurgency-affected regions, comprising parts of Assam, Manipur, Nagaland and Tripura.

Conflict resolution is generally seen as the process for the peaceful ending of conflict between two or more individuals/groups. Police officers are regularly called upon to deal with conflict situations. The trust and understanding between members of the community and members of the police forces are central to conflict resolution. To unpack this further, we asked the police personnel and common people their perspectives on the steps to reduce conflicts in India.

Since this is considered as a challenge for Indian security, we hoped that police personnel posted in the field would have

some useful perspectives to share. As *Table 8.1* highlights, they broadly agreed that development of the area was the need of the hour. Also, better facilities and opportunities need to be provided to the common people of the area to bring about a perceptive change. Three-quarters of the police personnel felt that development and providing better facilities to the people of the area would be very useful for reducing Naxalite/insurgent activities. Of all the measures mentioned to the police personnel, this particular measure

Table 8.1 | Three out of four personnel believe that development and better facilities for the people would be very useful for reducing conflict in the region

How useful will the following measures be for reducing Naxalism/ Insurgency activities?	Police Personnel (%)			
	Very	Somewhat	Not Much	Not At All
Strengthening routine law & order				
Increasing the number of police personnel	63	27	5	2
Improving the network of informers/Mukhbirs	56	28	10	2
More preventive arrests of antisocial elements	44	37	10	4
More stringent measures				
Elimination of Naxalites/ Insurgents by police	47	24	13	8
Increasing the strength of Paramilitary Forces	45	33	13	4
Appointing civilians as Special Police Officers (SPO)	35	31	18	11
Less policing/more political measures				
Development & better facilities for the people of this area	75	16	4	2
Finding a political solution to this problem	45	28	11	10
Initiating peaceful dialogue/ talk with Naxalites/ Insurgents	45	31	12	7

Note: Rest of the respondents did not answer. All figures are rounded off.

Questions asked: In your opinion, how useful will the following measures be for reducing Naxalism/Insurgency activities- very, somewhat, not much, or not at all?

a. Increasing the number of police personnel?

b. More preventive arrests of antisocial elements?

c. Improving the network of informers/Mukhbirs?

d. Initiating peaceful dialogue/talk with Naxalites/Insurgents?

e. Appointing civilians as Special Police Officers (SPO)?

f. Increasing the strength of Paramilitary Forces?

g. Elimination of Naxalites/Insurgents?

h. Finding a political solution to this problem?

i. Development and better facilities for the people of this area?

received the maximum approval. Also, only two percent police personnel rejected this step as being useful. We do need to keep in mind here that the peasants and tribals, who often participate in Naxalite or Maoist activities, were and still are deprived of the basic necessities of life while being victims of discrimination. Conflict-affected areas also lack proper facilities and development activities. Naxalism traces its history to uprisings by rural landless farmers whereas insurgents are from areas with widespread perception of injustice and discrimination. This makes a strong case for better development and fairness in these areas, a point supported by a substantial number of police personnel and citizens.

Another measure that received support was increasing the strength of the police force. Three out of every five police personnel said that the number of police personnel needs to be increased by a lot in order to eradicate Naxalism/insurgency. Similarly, a little less than half of the police personnel believed that more preventive arrests of antisocial elements can solve the Naxalism/insurgency issue. All these measures can be termed as changing/modernising police laws. Although it is clear that police reform is the need of the hour, we must also realise that the enhanced powers of the police must not go against the constitutional rights of Indian citizens. When police demand the right to conduct more preventive arrests, an individual's fundamental rights are jeopardised along the way. Therefore, the idea is to envision a police force that is people-friendly and yet competent enough to deal with problems of militancy and terrorism.

Nearly three-fifths of the police personnel felt that improving the spy network (*mukhbirs*/informers) would be a very useful measure to reduce Naxalism/insurgency activities. A little over two in every five police personnel said that initiating peaceful dialogue/talks with Naxalites/insurgents will be very effective in reducing Naxalite/insurgent activities. A little over one-fourth said it will be somewhat effective.

Only about a little over one in every three police personnel said that appointing civilians as Special Police Officers (SPO) will be a very useful step towards ending Naxalism/insurgency, whereas 31 percent said that it'll be somewhat effective. This measure was in fact rejected by the most number of police personnel, with 18 percent saying that it won't do much and 11 percent saying it won't be effective at all. This shows the belief that police personnel have in the training they receive before starting their duties.

A little over two in every five police personnel interviewed believed that increasing the strength of paramilitary forces will be very useful for reducing Naxalism/insurgency.

Almost half (47%) of the police personnel interviewed were of the opinion that eliminating Naxalites/insurgents would be a very useful step in reducing conflict and one-fourth (24%) said that it can be somewhat useful. The amount of approval this measure got is definitely on the higher side. Questionable police encounters as a practice needs to be scrutinised on a much higher level and definitely discontinued. The police have no right to become the judge, jury and executioner and this is one the best examples of police exceeding their statutory powers and violating another individual's constitutional and human rights. It is both disconcerting and contradictory that significant proportions of police personnel support development for locals on one hand and are supportive of the idea of 'elimination' (which precludes not only a political solution but also a fair judicial procedure).

Yet, when the police personnel were asked about their trust in politicians, policy makers and high ranking government officials to solve this problem, 45 percent thought that there can be a political solution to this problem. Twenty-eight percent felt that it might be a somewhat useful solution.

Probing deeper, police personnel who say it would be really helpful to increase their strength are also more likely to support the increased strength of the paramilitary forces deployed in their regions. Three in five, or 61 percent of those fully supporting the idea of increasing the strength of the police fully agree with an enhanced paramilitary force too. Further, 88 percent of those fully supporting the initiation of peaceful dialogue with Naxalites/insurgents, fully supported development of such regions as well.

Also, those in complete support of preventive arrests of anti-social elements and appointing civilians as SPOs are more likely to fully agree with the elimination of Naxalites/insurgents by the police (63% and 61% of those fully supporting the idea of preventive arrests and appointing civilians as SPOs, respectively, are found in full support of elimination of Naxalites/insurgents by the police).

When the common people were asked the same question, development of the area got the highest approval. Sixty-three percent or two-thirds of the respondents felt that it will be a very useful measure to combat Naxalism/insurgency *(Table 8.2)*.

The second most approved measure was increasing the number of police personnel in the area. Forty three percent of common people believed that it would be a very useful step in reducing Naxalite/insurgent activities. Two out of five people said that finding a political solution to the problem and initiating peaceful dialogues/talks with Naxalites/

Table 8.2 | Three out of five people believe that development and better facilities would be very useful for reducing conflict in the region

How useful will the following measures be for reducing Naxalism/ Insurgency activities?	Common People's Response (%)			
	Very	Somewhat	Not Much	Not At All
Strengthening routine law & order				
Increasing the number of police personnel	43	33	10	8
Improving the network of informers/Mukhbirs	38	28	12	10
More preventive arrests of antisocial elements	37	33	11	9
More stringent measures				
Elimination of Naxalites/Insurgents by police	38	19	16	15
Increasing the strength of Paramilitary Forces	37	27	15	11
Appointing civilians as Special Police Officers (SPO)	29	28	15	14
Less policing/more political measures				
Development & better facilities for the people of this area	63	18	5	7
Finding a political solution to this problem	40	26	11	14
Initiating peaceful dialogue/talk with Naxalites/Insurgents	40	25	12	12

Note: Rest of the respondents did not answer. All figures are rounded off.

Questions asked: In your opinion, how useful will the following measures be for reducing Naxalism/Insurgency activities-Very, somewhat, not much, or not at all?

a. Increasing the number of police personnel? *b. More preventive arrests of antisocial elements?*

c. Improving the network of informers/Mukhbirs? *d. Initiating peaceful dialogue/talk with Naxalites/Insurgents?*

e. Appointing civilians as Special Police Officers (SPO)? *f. Increasing the strength of Paramilitary Forces?*

g. Elimination of Naxalites/Insurgents? *h. Finding a political solution to this problem?*

i. Development and better facilities for the people of this area?

insurgents will be very useful in reducing Naxalism/insurgency in the area. Elimination of Naxalites/insurgents and improving the spy network came next at 38 percent.

The idea of appointing civilians as Special Police Officers (SPO) to curb Naxalism/insurgency found the least number of takers among common people. Less than a third of the respondents agreed with this measure. The common understanding was that certain amount of training was a prerequisite for solving complex issues of Naxalism and insurgency.

Among those people who fully support the idea of increasing the strength of paramilitary forces, three in four or 75 percent are in full support of elimination of Naxalites/insurgents by the police. Further, 71 percent of those in full support of improving the network of informers or spies fully agreed with the idea of elimination of Naxalites/insurgents by the police. So did 70 percent of those who were in full support of more preventive arrests of anti-social elements.

Further, 88 percent of those finding peaceful dialogue with the Naxalites/insurgents very useful, also fully supported development in such regions.

Measures that should be taken by the police to control the conflict

To understand the police personnel's opinions regarding the change they want to catalyse, they were asked an open-ended question, i.e., they weren't given any options/response categories beforehand.

When police personnel were asked what important step they can take to control Naxalism/insurgency related activities, the highest percentage of approval (17 percent) went to spreading of education and awareness, increase in employment opportunities and better socio-economic conditions. This was asked as an open ended question and then the responses were segregated in the above mentioned categories *(Table 8.3)*.

Not too far behind were steps like better investigation, increase in vigilance among police, focus on laws, justice, more honest, efficient and trustworthy police personnel, increased manpower, more patrolling, check posts, infrastructure etc. These steps got support from 16 percent police personnel. These are basic facilities that should have already been provided to the police, although as seen in SPIR 2019 several of these facilities are lacking across the country. Sixteen percent police personnel did not respond to this question.

Table 8.3 | Police personnel believe that increased education and employment are the most important steps needed to control the conflict

What is the most important step that the police should take to control conflict…	Police Personnel's Response (%)
Spread education and awareness; Employment, socio-economic solutions	17
Better investigation; Vigilant police; Focus on laws, justice; More honest, efficient, trustworthy	16
More manpower, patrolling, check posts, infrastructure etc.	16
Use latest technology & security systems, Special Training	12
Free hand to police, stricter police; Appoint special teams	11
Others	12

Note: Rest of the respondents did not answer. All figures are rounded off.

Question asked: In your opinion, what is the most important step that the police should take to control the Naxalism/insurgency related activities?

Measures that should be taken by the government to control the conflict

As above, a similar open-ended question was posed to the police personnel about their expectations from the government.

Table 8.4 | One out of three police personnel feel that improved working conditions are required for the police to better perform their jobs in the conflict-affected areas

What is the most important step that the Government should take to control conflict…	Police Personnel (%)
HR solutions - better pay, work hours, workload, promotions etc.	35
Training, weapons, infrastructure, technology, surveillance	23
No pressure, free hand, empower police	7
Spread education and awareness	5
Create employment	5
Checks and monitoring of police	3
Legal solutions	2
Others	6

Note: Rest of the respondents did not answer. All figures are rounded off.

Questions asked: In your opinion, what is the one step that the government must take to ensure that police can do its job in a better way in Naxalism/insurgency affected areas?

When police personnel were asked what the government should do to ensure that the police does its job better in conflict affected areas, improvement in working conditions got the highest approval at 35 percent. Almost a quarter of police personnel also said that the government should

ensure that they receive adequate training and facilities to be able to handle conflict situations *(Table 8.4)*.

Like the table above, the police personnel's response to this question too focused on the need for basic facilities such as better training, weapons, infrastructure, technology and surveillance. The demand for the very same basic facilities was second highest at 23 percent, perhaps something that the policymakers could consider for better results.

Efficiency in dealing with conflict: Local personnel vs. those from outside the district

This section of the chapter looks at police personnel's opinion on which of their colleagues are best suited for deployment in conflict affected regions. Also, a response of the common people regarding an increase in the presence of the paramilitary forces/Army in their area is discussed here to examine the issues of the peoples' trust in the police. It also offers an insight into common people's understanding of police efficiency.

Table 8.5 | Forty-five percent personnel from LWE-affected regions believe that personnel from within the district are more efficient in controlling conflict

Which police personnel are best suited for conflict affected areas…	Police Personnel (%)		
	Overall	LWE-affected regions	Insurgency-affected regions
Both equally efficient / No difference	41	35	51
Those belonging to this district	40	45	31
Those belonging to some other district	14	16	10
Both equally ineffective	1	1	2

Note: Rest of the respondents did not answer. All figures are rounded off.

Question asked: In your opinion, who is more effective in controlling the Naxalism/Insurgency-related activities -Police personnel belonging to this district itself OR a police personnel who have come here from some other district?

When police personnel were asked who is better suited for or is more effective in conflict-affected areas — those from the same district or those from another — they were three times more likely to prefer the former. While 40 percent said a local police person would be more effective, only 14 percent preferred an outsider. However, 41 percent police personnel answered that it doesn't matter if the police person is from the same district or another. They felt that both will be equally efficient in their job. The idea that a police personnel from the same district is better suited/more effective makes sense when we look at the history

of Naxalism/insurgency in India. People who are or have been a part of these movements are mainly individuals who happen to be dissatisfied with the government in power. Therefore, it seems unlikely that police personnel from outside the district sent to control the locals will have a favourable experience earning their trust and gaining a sense of control *(Table 8.5)*.

This is in contrast to the response of the personnel in non-conflict states surveyed in SPIR 2019. In that survey, one out of two (51%) personnel were of the opinion that if police personnel are posted in their home districts, they will be more efficient, while 18 percent felt that they would be less efficient. One out of four (27%) personnel surveyed felt that it does not make a difference.

When we look at the outsider-insider debate from the lens of conflict region and types — left wing extremist (LWE) area or insurgency-affected area — personnel from LWE are more likely to agree with greater effectiveness of colleagues belonging to the same district. Personnel from insurgency-affected areas are more likely to say that their colleagues, both insiders and outsiders, are equally efficient or that there is no difference between the two. Five out of 10 police personnel from insurgency–affected regions said that police personnel, both from the same district or from another, would be equally efficient in their job. A little more than two in five police personnel from LWE affected regions said that those who are from the same district would be better suited for such posts.

When experiences of the personnel on the field are taken into account for this question, there is not much difference in their opinion. This is especially true when we look at personnel with less than five years of experience and those with 10 years or more experience. Four out of 10 police personnel with less than five years of experience said that those belonging to the same district would be better suited for conflict-affected regions. Forty one percent police personnel with 10 or more years of service also said the same thing. Also, 42 percent police personnel with 10 or more years of experience felt that the personnel's origin is irrelevant and both the outsider and insider are equally efficient *(Table 8.6)*.

When responses are segregated by rank, a similar trend emerges. Two out of five police personnel from constabulary rank agreed that personnel belonging to the same district are better suited. A little more than a third of the police personnel from higher ranks also agreed that those belonging to the same district are better suited. However, personnel from higher ranks agreed more than the constabulary ranks that belonging to the same district need not be an advantage in being effective. Forty six percent

personnel from higher ranks i.e. almost half of the respondents from this rank said that both would be equally efficient.

Table 8.6 | Higher ranked officers less likely to believe that personnel from the same district would be more efficient in controlling conflict

Who would be more effective in controlling conflict: Police Personnel's Response (%)				
	Those belonging to the same district	Those belonging to some other district	Both equally efficient/ No difference	Both equally ineffective
Overall	*39*	*14*	*41*	*2*
Police personnel with less than 5 years of experience	42	13	39	2
5-9 years	37	17	41	1
10 yrs or more	41	12	42	1
Constabulary Rank	41	14	40	1
Higher Rank	36	11	46	3

Note: Rest of the respondents did not answer. All figures are rounded off.

Questions asked: In your opinion, who is more effective in controlling the Naxalism/Insurgency related activities a Police personnel belonging to this district itself OR a Police personnel who have come here from some other district?

Paramilitary/Army presence in conflict-affected regions

When the common people were asked if the presence of paramilitary/Army should increase or decrease in their locality, almost 37 percent said that it needs to increase. Nearly the same proportion (36%) also said that it should remain the same *(Figure 8.1)*.

When we examine common people's opinion further, a little more than two in five (44%) non-literate people supported the idea of increasing the presence of paramilitary/Army in their locality i.e. in their conflict ridden district. In contrast, the same percentage (44%) of college educated people said that it should remain the same. This shows that college educated people have a little more trust in the police and maybe also in a political solution than non-literates.

When responses are broken up on the basis of class, a similar trend can be noticed. Almost half (46%) of the poor said that paramilitary/Army presence should be increased. Thirty nine percent from the lower-class said the same thing. This is in stark contrast with the outlook of rich people. Less than one fourth of the rich (22%) said that the presence of paramilitary/Army needs to be increased

in their locality. At the same time almost half (49%) of the rich people said that the presence of paramilitary/Army should remain the same in their locality.

Figure 8.1 | Thirty-seven percent people believe that paramilitary/Army presence should increase in conflict-regions, 36 percent believe it should remain the same

Common people's perception: Should presence of paramilitary/army increase or decrease? (%)

Note: Rest of the respondents did not answer. All figures are rounded off.

Question asked: In your opinion, should the presence of Paramilitary/Army in your locality be increased or decreased?

Police accountability in conflict-affected regions

Police accountability refers to the explanation or justification for their actions which police personnel owe to the rule of law and to the common people. Police accountability lies at the heart of internal security of our country as the primary responsibility of upholding the rule of law and constitutional values lies with the police. A functioning democracy needs both an efficient and accountable police.

Police accountability begins with the question "to whom does the police need to be accountable? The National Police Commission suggests that the police should be concerned about protecting the interest of the public as mandated by the constitution. However, in our country, the deep rooted nexus between the executive and law enforcement encourages police deviance, corruption and misdeeds.

To understand the opinions of both the police personnel and common people regarding police accountability, they were asked an open-ended question, i.e., they weren't given options/ response categories beforehand. When police personnel were asked who they are accountable to, 34 percent said that they are accountable to the common people, three percent said they are accountable to their senior officers and the department they are working for and 15 percent said that they are answerable to the state government. When the common people were asked the same question, the responses too were similar. Most (32%) said that police personnel are answerable to the common people, 13 percent said that they are accountable to the state government and 11 percent said that they are answerable to their senior officers and the department they are working for. Common people however were far less likely to have an opinion on the question than the police personnel *(Table 8.7)*.

Table 8.7 | One out of three personnel and common people believe that police is accountable to the general public

Police is accountable to...	Police Personnel's Response (%)	Common People's Response (%)
Common People	34	32
Seniors in Police / Department	23	11
Government of State	15	13
Towards the law / Rule of law	12	4
Government of India	5	6
Any other	3	7

Note: Rest of the respondents did not answer. All figures are rounded off.

Question asked: In your opinion, who is the police accountable or answerable to?

Table 8.8 | Police in LWE-affected regions more likely to believe they are accountable to common people, while those in insurgency-affected regions slightly more likely to believe they are accountable to their department

Who is the Police Accountable to: Police Personnel's Response (%)					
	Common People	Seniors in Police / Department	Government of State	Towards the law / Rule of law	Government of India	Any other
Overall	*34*	*23*	*15*	*12*	*5*	*3*
LWE –affected Region	35	16	19	11	8	4
Insurgency-affected Region	31	34	9	13	1	1

Note: Rest of the respondents did not answer. All figures are rounded off.

Questions asked: In your opinion, who is the police accountable or answerable to?

Table 8.9 | Common people in insurgency-affected regions more likely to believe that the police is accountable to them

	Who is the police accountable to: Common People's Response (%)					
	Common People	Seniors in Police / Department	Government of State	Towards the law / Rule of law	Government of India	Any other
Overall	*32*	*11*	*13*	*4*	*6*	*7*
LWE –affected Region	30	9	15	5	8	8
Insurgency-affected Region	35	15	9	4	4	6

Note: Rest of the respondents did not answer. All figures are rounded off.

Questions asked: In your opinion, who is the police accountable or answerable to?

When further disaggregated across the verticals of rank and the type of conflict present in the region, a distinct pattern emerges. Almost the same proportion of police personnel from LWE-affected and insurgency-affected areas said that they are first and foremost accountable to the people. A little more than one third police personnel in the LWE-affected region and 31 percent in insurgency-affected region said that they are accountable to the common people. Although unlike police in LWE affected area, more than one third (34%) in insurgency-affected regions said that they are accountable to their seniors in police or to their department. A similar trend can be noticed when we examine the rank of the respondents. One third police personnel (34%) from higher ranks responded that they are accountable to the common people, while the same proportion of police personnel from the constabulary ranks also reported the same. Considering their subordinate position, one fourth (24%) of police personnel from the constabulary ranks said that they are accountable to their seniors in police or their department, while one-fifth (19%) among high rankers gave this response *(Table 8.8).*

When we look at the data across the years at their current posting, accountability towards people seemed to be a priority for majority of police personnel, regardless of their years of posting. A little more than one third of police personnel with five or more years in the same post (35%) and one third (33%) with less than five years at the same post reported that they are accountable to the people more than anyone else. Police personnel with more experience at the same post tend to be a little more answerable to their seniors with one fourth (25%) saying that they are answerable to their seniors first and foremost. Twenty-two percent of personnel with less than five years at their current posting agreed with the former.

When the responses are further disaggregated across the vertical of conflict types existing in the region and the common people's perspective, an interesting picture emerges. People from both the regions i.e., LWE-affected and insurgency-affected areas — are more likely to believe that the police is accountable to them. Thirty percent in the LWE

affected region and 35 percent in the insurgency affected area reported likewise *(Table 8.9).*

Conclusion

Conflict is seen as an aberration, which can and must be 'resolved' by adequate policy responses. Implicit in this approach is a presumption that it is possible to create a system of governance in which the policy choices are limited to merely finding the correct policy mix (Burgess, 2016). With the right determination, India's struggle with conflict can be resolved by taking thoughtful decisions that would favour one and all in ways that no section is excluded.

Work and family are the two primary spheres in most people's lives, which makes it necessary to balance both. The two should complement each other in ways that help people to perform well in both. Due to recent developments in both the spheres this has become an increasingly difficult task to achieve in India. This is also evident in the findings of the Randstad Work Monitor Survey (2015) which found that Indian employees had a poor work-family balance when compared with countries in Europe and the United States of America (Hyde, 2018). The Indian police personnel often come across as prime examples of such an imbalance. In the Status of Policing in India Report 2019[2] it was clearly reported that police personnel of nearly all the states surveyed were excessively over-worked, with an average police personnel working for 14 hours a day. One way of solving this problem is increasing their manpower, which has been extensively reported in this chapter. When the police personnel were asked what important step they can take to control Naxalism/insurgency related activities, a wish-list emerged. Increased manpower along with more regular and stricter patrolling and check-posts got the highest approval at 15 percent. Likewise, three out of every five police personnel interviewed in the conflict-affected regions felt that the number of police personnel needs to be increased by a lot in order to combat Naxalism/insurgency.

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2 For more on this, read SPIR 2019 at https://www.lokniti.org/otherstudies/status-of-policing-in-india-report-spir-2019-207

Efficient policing is generally defined as the ability to prevent crime, apprehend criminals and maintain order with available resources. In order to understand why there may be irregularities in the Indian police units it is necessary to look at the overall picture. Not only do the police have to perform a wide array of duties but they are themselves affected by India's political, economic and social developments and its lack of resources. Three-quarters of the police personnel felt that carrying out development and providing facilities to the people of the area would be very useful for reducing Naxalite/insurgent activities.

There is also a need to strengthen and rationalise the laws and increase police accountability. They need to be accountable to the citizens, their superior authorities but above all to the rule of law as mandated by the constitution. In addition, the police need to be a lot more responsible than common people since they have special powers vested in them. Hence the need for their constant training, sensitisation and capacity-building.

A closer look at the Naxalism/insurgent movements reveals that extremism thrives on unresolved political disputes, dissatisfaction of the marginalised and alienation of communities. It is also believed that the rebel movements have been exacerbated by the failures of the institutional mechanisms of the state and its ability to deliver socio-economic justice. The need, therefore, is to recognise that extremism is a wider socio-political issue rather than merely a law and order problem.

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Summing up

Policewomen march as they practice ahead of the Independence Day parade in Agartala, capital of India's northeastern state of Tripura. August 7, 2007. ©REUTERS/Jayanta Dey

Summing up

Public as well as academic debates around the issues of policing and police reforms in India are often restricted to the experiences and realities of policing in the so-called 'mainland' India. Regions affected by any kind of conflict are frequently left out of such discussions owing to the different nature of functioning of state institutions in such extraordinary circumstances. This is particularly true for policing, which by definition looks after the law-and-order situation of the region. With the conflict adding a new, much more complex layer to the law-and-order situation in the conflict-affected regions, the functioning and role of the police also change accordingly. This is the subject of the present study—to analyse the ways in which the police functions in conflict-affected areas. Our attempt is to study the dynamics between the locals and the police in such regions. We further look into their experiences, perceptions and general attitudes towards both the conflict itself as well as the role and scope of police within such circumstances.

However, every region impacted by armed violence, whether by internal or external extra-judicial forces, cannot simply be clubbed together. Thus, the different kinds of conflict-affected regions need to be studied separately and classified on the basis of the nature of conflict present in the area. Accordingly, the three different types of conflict-affected regions studied in this report were the areas affected by Left-Wing Extremism-related violence, insurgency-affected regions in the Northeastern states of the country and the militancy-affected former state of Jammu and Kashmir. While the situation in the latter region of J&K has been analysed using official data in Chapter 1, surveys could not be conducted in the region because of the lack of permissions (except Udhampur, Jammu, which has been analysed separately and annexed under Appendix 2 of the report). Thus, survey findings in this report are limited to the LWE-affected and the insurgency-affected regions of Northeast.

The overall picture emerging from the surveys is that the general public is largely satisfied with the working of the police and repose trust in not only the police but also the Army and the paramilitary forces. Simultaneously, conflict-affected regions have unique issues related to policing. Some of these issues include fear among the common people of being assaulted by either the police or conflict groups, or fear of being falsely implicated in Naxalism/insurgency-related cases.

On the other hand, on interviewing the police personnel, a common thread of under-staffing and lack of infrastructure emerges, similar to findings of the previous report (SPIR 2019). Along with it, however, personnel from conflict-affected regions highlight problems specific to these regions, such as feeling insecure and unsafe within the police force itself. Also, there is a sympathetic attitude towards the demands of the conflict groups widely but not towards the violence itself, both among the general public as well as police personnel.

When reading these findings, we need to keep in mind that the survey samples have been kept as representative as possible. While this is helpful in providing the larger public opinions about these matters in the regions, they do not necessarily fully represent the voices of those who are directly impacted by the violence, but is rather the general public opinion in that area. Thus, some of the disconcerting opinions embedded in the very fabric of our society also emerge as the predominant views of the people of the region. For instance, both the common people as well as police personnel believe that Adivasis are more likely to become Naxalites or insurgents. Further, a notable percentage of the respondents, about one in five of both the common people as well as police personnel, condone extra-judicial killings of Naxalites and insurgents. These and some other findings need to be contextualised within the framework of the systemic and intrinsic prejudices that exist in our society.

In this chapter, we sum up some of the striking findings of the surveys with the police personnel and the common people from the conflict-affected regions.

Attitudes towards conflict and conflict groups

The people and the police personnel contacted in the conflict-affected regions shared divergent views on key aspects of policing, policy issues like special laws, and their opinions of one another. A large majority of the police and public do not support any act of violence. At the same time, they support the cause and the demands of the conflict-groups though not the means adopted by them. More than two in every five-- 46 percent of the common people and 43 percent of the police personnel-- believe that the cause of the conflict groups is legitimate but the means adopted by them are wrong. Adivasis are most likely to hold this opinion, at 50 percent. Further, according to the common people, the major reasons for the people joining Naxalism/insurgency are inequality and discrimination, while police are more likely to believe that unemployment is a major reason.

Apart from Naxalites/insurgent groups, people are also somewhat afraid of the police and security forces. While 37 percent people are afraid of physical assault by the Naxalites or insurgents, 35 percent are afraid of physical assault by the police. One out of five persons fear false implication by the paramilitary forces/Army in Naxalite/insurgency related cases. Further, both the police and people supported fair trial for the conflict-groups and broadly agreed that they should be treated like other criminals. However, troublingly, nearly one out of five common people (19%) as well as police personnel (21%) are of the opinion that killing a dangerous Naxalite/insurgent is better than a legal trial.

Further, a pattern emerges when social groups are factored into this equation. Both the police and public believe that some social groups (Adivasis and poor) are more likely to join Naxalites/insurgents. This prejudice likely colours the police's treatment of these groups while dealing with Naxalism/insurgency-related cases. These groups also face violence perpetrated by security forces and conflict groups.

Controlling the conflict: Challenges in policing

In conflict regions, police often have to rely on the assistance provided by surrendered Naxalites/insurgents and local informers or *mukhbirs*. Among the two, the survey found surrendered cadres of Naxalites and insurgents providing better assistance to the local police in dealing with conflict-groups than local informers. Further, the stringent or draconian security laws enacted by the central and state governments found huge support among the police personnel posted in conflict-affected regions. While the proportion in favour of the laws was far greater

than that opposed to them, a fairly large proportion of police personnel (over one-fifth), however, did not have an opinion on the issue. When asked about these laws, civilians/common people were found to be even more evasive. More than two-fifths did not answer the question. However, among those who did, support for the laws was only slightly greater than opposition to them.

Nearly two-fifths of police personnel reported having experienced an attack by Naxalites and insurgents at least once during their time in the area, as against only one in 10 civilians. A similar divergence in responses between civilians and police can be seen regarding questions on the existence of parallel taxation and justice systems run by extremists. Civilians were two to three times less likely to confirm their existence than the police personnel.

Most people, quite surprisingly, did not view the police as being corrupt. However, most also agreed that police personnel in their area were making money from illegal sources at the same time. From the differing responses to the two questions, it thus appears that people in conflict-affected areas may have a different idea of corruption in their mind than what is generally assumed, and that the making of money via illegal channels by the police may not necessarily be construed as corruption by the public.

Relationship between the police and the people in conflict regions

A prolonged conflict often shadows the relationship between the police and the people with mistrust and doubt. The study found the police and the civilians differing in the way they perceive confrontations. The civilians believe that the confrontations between the police and conflict groups (Naxalites/insurgents) are less frequent and violent, while the personnel believe that they are more frequent and violent. The proportion of police personnel reporting such conflicts at least once or twice during the past two-three years is almost double than that of people reporting the same. Further, the proportion of police reporting such conflicts three or four times during past couple of years is thrice than that of people having reported the same.

There are differing opinions regarding the disparities exercised by the police. A large majority of common people disagreed that police implicate innocent people under false charges of Naxalism/insurgency. However, there were dissenters to this opinion, who considered the poor, Adivasis and Dalits to be the most targeted groups. Further, interesting patterns emerged when we looked at the questions examining the level of trust. The police personnel themselves were found to rate the local people's trust in them much higher than what is actually reported by the people.

About two in five (39%) civilians reported that they have a lot of trust in the police. Three in five (63%) among the police personnel believed that the local people trust them 'a lot.' Further, a majority of the people are fearful of the police in varying degrees. A significant proportion of the general public fears that the police can take harsh actions against them on the pretext of searching for Naxalites/insurgents. They are fearful of being beaten up, arrested or detained, falsely implicated in Naxalism/insurgency cases and the police coming to their house.

Perceptions about police *vis-à-vis* paramilitary forces or the army

Despite being vastly different agencies with almost incomparable roles, scope of work and organisational structures, the police, paramilitary forces and the Army often come to a point of convergence in regions with active conflict. This is a lived reality of not just the security forces that are deployed in such regions but also of the common public with whom they frequently interact.

Although most police personnel said that they were not being given as much attention on budgeting, staffing and provision of arms and ammunition as compared to the paramilitary forces/Army, a large proportion were quite certain that they were either better or at least equally suited as the latter, to control extremist violence. Police personnel also strongly believed that their agency and not the paramilitary forces/Army should be given a free hand in dealing with the conflict situation in their area. The civilians too echoed this thought. Most civilians felt that the police were more capable of handling the safety and security of the people than the paramilitary forces/Army.

Corroborating this argument, most of the civilians also said that they would rather contact the police than the paramilitary forces/Army in case they were threatened by Naxalites or insurgents. Civilians' trust in the police was also found to be quite high, slightly higher than the paramilitary forces, but lower than the Army. We also compared the survey data of civilians from conflict states (present study) with the SPIR 2018 data on survey with the common people across 22 Indian states. Through this exercise we found that not only is the level of trust in the police among the common people higher in the conflict-affected regions, but the people are also less likely to perceive the police as corrupt in these regions.

Posting to a conflict region: Opinions of police personnel and common people

The role performed by the police and expectations from them in conflict areas tend to go beyond the usual tasks of law enforcement and crime prevention. It is, therefore, likely that personnel posted in conflict-hit regions have anxieties, concerns and special needs that are different from their counterparts in other, relatively peaceful parts of the country. A very large majority seem content with their posting location and this is true for all kinds of police personnel. However, older police personnel, who have served at their current location for more years, and those who have their families living with them are more likely to be fully content with the area of their posting than their younger, less experienced colleagues who are living without families. High levels of contentment among personnel with the area of their posting should not, however, be misconstrued as them not viewing those areas as being dangerous or unsafe. We find that a large majority of personnel—even ones who were satisfied with their area of posting—felt that the area was risky for them and their families. Civilians were less likely to view the area as being dangerous for police personnel than police personnel themselves.

Further, nearly half the personnel reported an adverse effect of their work on their mental health, of which one-thirds reported a strong effect. Those who have been relatively new to their posting locations were far more likely to report a higher level of mental stress than the ones who have been posted to conflict-regions for longer.

General policing amid conflict

How much does the conflict impact normal policing? It is reasonable to expect that since the police force is also tasked with handling LWE or insurgency, their undivided focus on the same may have adverse effects on their capacity to attend to routine crimes. Unsurprisingly, police personnel were quite assertive in their claim that normal policing suffers a lot due to the ongoing conflict in the region. More than three in five police personnel and one in two common people believe that normal policing suffers a lot or somewhat because of the conflict.

Further, while people interact with the police for various reasons, they shared different kinds of experiences in dealing with them. Along with the occurrence of common crimes such as theft, robbery, family disputes, etc. both the police and common people believe that they face violence from conflict groups. Further, caste and class dynamics continue to play an important role in policing in the conflict regions, as they do in the rest of India, as also revealed in the previous Status of Policing in India Reports (2018 and 2019). While Hindus and OBCs are most likely to contact the police themselves, Adivasis are highly likely to *have been* contacted by the police. Simultaneously, people also expressed a positive view by stating that crime in their area has decreased in the last 2-3 years.

Ensuring better policing: The way forward

The 2019 edition of the SPIR found police personnel of nearly all the states excessively over-worked, with an average personnel working for 14 hours a day. The interviews of police personnel in the present study resonated this, indicating the need to increase manpower in the police force. When the police personnel were asked what important steps they can take to control Naxalism/insurgency related activities, a wish-list emerged. Increased manpower along with more regular and stricter patrolling and check-posts got the highest approval at 15 percent. Likewise, three out of every five police personnel interviewed in the conflict-affected regions felt that the number of police personnel needs to be increased by a lot in order to combat Naxalism/insurgency. Further, three-quarters of police personnel felt that development and providing better facilities to the people of the area would be very useful for reducing Naxalite/insurgent activities. Three-fifths of the common people were also found agreeing to this view.

Further, when asked who is better suited for or is more effective in conflict-affected areas, police personnel were three times more likely to prefer personnel from the same district as against someone from outside. While two in five percent said a local police person would be more effective, one in seven believed someone from outside would be more effective. However, another two in five considered both types of police personnel equally effective.

There is also a need to strengthen and rationalise the laws and increase police accountability. When police personnel were asked who they are accountable to, almost two out of every five said that they are accountable to the common people. This sentiment is prevalent in common people too; one in three said that police personnel are answerable to them

Patterns emerging from LWE-affected regions

Aside from the overall findings as given above, some specific issues related to the Left-Wing Extremism-affected areas surfaced in the surveys. Some of these findings are discussed here.

Both common people as well as police personnel from LWE-affected areas exhibited a more sympathetic attitude towards Naxalites. Twenty-two percent civilians and 10 percent police personnel believe that Naxalite groups struggle for the rights of the poor. Twenty-two percent common people from this region also believe that Naxalites want to improve people's lives and should not be punished, while 13 percent personnel from the region strongly feel that the common people have a lot of trust in Naxalites.

While these percentages may be small, they are not only higher than those in insurgency-affected regions of NE but are also significant by themselves.

On the other hand, the support for extra-judicial killing of Naxalites is also high in this region, with 20 percent common people and 25 percent police personnel from the region agreeing that "for the greater good of the society sometimes, killing dangerous Naxalites is better than a legal trial."

People from LWE-affected areas are also notably vulnerable to violence by the police or paramilitary forces/Army. Nearly one out of five respondents was/knew of a victim of police torture, while 15 percent said they know of cases of false implication in Naxalism-related cases by the police. Children of this region are particularly vulnerable, with 20 percent respondents claiming to know of cases where children faced violence by the police and another 18 percent who knew of cases of arrest/detention of children by the police.

On the other hand, police from this region also expressed facing severe pressure from various quarters. Nearly one out of two personnel said that they faced pressure from the public (48%), local media (53%), human rights activists/ NGOs (51%) and courts (46%). Seen in the context of reported violence by the police against the local community, this 'pressure' can be understood as a positive mode of checking police brutality.

However, the lack of infrastructure and safety among police personnel of this region is also glaring. More than three out of five personnel from these areas reported facing a situation where Naxalites committed a violent crime but the team was unable to reach the crime spot on time because of shortage of staff at the police station. A similar 58 percent said that they have been in situations where Naxalites committed a violent crime but the team could not go as it was unsafe for the police to do so. Again, 59 percent or nearly three in five have witnessed attack on police personnel or their vehicles by the Naxalites. Thirteen percent common people also knew of cases of abduction or murder of police personnel by the Naxalites. Further, seventeen percent common people knew of cases of harassment of *Mukhbirs* or police informers by the Naxalites. Also, one in five personnel from this region said that the posting highly impacts their mental well-being.

Caste, class and religion-based discrimination by the police is also rampant in this region. One out of three people believe that the police would favour an upper caste over a Dalit, 22 percent believe that they would favour a non-

Adivasi over an Adivasi, 20 percent believe that they would favour a Hindu over a Muslim and 40 percent believe that they would favour rich over the poor during a criminal investigation.

Common people from this region also have higher levels of trust in the police, along with high levels of trust in the Army and paramilitary forces. Yet, a significant proportion of people, 28 percent, reported being contacted by the paramilitary forces/Army in the last 2-3 years.

Tribals in the LWE-affected areas often face the brunt of the violence, as is evident from the survey findings. In the insurgency-affected areas of NE the difference between tribals and non-tribals' response to this question is not very significant. However, in the LWE-affected areas, tribals are 20 percentage points lesser likely to feel that the area is very safe for living, compared to the non-tribals. Conversely, tribals of this area are twice as likely to feel that the area is somewhat unsafe for living compared to the non-tribals. One out of two people of this area blame Naxalism or underground cadres for the lack of safety.

The impact of Naxalism on general law-and-order and crime investigation also appears to be high in these regions. More than 70 percent personnel believe that normal policing suffers due to Naxalism and 12 percent feel that Naxalism-related crimes are the most common in the area.

Patterns emerging from insurgency-affected Northeast regions

The regions covered in the survey of insurgency-affected areas of NE are among those that fall under the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA), 1958. With several people's movements against this Act, which empowers the armed forces with certain extraordinary and draconian powers, public sentiments are also tilted against it and similar laws such as UAPA. Forty-two percent common people from this region believe that such security laws should be repealed. Sixty-seven percent among those people from the insurgency-affected areas of NE who are aware of the security laws want them repealed.

A higher proportion of police personnel of the region are also against the laws, compared to those from LWE-affected regions. Although one out of two personnel from the insurgency-affected areas believe that in order to control insurgency, security laws like UAPA are important, a significant 25 percent also believe that such laws are very harsh and should be repealed.

There are also reports of parallel systems of taxation and law-and-order systems set up by the insurgents in the area, which is confirmed by more than one in three police personnel of the region. Thirty-four percent personnel believe that insurgents illegally collect tax from the people, while 37 percent personnel say that the insurgents have their own rules and laws. However, common people are much less likely to hold both these opinions, compared to the police.

A large section of the common people from this region believe that the police are corrupt. While 12 percent say that they are very corrupt, another 31 say that they are somewhat corrupt. Forty-eight percent people also believe that police in conflict-affected regions like this are more likely to earn extra money from illegal sources.

The levels of trust people of the region repose in the police, as well as other security agencies such as the paramilitary forces and Army are also lower. One out of three people have a lot of trust in the Army, 37 percent people have a lot of trust in the police while 25 percent people have a lot of trust in the paramilitary forces. These proportions are all significantly lower than the levels of trust among people of the LWE-affected regions. Conversely, the level of fear of the police is significant in this region, with one out of five persons being very afraid of the police.

On the other hand, the police of this region also suffer from more infrastructural and resource-constraints, especially in comparison to the Army and paramilitary forces. Four out of five personnel of these areas believe that the paramilitary forces/Army are better budgeted, two out of three believe that they are better staffed and 88 percent believe that they are better equipped than the police. Fifty-four percent personnel of this region believe that their posting location is risky. Personnel posted in these regions are also less likely to be imparted proper training, with 70 percent or less police personnel having received training at least once on new technology, human rights, community/tribe sensitisation, new laws/rules/orders, gender sensitisation or sensitisation towards children/juveniles. Only 30 percent of the personnel from these areas received special training on how to deal with insurgency.

Further, there is significant departmental pressure on the police here, with 34 percent personnel claiming that they are accountable to seniors in the department, with accountability to common people coming next at 31 percent. Fifteen percent of the common people of the region also believe that the police are accountable to their seniors in the department.

Appendices

Survey Methodology

Lokniti-Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS), in collaboration with Common Cause, has been preparing a series of baseline documents titled the 'Status of Policing in India Report' (SPIR). The idea of the SPIR reports is to improve policing through study of the official data, ground-based surveys and wide-ranging research conducted in collaboration or cooperation with the academia, civil society and government agencies. Two editions of the report have already been published. The first, SPIR 2018, was based on the common man's perception of policing gauged through a citizens' survey and a performance evaluation of policing using official data. The second report in the series, SPIR 2019, was a study of the working conditions and experiences of police personnel captured through a nation-wide survey, as well as a measure of the adequacy levels of the police using official data.

The third episode, SPIR 2020-2021, is a study divided into two volumes. While the first one focuses on 'policing in conflict-affected regions,' the second tries to understand the various aspects of 'policing during Covid-19 pandemic'. The key objective of Volume I of the study is to provide state-wise analysis of performance and perception of policing in the areas where some form of conflict, extremism, or insurgency prevails. Volume II examines the challenges faced by the police in states most-affected by the Covid-19 pandemic and the consequential lockdowns. It also studies the experiences of the common people while interacting with the police and their perceptions of various aspects of policing done in pandemic-induced conditions. Therefore, separate questionnaires have been used to interview both the police personnel and civilians for both Volume I and Volume II.

The present edition, 'Status of Policing in India Report 2020-2021: *Policing in Conflict-Affected Regions*' is based on a sample survey of 6,881 individuals (2,276 police personnel and 4,605 civilians), across 27 districts of 11states/ Union Territories (UTs) of India. The survey was conducted by the Lokniti- Programme for Comparative Democra-

cy, Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS), in the months of October and November 2020.

Sampling framework

For Volume I of the Study, i.e. '*Study of Policing in Conflict-Affected Regions*', we identified 27 districts in 11 states and UTs covering all the regional zones for the survey. The sampling of Naxalism or Maoism affected districts is based on the latest data pertaining to 90 Left Wing Extremism (LWE)-affected districts identified by the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA). The selected districts were shortlisted further on the basis of Special Central Assistance (SCA) given by the MHA, identification of districts as 'high risk' by the CRPF, deployment of units of CRPF and other paramilitary forces, as well as location and distance of the districts from each other. Identification of regions plagued with militancy and insurgency has been done using the following methodology. They have been selected on the basis of the deployment of units of Army and paramilitary forces, whichever applicable, and on the basis of incidents of violence reported in the last few years.

Table A has the list of the states and the districts shortlisted for the study.

Sampling details

One of the key objectives of the study was to provide state-wise analysis of performance and perception of policing in the areas affected by conflict, extremism, or insurgency. Therefore, we surveyed both the police personnel and the civilians. The sample size for all the 11 states was finalized on the basis of the number of affected districts in each state. In four of the states- Bihar, Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh and Assam, interviews were conducted in three districts each. In Manipur, the study was conducted in four districts as the districts were smaller in size. In the UT of J&K, the study could be conducted only in Jammu (Uddhampur).[1] For the rest, two districts from each of the states were included in the sample.

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1 The data from Jammu has been analysed separately in the appendices section.

Table A | Sample Frame

State/UT	District			
Andhra Pradesh	Visakhapatnam	Guntur		
Assam	Kokrajhar	West Karbi Anglong	Golpara	
Bihar	Aurangabad	Munger	Jamui	
Chhattisgarh	Sukma	Rajnandgaon	Narayanpur	
Jharkhand	Giridih	Simdega	Latehar	
Manipur	Imphal East	Chandel	Churachandpur	Jiribam
Nagaland	Dimapur	Peren		
Odisha	Malkangiri	Sundargarh		
Telangana	Khammam	Adilabad		
The UT of J&K	Uddhampur			
Tripura	West Tripura	Dhalai		
Total No. of Districts	**27**			

States in which the survey was conducted

Jammu & Kashmir*

Assam

Nagaland

Manipur

Bihar

Tripura

Jharkhand

Chhattisgarh

Odisha

Telangana

Andhra Pradesh

*The survey could not be completed in J&K

In the initial stages of the sampling, the now-UTs of Jammu and Kashmir were to be included in the survey and three districts from the region were selected for the survey. However, after the revocation of Article 370 in the state and the Centre's decision to reconstitute the state into two Union Territories, the local atmosphere in the region was not conducive for conducting a survey on an issue as sensitive as policing. Therefore, only one district from the UT could be covered and since it could be unrepresentative of the state's larger conditions, it was decided to analyse the data separately. This data is provided in the appendices section of Volume I of the report.

Two hundred and eighty-four interviews (100 interviews of the police personnel and 184 of the civilians) were targeted in each district. Therefore, in the states with two sampled districts (and Manipur), 568 interviews were targeted. In the states with three sampled districts, 852 interviews were targeted. Details of the different stages of sampling are shared below:

Stage 1: Sampling of districts
The districts in each of the states were chosen following the 'purposive sampling' technique. The districts in the states affected by Left-Wing Extremism (LWE) were selected on the basis of the 90 LWE-affected districts identified by Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA). The selected districts were shortlisted further on the basis of Special Central Assistance (SCA) given by MHA, identification of districts as 'high risk' by the CRPF, deployment of units of CRPF and other paramilitary forces, as well as location and distance of the districts from each other. Identification of the states/UTs facing militancy and insurgency, has been done on the basis of the deployment of units of Army and paramilitary forces, whichever is applicable. They have also been selected on the basis of the incidents of violence reported in the last few years. For the feasibility of the field-work, as well as the safety and security of field investigators, we cautiously chose districts (and locations within them) witnessing moderate level of conflict. As a result, we avoided choosing extreme locations for the survey.

Stage 2: Sampling of locations within districts
Two Blocks (or *tehsils*) were chosen from each of the sampled districts for conducting interviews of civilians in the 27 sampled districts, following the 'purposive sampling' technique. Further, two villages were chosen in each of the sampled Blocks. The Blocks and locations were identified using the same rationale, i.e., incidents of conflict-related violence in the recent past.

To accomplish the targeted interviews of police personnel, considering the strength of the police personnel deployed in each site, five locations were chosen. First was the venue of the District Headquarters of police, and second, four other Blocks. The selection of Blocks followed the same criteria, i.e., incidents of conflict-related violence in the recent past. While 16interviews of police personnel were targeted from each of the sampled Blocks, 36 interviews were targeted from the location of District Headquarters of police. Two of the Blocks doubled as interview locations for both police personnel and civilians.

Stage 3: Sampling of respondents
One hundred and eighty-four interviews of civilians were targeted from each of the sampled district. This makes 92 interviews from each of the two sampled Blocks within a sampled district, and 46 interviews from each of the two sampled villages within a sampled Block. The interviews of civilians were conducted using the 'systematic random sampling' technique, i.e., a fixed sampling interval was maintained for every subsequent interview. Ensuring that the sample is spread across all the houses/streets/colonies in a given village, depending on the size of the village, a person was interviewed in every 3rd or 5th house. To make the sample representative, the targeted male-female ratio was equal, i.e., 50:50. Also, the targeted age-wise proportion of the respondents was as follows: 18-25 years-25 percent; 26-35 years-25 percent; 36-45 years-20 percent; 46-55 years-14 percent; 56 years and above-16 percent. Interviewees were of minimum 18 years of age.

For police personnel, 100 interviews were targeted in each of the sampled district. Further, 16 interviews of police personnel were targeted from each of the four sampled Blocks within a sampled district. Thirty six interviews were targeted from the District Headquarters of police location. Two of the Blocks doubled as interview locations for both police personnel and civilians. As far as possible, the male-female ratio among police respondents was maintained at 80:20; i.e., 80 percent of the total interviews were conducted with male police personnel, while 20 percent interviews were conducted with female police personnel. Further, as far as it was feasible, the targeted ratio of 'Constabulary-Rank Officers' to the 'High-Rank Officers' was maintained at 80:20, i.e., 80 percent of the police personnel from constabulary ranks (Constables and Head Constables), and 20 percent from the higher ranks (Assistant Sub-Inspectors and above) were targeted for the interviews.

The detailed sampling plan (targeted and achieved) for the study is shared below:

Table B | Targeted Sample

	Units
Total no. of Districts	27
Total no. of States/UTs	11
Civilians	
No. of Blocks per District	2
No. of villages per Block	2
No. of interviews per village	46
No. of interviews per Block	92
No. of interviews per District	184
Total no. of civilians' Interviews	**4784**
Police Personnel	
No. of Blocks/PHQ per District	1 PHQ; 4 Blocks
No. of interviews per HQ	36
No. of interviews per Block	16
No. of interviews per District	100
Total no. of Police' interviews	**2600**
Gross Total Targeted (*Civilians and Police Personnel*)	**7384**

Table C | Achieved Sample

State/UT	*Civilians*	*Police Personnel*
Andhra Pradesh	326	193
Assam	553	300
Bihar	545	214
Chhattisgarh	554	300
Jharkhand	552	300
Manipur	368	175
Nagaland	369	160
Odisha	385	134
Telangana	401	200
The UT of J&K	184	100
Tripura	368	200
Total Interviews (6881)	**4605**	**2276**

Research instruments

Preparation of the questionnaire: The English questionnaires were designed after rigorous dialogues between members of the research team from Lokniti-CSDS and Common Cause, in a series of meetings and discussions. A brainstorming session was also organised at CSDS, attended by experts from various fields, including academicians and researchers, police/paramilitary officers having served in conflict-affected regions, journalists reporting on the ongoing conflicts and social activists. They shared their expert feedback with the Lokniti-CSDS and Common Cause teams and helped them navigate the themes and issues of the questionnaire.

Pre-testing and finalising the questionnaire: It was also necessary to administer the questionnaire in the field to check its accuracy and credibility. A pilot fieldwork was conducted between February and early March 2020 at one of the sampled locations in each of the following states- Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand Nagaland, Odisha, and Telangana. No sampling was carried out during pre-testing. The pre-testing was conducted by the research team members from Lokniti-CSDS and Common Cause, who were also involved in the questionnaire designing. After getting inputs from researchers, ques-

tions were reframed, omitted and added. The process also helped in determining the length of the questionnaire, writing instructions for field investigators as well as adding and omitting new options in answer categories.

Translation: It would not be justifiable to use a single language questionnaire in a multi-lingual country like India. Therefore, the questionnaire was translated in each state by regional teams familiar with the local language before administering it in the field.

Training workshop: A one-day training workshop was organised in each state before the survey fieldwork began in order to train the field investigators (FIs) and supervisors tasked to carry out the fieldwork operations. The trainers conducted an intensive, interactive workshop for investigators who participated in an orientation programme. Investigators were also trained rigorously on survey methods, interviewing techniques and communication with the respondents. A comprehensive and detailed interviewing guide, based on the questionnaire and survey methodology was prepared for the field investigators. In addition, mock interviews were also conducted by the FIs for a better understanding of the questionnaire. The workshops were conducted while strictly following the Covid-19 protocols. Taking the safety and security of the state coordinators, supervisors, field investigators and other team members into account, in a few states, the workshops were conducted online, through platforms like Google Meet, Skype and Zoom.

Fieldwork: The fieldwork of the survey took place in the months of October and November 2020. Field investigators, mainly students of social sciences in colleges and uni-

The profile of the respondents is as follows:

Table D | Profile of the Respondents[1]

Civilians	(%)
Men	59
Women	41
18-29 years	34
30-39	25
40-49	20
50-59	12
60 years or above	9
Poor	30
Lower class	36
Middle class	24
Rich	10
Hindu Upper Castes	12
Hindu OBCs	29
Hindu Dalits	15
Hindu Adivasis	23
Muslims	5
Christians	14
Others	3
Non-literate	19
Below Primary	4
Primary pass / Middle fail	10
Middle pass / Matric fail	12
Up to Matric	17
Up to Intermediate	17
Graduates or above	21
LWE-affected Regions	63
Insurgency-affected Regions	38

1 This excludes Jammu. The data from Jammu has been analysed separately in the appendices section.

Police Personnel	(%)
Men	83
Women	17
18-29 years	18
30-39	49
40-49	23
50 years or above	11
Constabulary Ranked	76
Higher Ranked	19
Others	5
<5 years of services	13
5-10 years of services	32
More than 10 years of services	56
<5 years at the current posting	65
5 or more years at the current posting	35
LWE-affected Regions	62
Insurgency-affected Regions	38

Note: All figures are rounded off.

versities across the country, were selected to carry out the field work. They conducted face-to-face interviews with the respondents at their place of work or residence, using a standardised questionnaire in the language spoken and understood by her/him. The fieldwork was also conducted while strictly following the Covid-19 protocols.

Data checking and analysis: All questionnaires were manually screened for consistency and quality checks. The questionnaire had codes (of pre-coded questions) for data punching. A team was constituted to check the codes and make corrections. The checking as well as the subsequent data entry process took place at the Lokniti-CSDS office in Delhi. The analyses presented in this report have been done using Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS).

Perception of Policing: Udhampur, Jammu

As part of the larger study of policing in conflict-affected regions, Common Cause and Lokniti, CSDS had also planned to interview police personnel posted and civilians residing in some of the 'militancy-affected' areas in the Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir. This was intended to be done in addition to the survey conducted among police personnel and civilians in 'left-wing extremism-affected' and 'insurgency-affected' areas. The objective behind doing a survey in militancy affected areas was to generate a comparison of responses in these areas with those received from the other two conflict-affected regions. We hoped to conduct 100 interviews of police personnel and 184 of civilians at four locations each in Udhampur district of Jammu. The same number of interviews of police personnel and civilians were to be conducted at two and four locations, respectively, in Srinagar district of Kashmir. Eventually, owing to the tense security situation and the consequent risks of conducting surveys in the Kashmir region/valley, we went ahead with the survey only in Jammu and shelved our plan of doing it in Kashmir. Since the survey was incomplete and we were unable to get a more complete and nuanced picture of the militancy-affected areas of Jammu and Kashmir, we thus decided not to include only the Jammu data in our overall data file. So, we did not merge the survey data from the Udhampur district of Jammu with that from the LWE-affected districts of central, east and southern India and insurgency-affected districts of northeast India.

Doing so would have resulted in the misreading of the Jammu and Kashmir situation, considering that the militancy problem is worse in Kashmir where the survey was not conducted, as compared to Jammu. In addition, this would have led to a flawed comparison of responses of personnel and civilians in the militancy-affected areas of J&K with those of the same groups in the other two conflict-affected areas. That's because the comparison would have occurred between responses from just one district and those from several districts clubbed together. However-

er, since we did end up conducting the survey in Jammu as part of the study, we are sharing some of its important findings in a transparent way. This chapter does not offer a detailed summary of responses to each and every question. Instead, it is a snapshot of some interesting findings from the survey. We would also like the reader to exercise caution and not read too much into the data as the responses received during the survey are not representative of police personnel and civilians located in/residing in the Udhampur district, let alone the Jammu region.

Key findings

Hardly any police personnel interviewed in the militancy-affected areas of Udhampur was found to be dissatisfied with their posting. Only three out of the total 100 personnel interviewed expressed dissatisfaction, and that too of moderate intensity *(Table 1)*. Almost everyone was satisfied with their posting, with nearly three-fourth (73%) expressing complete satisfaction. Yet, when it came to assessing the safety of the area for their own selves and families, a substantial number of personnel (42%) said that the area was very risky and another 14 percent viewed it as being somewhat risky *(Table 2)*. These divergent responses of police personnel to the satisfaction and risk perception questions mirror the pattern noticed in the LWE and insurgency-affected areas.

Table 1 | Nearly three-fourths of personnel in the Jammu (Udhampur) survey were fully satisfied with the location of their posting

Police Personnel's Response (%)	
Fully satisfied	73
Somewhat satisfied	23
Somewhat dissatisfied	3
No Response	1

Note: All percentages are rounded off.

Question asked: Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with this area of your current posting?

Table 2 | Two out of five police personnel from Udhampur considered their place of posting very risky

Police Personnel's Response (%)	
Very risky	42
Somewhat risky	14
Not much risky	12
Not at all risky	32

Note: All percentages are rounded off.

Question asked: Considering your own safety and your family's safety, how risky do you find this area - Very, somewhat, not much or not at all?

The civilians living in the very same areas of Udhampur district where the police personnel survey was done, however, held an opposing opinion about the area's safety for police personnel. Only six percent viewed it as being unsafe and well over four-fifth (92%) considered the area to be safe, despite being militancy-affected *(Table 3)*. Further, on the issue of their personal safety, all respondents, barring one, viewed it as being safe for living *(Table 4)*.

Table 3 | Over four-fifths of the common people considered Udhampur safe for the police personnel posted there

Common People's Response (%)	
Very unsafe	4
Somewhat unsafe	2
Not much unsafe	6
Not at all unsafe	86
No response	2

Note: All percentages are rounded off.

Question asked: In your opinion, how unsafe is this locality for the police personnel who are posted here - Very, Somewhat, Not much or Not at all?

Table 4 | Ninety-seven percent common people considered Udhampur to be very safe for living

Common People's Response (%)	
Very safe	97
Somewhat safe	2
Somewhat unsafe	1

Note: All percentages are rounded off.

Question asked: While talking to people in the area, some people said that this area is unsafe for living and some others said it is safe. Do you feel safe or unsafe living in this area?

On the issue of whether militancy has increased or decreased in the area, a notable two-thirds of the common people surveyed from the region did not respond to the question. Only one percent said it had increased in the last two-three years, as opposed to 15 percent who said it had decreased and 21 percent who said it was same as before *(Table 5)*. Responses of police personnel also seem to suggest a decrease in militancy in the region. When asked about whether they had faced a militant attack during

their posting, 92 of the 100 police personnel interviewed said that they had never experienced any. Only five police personnel reported having experienced it. Four of those five have experienced it only rarely; that is once or twice perhaps *(Table 6)*. Also, almost all civilian respondents, barring a few, reported being unaware of any violent militant attack on police personnel in the area *(Table 7)*.

Table 5 | Nearly one out of six common people believe that militancy and criminal activity has decreased in the last two-three years

In the last 2-3 years	Common People's Response (%)			
	Have Increased	Have Decreased	Are Same as before	No response
Militant activities in my locality	1	15	21	63
Criminal activities in my locality	8	17	42	33

Note: Rest of the respondents did not answer. All figures are rounded off.

Question asked: In the last 2-3 years, have the Militant activities in your locality increased or decreased? In the last 2-3 years, have the other criminal activities in your locality increased or decreased?

Table 6 | More than nine out of 10 police personnel have never faced a militant attack during their posting

Police Personnel's Response (%)	
Few times	1
Rarely	4
Never	92
No response	3

Note: All percentages are rounded off.

Question asked: During this posting, how often have you faced attack on Police or on Police jeep/car by militants?

Table 7 | Ninety-eight percent people do not know of any cases of attack by the militants on the police

Common People's Response (%)	
Know of a case of abduction/murder/ violence against a police person by militants	<1
Don't know of a case of abduction/murder/ violence against a police person by militants	98
No response	2

Note: All percentages are rounded off.

Question asked: Do you know of any case where a police person was abducted or became a victim of violence or killed by militants?

When police personnel were asked to identify the most common crime of the area that they were posted in, a majority (27%) said it was drug trafficking. Around 16 percent said crimes related to family issues were most common and 15 percent said theft was the most common crime *(Table 8)*. Only one police personnel out of 100 interviewed said that the most common crime was abduction or kid-

napping of police personnel. In fact, even when specifically asked about the frequency of attacks on police personnel and abduction and kidnappings in general, over half of the police personnel and over four-fifths of civilians felt that these types of serious crimes were not at all common in their area *(Tables 9 and 10)*.

Table 8 | Police personnel identified drug trafficking as the most common crime in the area

Police Personnel's Response (%)	
Drug trafficking	27
Family issues	16
Theft	15
Local fights	11
Domestic Violence	6
Bootlegging / Illegal trade in alcohol	3
Accident	3
Land issue	3
Cow-smuggling	2
Robbery	1
Abducting/Kidnapping police personnel	1
Extortion	1
Sexual Assault/Harassment	1
Murder of civilians	1
Cyber crimes	1
No response	8

Note: All figures are rounded off.

Question asked: What is the most common crime in this area?

Table 9 | More than one out of two police personnel believe that abduction and kidnapping and attacks on police personnel are not at all common in the area, four out of five believe that extortion is not at all common in the area

Type of crimes	Police Personnel's Response (%)				
	Very common in area	Somewhat common in area	Not much common in area	Not at all common in area	No response
Abduction/Kidnapping	1	6	36	54	3
Extortion	2	1	11	83	3
Rape	-	26	48	21	5
Attacks on police personnel	-	13	25	58	4
Minor offenses, like theft etc.	45	36	9	7	3

Note: All figures are rounded off.

Question asked: How common are the following in your jurisdiction/area - very, somewhat, not much, or not at all?

Table 10 | More than four out of five common people believe that abduction, kidnapping, extortion and attacks on police personnel are not at all common in the area

Type of crimes	Common People's Response (%)				
	Very common in area	Somewhat common in area	Not much common in area	Not at all common in area	No response
Abduction/Kidnapping	1	1	9	90	1
Extortion	1	-	10	89	1
Rape	1	1	28	70	1
Attacks on police personnel	1	1	15	84	1
Minor offenses, like theft etc.	12	30	32	26	1

Note: All figures are rounded off.

Question asked: How common are the following in your area - very, somewhat, not much, or not at all?

Police personnel posted in the area strongly believed that locals had no faith in the militants. Out of the 100 personnel who were interviewed, 89 felt that civilians had no faith or trust whatsoever in the militants and another six said that there was hardly any trust in the militants among the people *(Table 11)*. The survey also found next to no sympathy for militancy, both among police personnel and civilians. Nearly nine out of 10 from both categories felt that militants spread unnecessary violence and only nine percent said that while the militants' methods may be wrong, their demands were genuine *(Table 12)*. Police personnel and common people were also found to be supportive of stringent laws like the UAPA. Sixty-eight percent police personnel found such laws to be important and only two percent viewed them as harsh. Among civilians, 30 percent supported the laws and seven percent opposed them, with over two-fifths either being ignorant about them or not having an opinion on them *(Table 13)*.

Table 11 | Nine out of ten police personnel are of the opinion that people in their area completely distrust the militants

People of this area trust the militants…	Police Personnel's Response (%)
A lot	1
Somewhat	2
Not much	6
Not at all	89
No response	2

Note: All figures are rounded off.

Question asked: In your opinion, to what extent do people in this area trust the militants- a lot, somewhat, not much or not at all?

Table 12 | Nearly nine out of ten common people and police personnel believe that militants spread unnecessary violence

	Police Personnel's Response (%)	Common People's Response (%)
Agree with 1st Statement - Militants spread unnecessary violence	88	89
Agree with 2nd Statement - Militants struggle for the rights of the poor	-	-
Agree with 3rd Statement - Their demands are genuine but their methods are wrong	9	9
No response	3	3

Note: All figures are rounded off.

Question asked: (1): The Militants spread unnecessary violence. (2): The Militants struggle for the rights of the poor. (3): Their demands are genuine but their methods are wrong. Which statement do you agree among 3?

Table 13 | Nearly one out of three common people and two out of three police personnel favour stringent laws like UAPA

	Police Personnel's Response (%)	Common People's Response (%)
Agree with 1st Statement - In order to control Militant activities, laws like UAPA are important	68	30
Agree with 2nd Statement - Such laws are very harsh, and should be repealed/removed	2	7
Not heard of them/ No response	30	64

Note: All figures are rounded off.

Question asked: (1) In order to control Militant activities, laws like UAPA are important (2) Such laws are very harsh, and should be repealed/removed. Do you agree with 1 or 2?

Worryingly, the survey found a large proportion of police personnel to be supportive of measures like tapping phones, surveillance through drone cameras, arresting people for social media posts sympathetic to militants, so as to control militancy. Additionally, it also found civilians to be supportive of them *(Table 14)*. Interestingly, the common people were more comfortable with the idea of tapping phones of civilians than police personnel themselves. However, banning internet in militancy-affected areas found greater opposition than support, both among civilians and police personnel. Over half the civilians and police personnel were opposed to such a measure.

Table 14 | One out of two people as well as police personnel oppose the complete ban on internet in places affected by militancy

	Police Personnel's Response (%)		Common People's Response (%)	
	Support (%)	Oppose (%)	Support (%)	Oppose (%)
Tapping phones of common people	50	50	60	31
Tapping phones of suspected militants	96	4	91	3
Surveillance through drone cameras	92	7	86	7
Arresting people for their posts on social media that sympathise with militants	91	9	78	14
Complete ban on internet in places which are affected by militancy	47	53	37	55

Note: Rest of the respondents did not answer. All figures are rounded off.

Question asked: For controlling militancy, do you support or oppose the following methods?

The survey in Udhampur also found both civilians and police personnel to be more concerned about national security than about human rights. When given a choice, over two-thirds of civilians and police personnel prioritised national security over human rights whereas only about one in every four personnel and one in every five civilians gave some importance to the latter *(Table 15)*.

Table 15 | More than two out of three police personnel and nearly three out of four common people believe that human rights can be ignored to ensure national security

	Police Personnel's Response (%)	Common People's Response (%)
Agree with 1st Statement -National security is of primary importance, and human rights can be ignored to ensure national security	68	72
Agree with 2nd Statement - It is wrong to ignore human rights in the name of national security	25	18
No response	7	10

Note: All figures are rounded off.

Question asked: Do you agree with statement 1 or 2?

There was however a significant difference in how police personnel and civilians viewed extra judicial killings. Opinion among police personnel was nearly split down the middle on this issue. Fifty-one percent supported the killing of militants for the greater good of society than going

for legal trial while 48 percent supported legal procedures. Among civilians the support for extra judicial killings was three times greater than opposition to it – 72 percent as opposed to 22 percent *(Table 16)*.

Table 16 | Nearly three-fourth common people and one out of two police personnel believe that killing dangerous criminals is better than a legal trial

	Police Personnel's Response (%)	Common People's Response (%)
Agree with 1st Statement - For the greater good of the society sometimes, killing dangerous militants is more effective than giving them a legal trial	51	72
Agree with 2nd Statement - No matter how dangerous militants are, Police should try to catch them and follow proper legal procedures	48	22
No response	1	6

Note: All figures are rounded off.

Question asked: Do you agree with statement 1 or 2?

As far as civilians' trust in the security forces was concerned, people reposed the highest level of trust in the Army (86% trusted it highly), followed by the paramilitary forces (73%). The police was a distant third, with less than half the respondents (49%) trusting it strongly *(Table 17)*. It must be added here, however, that there was hardly any distrust among civilians for all the three and the differences in trust were only with respect to its intensity.

Table 17 | Civilians trust Army the most, followed by the paramilitary; only one in two people have high levels of trust in the police

Trust in...	Common People's Response (%)			
	High trust	Some trust	Not much	None at all
Police	49	44	5	2
Army	86	9	3	2
Paramilitary	73	17	8	2

Note: Rest of the respondents did not answer. All figures are rounded off.

Question asked: How much trust do you have on the following- lot, somewhat, not much or not at all? a. Police b. Army c. Paramilitary

A very large majority of police personnel considered the Army/paramilitary forces to be better budgeted, staffed and equipped *(Table 18)*. Sixty percent of the police personnel were most likely to view both themselves as well as the Army/paramilitary forces as being equally effective in controlling militancy. Among the remaining police personnel, most were likely to view themselves as being more effective than the paramilitary forces/Army.

Table 18 | Nine out of 10 police personnel believe that the paramilitary/Army is better budgeted and equipped

Who is...?	Police Personnel's Perception (%)			
	Police	Paramilitary/ Army	Both equally	None
Better budgeted	1	90	4	1
Better staffed	20	67	8	1
Better equipped (arms, ammunitions, bullet proof gear etc.)	2	92	2	4
More effective in controlling militancy	36	4	60	-

Note: Rest of the respondents did not answer. All figures are rounded off.

Question asked: In your opinion, who is in a better position with regard to the following- 'Police' OR 'Paramilitary/Army'?

When it comes to training, most police personnel interviewed in Udhampur district reported having received training in handling weapons, followed by physical training and training in crowd control. A large proportion of personnel, in fact, had last received all three types of training in the past one year or so. However, they lacked training with respect to sensitisation on gender, caste-community and children. Also, their training did not cover new rules, laws and human rights, which should be a matter of concern *(Table 19)*. This might also partly explain the earlier survey finding on how an overwhelming majority of police personnel did not have a positive view about human rights.

Table 19 | Personnel more likely to be recently trained on weapons training, physical training and crowd control

Type of Training	Police Personnel's Response (%)				
	In last one year	2-3 years ago	4-5 years ago	Even before that	Never/ No response
New technology	18	11	6	20	45
Weapons training	65	11	7	14	3
On human rights	27	3	2	13	55
On crowd control	35	8	8	24	25
Physical training	49	10	7	21	13
On community/ tribe sensitisation	10	1	4	16	69
On new laws/ rules/orders	18	3	5	13	61
On sensitisation towards women	15	7	3	14	61
On sensitisation towards children/ juveniles	19	4	4	17	56

Note: All figures are rounded off.

Question asked: When was the last time you received training about the following things in the last one year, two-three years ago, four-five years ago, even before that or never?

Note: *The interview schedule shared below uses the terms 'Naxalism' and 'Naxalites' for identifying the conflict and the conflict-groups, respectively. This particular version was used in the states of Andhra Pradesh and Bihar. The terms 'Maoism' and 'Maoist' were used in the interview schedules of Jharkhand and Odisha. Chhatisgarh's interview schedule had both Naxalism/Naxalites and Maoism/Maoists. Among insurgency-affected regions, the terms 'Insurgency' and 'Insurgents' were used in Assam, Manipur, and Tripura; while 'Underground Cadres' was used in Nagaland. In Udhampur (Jammu), the only militancy-affected region in the sample, the terms 'Militancy' and 'Militants' were used. The interview schedules were translated into the local language most commonly spoken in each of the states in the sample.*

STATUS OF POLICING IN INDIA REPORT 2020: POLICING IN DISTURBED AREAS INTERVIEW SCHEDULE FOR <u>CIVILIANS</u>

INVESTIGATOR'S INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF INFORMED CONSENT

My name is _____and I have come on behalf of Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (also give your university's reference), a social science research organization and Common Cause, an NGO in Delhi. We are conducting a survey on people's perception and experience of dealing with the police. Every person over the age of 18 has an equal chance of being included in this study. You have been selected by chance. There is no risk and also no benefit in participating in this survey and your participation is voluntary. This survey is an independent study and is not linked to any political party or government agency. Your identity and the information you provide will be kept strictly confidential.

Participation in this survey is voluntary. We hope that you will take part in this survey since your participation is important. It usually takes 20 to 30 minutes to complete this interview. Please spare some time for the interview and help me in sucessfully completing the survey.

A1. Did the respondent give consent? *(Put a tick and then proceed with interview)*

State ID   **District ID**   **Respondent S. No.**

Z1. State:

Z2. District: _____

Z3. Block/Tehsil: 1. District Head Quarter   2. Block

Z4. Village/Town: _____

Z5. Name of the Respondent: _____

Z6. Address of the respondent *(Give landmark)*: _____

_____

Date | **Month**

Z7: Date of Interview *(dd/mm):* _____

Investigator Roll No.

Z8: Name of Investigator *(Write your Roll No. in the box):* _____

INTERVIEW BEGINS:

B1. How long have you been living in this area? *(Number of years)* _____ *(If less than one year, Code 01)*   97. Entire life   98. No response

B2. What is your age? *(in completed years)* _____ 98. No Response *(Code 95 for 95 yrs & above)*

B3. Gender: 1. Male   2. Female   3. Other

B4. Up to what level have you studied? *(Record exactly and consult code book)*

_____ 9. No response

Q1. What is the biggest problem for the people living in this area? *(Record exactly, and consult codebook)* _____ 98. No response

Q2. While talking to people in the area, some people said that this area is unsafe for living and some others said it is safe. Do you feel safe or unsafe living in this area *(Probe further whether fully or somewhat)* 1. Fully safe   2. Somewhat safe

3. Somewhat unsafe   4. Fully unsafe   8. No Response

Q2a. *(If 'unsafe' in Q2)* What is the biggest reason for your feeling unsafe in this area? *(Record exactly and consult code book)*_____98. No response   99. Not applicable

Q3. How common are the following crimes in your area - Very, somewhat, not much, or not at all?

	Very	Somewhat	Not much	Not at all	No response
a. Abduction/Kidnapping	1	2	3	4	8
b. Extortion	1	2	3	4	8
c. Rape	1	2	3	4	8
d. Attacks on Police personnel	1	2	3	4	8
e. Minor offenses, like theft etc.	1	2	3	4	8

Q4. For the safety and security of the people living in this area, who do you need more- State Police **OR** Paramilitary/Army?   1. State Police   2. Paramilitary/Army   3. Both equally *(silent option)*   4. Neither of the two *(silent option)*   8. No Response

Q5. People have some kind of contact with the police for different reasons. In the last 2-3 years, have you or any of your family members had any kind of contact with the police?

    2. Yes   1. No *(If respondent's answer is 'no' or s/he does not answer, go to Q6)*   8. No Response

Q5a. *(If 'yes' in Q5)* So did you contact the police **OR** the police contacted you?

    1. I contacted the police   2. Police contacted me   3. Both   8. No Response   9. Not applicable

Q5b. *(If 'yes' in Q5)* What was the reason for contact with the Police? *(If the respondent has had contact with the Police more than once, record the reason for the most recent contact) (Record exactly and consult code book)*

    Reason for police contact _____ 98. No Response   99. NA

Q5c. *(If 'yes' in Q5)* How satisfied or dissatisfied were you with the help provided by the police? *(Probe further whether fully or somewhat)*

    1. Fully satisfied   2. Somewhat satisfied   3. Somewhat dissatisfied   4. Fully dissatisfied   8. No Response   9. Not applicable

Q5d. *(If somewhat or fully dissatisfied in Q5c)* What was the main reason for your dissatisfaction? *(Record answer and consult codebook)* _____ 98. No Response   99. NA

Q6. In the last 2-3 years, how often did it happen that some Army/Paramilitary personnel contacted you or someone from your family- many times, sometimes, rarely or never?

    1. Many times   2. Some times   3. Rarely   4. Never   8. No response

Q7. Suppose you are threatened by some Naxalites, and you have a choice of contacting both Police and Army /Paramilitary, who will you contact?

    1. Police   2. Paramilitary/Army   3. Any of the two   4. Both   5. None   8. N.R.

Q8. How much trust do you have on the following- a lot, somewhat, not much or not at all?

	A lot	Somewhat	Not much	Not at all	NR
a. State Police	1	2	3	4	8
b. Army	1	2	3	4	8
c. Paramilitary	1	2	3	4	8
d. Local Politician	1	2	3	4	8

Q9. In your opinion, who is better with regard to the following- Police **OR** Paramilitary/ Army?

	Police	Paramilitary /Army	Both equally good	Both equally bad	NR
a. Behavior towards local people	1	2	3	4	8
b. Respecting your culture and customs even while performing their duty	1	2	3	4	8
c. Communication in your language	1	2	3	4	8

Q10. In the last 2-3 years, has the following activities in your locality increased or decreased?

	Increase	Decreased	Remained same	NR
a. Naxalism activities	1	2	3	8
b. Other criminal activities	1	2	3	8

Q11. It is often alleged that the Police intentionally implicate people under false charges of Naxalism. Do you think the police in your area do this?

2.Yes   1. No   3. May be   8. No response

Q11a. *(If 'yes' in Q11)* So who are these people, or social group, who are implicated under false charges of Naxalism? *(Record exact answer and consult code book)*

_____ 98. No response   99. Not applicable

Q12. Often people say that while taking action against the Naxalites, the Police discriminate against some people. In your opinion, how much does the Police discriminate against the following- a lot, somewhat, not much, not at all?

	A lot	Somewhat	Not much	Not at all	NR
a. Poor People	1	2	3	4	8
b. Rural people	1	2	3	4	8
c. Non-literate people	1	2	3	4	8
d. Muslims	1	2	3	4	8
e. Christians	1	2	3	4	8
f. Dalits	1	2	3	4	8
g. Tribals	1	2	3	4	8

Q13. Do you know of anyone who....?

	Yes	No	NR
a. Was held by **Police** for Naxalism charges in spite of being innocent.	2	1	8
b. Was held by **Paramilitary/Army** for Naxalism charges in spite of being innocent.	2	1	8
c. A victim of fake encounter by **Police**	2	1	8
d. A victim of fake encounter by **Paramilitary/Army**	2	1	8
e. A victim of physical torture by **Police**	2	1	8
f. A victim of physical torture by **Paramilitary/Army**	2	1	8

Q14. And, do you know of any case.........?

	Yes	No	NR
a. Where Naxalites have harassed someone who has been an informer to the police.	2	1	8
b. Where a Police personnel was abducted or became a victim of violence or killed by Naxalites.	2	1	8

Q15. In your experience, in such Naxalism affected areas, how corrupt are the following- very, somewhat, not much or not at all?

	Very	Somewhat	Not much	Not at all	NR
a. Police	1	2	3	4	8
b. Army/Paramilitary	1	2	3	4	8

Q16. Often people have fear of **police** for what they might do on the pretext of searching for Naxalites. What about you- how much do you fear of the following- a lot, somewhat, not much or not at all?

	A lot	Somewhat	Not much	Not at all	NR
a. Fear of being beaten up by the Police	1	2	3	4	8
b. Fear of being arrested/detained by the Police for no reason	1	2	3	4	8
c. Fear of the Police coming to your house	1	2	3	4	8
d. Fear of the Police destroying your belongings or property	1	2	3	4	8
e. Fear of being falsely implicated in Naxalism cases by Police	1	2	3	4	8
f. Fear of sexual harassment by the Police	1	2	3	4	8
g. Fear of being killed by the Police	1	2	3	4	8

Q17. In your opinion, how unsafe is this locality for the police personnel who are posted here- Very, Somewhat, Not much or Not at all?

1. Very   2. Somewhat
3. Not much   4. Not at all   8. No Response

Q18. Often people have fear of **Paramilitary/Army** for what they might do on the pretext of searching for Naxalites. What about you- how much do you fear of the following- a lot, somewhat, not much or not at all?

	A lot	Somewhat	Not much	Not at all	NR
a. Fear of being beaten up by the Paramilitary/Army	1	2	3	4	8
b. Fear of being arrested/detained by the Paramilitary/Army for no reason	1	2	3	4	8
c. Fear of the Paramilitary/Army coming to your house	1	2	3	4	8
d. Fear of the Paramilitary/Army destroying your belongings or property	1	2	3	4	8
e. Fear of being falsely implicated in Naxalism cases by Paramilitary/Army	1	2	3	4	8
f. Fear of sexual harassment by the Paramilitary/Army	1	2	3	4	8
g. Fear of being killed by the Paramilitary/Army	1	2	3	4	8

Q19. It is alleged often that some people are falsely implicated by the Police on Naxalism related charges. In your opinion, how likely is it for the following groups to be falsely implicated in such cases by the Police- very, somewhat, not much or not at all?

	Very	Somewhat	Not much	Not at all	NR
a. Dalits	1	2	3	4	8
b. Tribals	1	2	3	4	8
c. Muslims	1	2	3	4	8
d. Indigenous People *(Only for Nagaland, Manipur and Assam)*	1	2	3	4	8

Q20. Do you know of any child below 18 years who has faced any of the following

	Yes	No	NR
a. Arrest/detention by the police.	2	1	8
b. Violence by the police.	2	1	8
c. Detention by the army/paramilitary.	2	1	8
d. Violence by the army/paramilitary.	2	1	8
e. Abduction by the Naxalites.	2	1	8
f. Violence by the Naxalites.	2	1	8

Q21. Do you know of any woman who has faced any of the following

	Yes	No	NR
a. Arrest/detention by the police.	2	1	8
b. Sexual violence by the police.	2	1	8
c. Detention by the army/paramilitary.	2	1	8
d. Sexual violence by the army/paramilitary.	2	1	8
e. Abduction by the Naxalites.	2	1	8
f. Sexual violence by the Naxalites.	2	1	8

Q22. During the last 2-3 years, how many times have been in a situation when you are in a public place, you were not committing any offence, but...

	Never	1-2 times	Many times	NR
a. A **Police** personnel asked for your ID Card or documents	1	2	3	8
b. A **Paramilitary/Army personnel** asked for your identity card/documents	1	2	3	8

Q23. Often people are scared of **Naxalites** due to different reasons. What about you, how much do you fear of the following- a lot, somewhat, not much or not at all?

	A lot	Somewhat	Not much	Not at all	NR
a. Fear of being beaten up by the Naxalites	1	2	3	4	8
b. Fear of being abducted by the Naxalites	1	2	3	4	8
c. Fear of the Naxalites coming to your house	1	2	3	4	8
d. Fear of the Naxalites destroying your belongings or property	1	2	3	4	8
e. Fear of extortion by Naxalites	1	2	3	4	8
f. Fear of sexual harassment by Naxalites	1	2	3	4	8
g. Fear of being killed by the Naxalites	1	2	3	4	8

Q24. What is your main source of information about the ongoing conflict in your area?

1. Radio   2. TV   3. Newspaper   4. Social Media (Whatsapp/Youtube/Facebook/Twitter etc)
5. Local people   6. Police   7. Paramilitary/Army   8. Any other *(specify)*_____   9. NR

Q25. How much trust do you have on the information you receive from the following sources - a lot, somewhat, not much or not at all?

	A lot	Somewhat	Not much	Not at all	NR
a. Local Newspapers	1	2	3	4	8
b. Local TV News Channels	1	2	3	4	8
c. Messages you receive on Whatsapp	1	2	3	4	8

Q26. When there is a peaceful protest going on at a public place without any permission, what do police mostly do in such a situation?

       1. Let it happen   2. Try to disperse the crowd through appeal/persuasion

       3. Use force to disperse the crowd   4. Arrest the protestors   8. No Response

Q27. In your opinion, should the presence of Paramilitary/Army in your locality be increased or decreased?   1. Increase   2. Decrease   3. Should remain the same *(silent option)*

       4. Should be completely removed *(silent option)*   8. No Response

Q28. In this area, what term is used for the persons who take up arms against the Government? *(Record answer, coding will be done at CSDS Delhi)*_____ 98. NR

Q29. To what extent do you support police eliminating the criminals in the following cases- Fully, Somewhat, Not much or Not at all?

	Fully	Somewhat	Not much	Not at all	NR
a. In cases of self defense for the police	1	2	3	4	8
b. In dealing with dangerous criminals	1	2	3	4	8
c. When the crime committed is brutal	1	2	3	4	8
d. When dealing with Naxalites	1	2	3	4	8

Q30. Now I will read out two statements, please tell me which of the two statements do you agree with the most? *(Read out the two statements)*

Statement 1: 'Naxalites take up Naxalism activities as they want to improve people's lives, therefore, they should not get any punishment.'

Statement 2: 'Criminal activity, done with any objective, is wrong, and the Naxalites should be punished for it.'

     1. Agree with 1st Statement   2. Agree with 2nd Statement   8. No Response

Q31. In your opinion, how useful will the following measures be for reducing Naxalism activities - Very, somewhat, not much, or not at all?

	Very	Somewhat	Not much	Not at all	NR
a. Increasing the number of police personnel.	1	2	3	4	8
b. More preventive arrests of anti-social elements.	1	2	3	4	8
c. Improving the network of informers/*Mukhbirs*	1	2	3	4	8
d. Initiating peaceful dialogue/talk with Naxalites.	1	2	3	4	8
e. Appointing civilians as Special Police Officers (SPO).	1	2	3	4	8
f. Increasing the strength of Paramilitary Forces.	1	2	3	4	8
g. Elimination of Naxalites.	1	2	3	4	8
h. Finding a political solution to this problem.	1	2	3	4	8
i. Development and better facilities for the people of this area.	1	2	3	4	8

Q32. People have different opinions regarding the Naxalites. Now I will read out three statements, please tell me which one do you agree with the most? *(Read out three statements given below)*

Statement 1: The Naxalites spread unnecessary violence.

Statement 2: The Naxalites struggle for the rights of the poor.

Statement 3: Their demands are genuine but their methods are wrong.

    1. Agree with 1st Statement   2. Agree with 2nd Statement   3. Agree with 3rd Statement   8. NR

Q33. In your opinion what is the major reason for Naxalism activities in your area? *(Record exactly and use codebook for coding)*_____ 98. NR

Q34.	In this area, do the Naxalites do the following?	Yes	No	May be	No response
a.	**a.** Illegally collect money/tax from people	2	1	3	8
b.	**b.** Run their own rules and laws	2	1	3	8

Q35. Have you heard about (Name of the Security Act in force in the State) , UAPA laws, which allow the State to detain persons on the basis of "unlawful activities" or for the "acts that show a "tendency to pose an obstacle to the administration of law"?

<div align="center">2.Yes   1. No.   3. May be   8. No Response</div>

Q36. Now I will read out two statements, please tell me which one do you agree with the most?

Statement 1: In order to control Naxalism, laws like (Name of the Security Act in force in the State), UAPA are important.

Statement 2: Such laws are very harsh, and should be repealed/removed.

<div align="center">1. Agree with 1st Statement   2. Agree with 2nd Statement   8. No Response</div>

Q37. For controlling Naxalism, do you support or oppose the following methods? *(Further probe for 'fully' and 'somewhat')*

		Support		Oppose		NR
		Fully	**Somewhat**	**Somewhat**	**Fully**	
a.	**a.** Tapping phones of common people.	1	2	3	4	8
b.	**b.** Tapping phones of suspected Naxalites.	1	2	3	4	8
c.	**c.** Surveillance through Drone cameras.	1	2	3	4	8
d.	**d.** Arresting people for their posts on social media (Facebook, Whatsapp etc) that sympathise with Naxalites.	1	2	3	4	8
e.	**e.** Complete ban on internet in places which are affected by Naxalism.	1	2	3	4	8

Q38. Now I will read out two statements, please tell me which one do you agree with the most?

Statement 1: National security is of primary importance, and Human Rights can be ignored to ensure national security.

Statement 2: It is wrong to ignore Human Rights in the name of national security.

<div align="center">1. Agree with 1st Statement   2. Agree with 2nd Statement   8. No Response</div>

Q39. 'Police in disturbed areas like this is usually more likely to earn extra money from the illegal sources'. Do you agree or disagree with this statements *(Probe further fully or somewhat)*

<div align="center">1. Fully agree   2. Somewhat agree   3. Somewhat disagree   4. Fully disagree   8. NR</div>

Q40. Because of the presence of Naxalites in your area, how much does the normal policing, such as maintaining law & order and crime investigation suffer-a lot, somewhat, not much or not at all?   1. A lot   2. Somewhat   3. Not much   4. Not at all   8. NR

Q41. In your opinion, how much trust do people of this area have in the Police- A lot, somewhat, not much or not at all?   1. A lot   2. Somewhat   3. Not much   4. Not at all   8. NR

Q42. In last 2-3 years, how many times have you been in a situation where there is a violent conflict between the local people and the police force - never, once-twice, three-four times, or many times?   1. Never   2. Once-twice   2. Three-four times   4. Many times

<div align="center">5. Always *(Silent option)*   8. No Response</div>

Q43. Do you consider these things right or wrong? *(Probe further- completely or somewhat)*

	Right		Wrong		NR
	Completely	Somewhat	Somewhat	Completely	
a. When for the safety and security of the society, Police gets violent with the arrested Naxalites.	1	2	3	4	8
b. When for the safety and security of the society, Police gets violent with the other criminals.	1	2	3	4	8

a. ☐
b. ☐

Q44. If the children of the following age-groups get into the Naxalism, should they be treated like Juveniles/Children **OR** just like adult criminals?

a. ☐
a. Children between 16-18 years of age

    1.Like Juveniles/Children   2. Like adult criminals in extreme cases *(Silent option)*

    3. Just like adult criminals   8. No response

b. ☐
b. Children between 7 to 15 years of age

    1.Like Juveniles/Children   2. Like adult criminals in extreme cases *(Silent option)*

    3. Just like adult criminals   8. No response

☐
Q45. Now I will read out two statements, please tell me which one do you agree with the most?

Statement 1: For the greater good of the society sometimes, killing dangerous Naxalites is more effective than giving them a legal trial.

Statement 2: No matter how dangerous a Naxalites is, Police should try to catch them and follow proper legal procedures.

    1. Agree with 1st Statement   2. Agree with 2nd Statement   8. No Response

☐
Q46. In your opinion, how much trust do people of this area have in the Paramilitary/Army- A lot, somewhat, not much or not at all?   1. A lot   2. Somewhat   3. Not much

    4. Not at all   8. NR

☐☐
Q47. In your opinion, who is the police accountable or answerable to? *(Record exact answer and Code from the Codebook)* _____ 98. No Response

Q48. If there is a criminal investigation for cases involving following groups of people, in your opinion, who do Police generally tend to favour more?

a. ☐
a. Between Dalits and Upper Castes   1. Dalits   2. Upper Castes   3. None   8. No response

b. ☐
b. Between Tribals and non-tribals   1. Tribals   2. Non-tribals   3. None   8. No response

c. ☐
c. Between Muslims and Hindus   1. Muslims   2. Hindus   3. None   8. No response

d. ☐
d. Between Poor and rich   1. Poor   2. Rich   3. None   8. No response

BACKGROUND DATA

Personal Information

B5. How regularly do you do the following – daily, sometimes, rarely or never?

	Daily	Sometimes	Rarely	Never	NR
a. Watch television?	1	2	3	4	8
b. Read the newspaper/s?	1	2	3	4	8
c. Listen to radio?	1	2	3	4	8
d. Use internet?	1	2	3	4	8

a. ☐
b. ☐
c. ☐
d. ☐

B5aa. *(If watches TV daily or sometimes or rarely)* Which TV news channel do you watch the most? *(Note down answer and consult codebook for coding)*_____

☐☐ ☐
    998. No response   999. NA

B5ba. *(If reads newspaper daily or sometimes or rarely)* Which newspaper do you read the most?

*(Note down answer and consult codebook for coding)*_____

998. No response   999. NA

B6. How often do you use the following - many times a day, once or twice a day, some days a week, some days a month, very rarely or never?

	Many times a day	Once or twice a day	Some days a week	Some days a month	Very rarely	Never	No account	NR
a. Facebook	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
b. Twitter	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
c. WhatsApp	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
d. Instagram	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
e. Youtube	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
f. Tik Tok **(Before ban)**	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
g. Public app	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8

B7. What is your main occupation? *(Record & consult codebook. If retired, find out previous job. If student/house wife, note down. If farmer, ask land size owned/cultivated)*

_____ 98. NR

B7a. Are you the main earner of your household?   2. Yes   1. No

B7b. *(If No in B7a)* What is the occupation of the main earner of your household? *(Record exactly and consult codebook)* _____ 98. NR   99. NA

B8. How far is the nearest police station/chowki from your village/locality? *(Record answer in kilometer)* _____ 998. NR

B9. Are you married?   1. Married   2. Married (No Gauna/not started living together)
3. Widowed   4. Divorced   5. Separated   6. Deserted
7. Unmarried/Single   8. Live with partner but not married   9. NR

B9a. *(If Married)* Do you have any children?   2. Yes   1. No   8. NR   9. NA

B10. What is your Caste/Jati-biradari/Tribe name? *(Consult code book for code)*

_____ 998. NR

B10a. And what is your caste group?   1. Scheduled Caste (SC)   2. Scheduled Tribe (ST)
3. Other Backward Classes (OBC)   4. Other

B11. What is your religion?   1. Hindu   2. Muslim   3. Christian   4. Sikh   5. Buddhist/Neo Buddhist
6. Jain   7. Parsi   8. No religion   9. Others *(Specify)* _____

B12. Do you have an Aadhar card?   2. Yes   1. No   8. NR

B13. Area/locality: 1. Village   2. Town (50,000-1 lakh population)   3. Small City (1-5 lakh)
4. Big City(5-10 lakh)   5. Metropolitan City (Above 10 lakh)

B13a. Is the respondent's house well built or partially built (kaccha)?
1. Well built (pucca)   2. Partially built (kutcha)
3. Both (pucca-kutcha)   4. Jhopdi   9. NA

B13b. How many rooms does your house have, excluding kitchen and bathroom?

_____ 98. No response

Adults Children

B14. A Total no. of family members living in the household?

Adults_____ Children_____ (*If more than 9, code 9*)

B15. Do you or members of your household have the following things?   **Yes**   **No**

a.	**a.** Car/Jeep/Van	2 1
b.	**b.** Scooter/Motorcycle/Moped	2 1
c.	**c.** Airconditioner	2 1
d.	**d.** Computer/laptop/i-Pad	2 1
e.	**e.** Electronic Fan/Cooler	2 1
f.	**f.** Washing machine	2 1
g.	**g.** Fridge	2 1
h.	**h.** Television	2 1
i.	**i.** Bank/Post office account	2 1
j.	**j.** ATM/Debit/Credit card	2 1
k.	**k.** LPG gas	2 1
l.	**l** Internet connection in the house (Excluding mobile phone)	2 1
m.	**m.** Toilet inside the house	2 1
n.	**n.** Pumping set	2 1
o.	**o.** Tractor	2 1

B16. Livestock   **Total Number**

a.   **a.** Goat /sheep   _____

b.   **b.** Oxe /buffalo   _____

c.   **c.** Cow   _____

B17. Total monthly household income - putting together the income of all members of the houshold?

01. Less than 1000   02. 1001 to 2000   03. 2001 to 3000   04. 3001 to 5000
05. 5001 to 7500   06. 7501 to 10000   07. 10001 to 15000   08. 15001 to 20000
09. 20001 to 30000   10. 30001 to 50000   11. 50001 and above   98. No response

B18. Mobile/ Telephone number of the respondent? **Mobile _____**

STATUS OF POLICING IN INDIA REPORT 2020: POLICING IN DISTURBED AREAS
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE FOR <u>POLICE PERSONNEL</u>

INVESTIGATOR'S INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF INFORMED CONSENT

My Name is _____ and I am from Lokniti–CSDS: Centre for the Study of the Developing Societies (Please mention your university's name here), a research institute based in Delhi. We are doing a survey of police across the country, to gather their perspective towards the police system and criminal justice system. It covers aspects such as conditions of duty hours, work-stress, obstacles in investigation, etc. We are interviewing thousands of police personnel across the country. Based on this study, a report on the status of policing in India will be produced.

This survey is an independent study and it is not linked to any political party or government agency. Whatever information you provide will be kept strictly confidential. The findings of the survey will be used for research work.

Participation in this survey is voluntary and it is entirely up to you answer or not to answer any question that I ask. We hope that you will take part in this survey since your participation is important. It usually takes 20–30 minutes to complete this interview. Please spare some time for the interview and help me in completing this survey.

A1. Did the respondent give consent? *(Put a tick and then proceed with interview)*

State ID   **District ID**   **Respondent S. No.**

Z1. State:

Z2. District: _____

Z3. Location: 1. District Head Quarter   2. Block

Z4. District HQ/Block's Name: _____

Z4a. Name of Village/Town: _____

Z5: Date of Interview *(dd/mm):* _____

Z6: Name of Investigator *(Write your Roll No. in the box):* _____

Date   **Month**

Investigator Roll No.

INTERVIEW BEGINS:

B1. What is your rank within the police force?

    1. Constable   2. Head constable   3. Assistance sub-inspector   4. Sub-inspector

    5. Inspector   6. Circle Inspector   7. ASP/Dy. SP   8. Other_____   9. No response

B1a. Are you in civil police or armed police?

    1. Civil Police   2. Armed Police   3. Other_____   8. No response

B1b. In this posting, what is the main task that you usually perform daily?*(Record exactly, code from the code book)* _____ 98. No response

B2. How long have you been in police service? *(No. of years) _____ (If less than one year, Code 01)*

B3. Where are you currently posted–Police Station, Police Outpost, Cyber Cell, Armed Police Battalion or anywhere else? 1. Police Station   2. Police Outpost   3. Cyber Cell

        4. Armed Police Battalion 5. Anywhere else_____   8. No Response

B4. How long have you been at your current place of posting? *(Number of years)* _____ *(If less than one year, Code 01)*

B5. Does your family live with you at this posting?   2. Yes   1. No   8. No response

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Q1. Did you specifically ask for a posting in this area or was this a routine posting?

    1. Specially asked for this posting   2. It was a routine posting

    3. Punishment posting *(silent option)*   8. No Response

Q2. Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with this area of your current posting? *(Probe further, 'Fully' or 'somewhat')*   1. Fully satisfied   2. Somewhat satisfied   3. Somewhat dissatisfied

    4. Fully dissatisfied   8. No Response

Q2a. *(If dissatisfied in Q2)* What is the major reason for your dissatisfaction with your posting? *(Write ONE biggest reason and code from the code book)*

    _____   98. N.R.   99. N.A

B6. Is this your Home District?   2. Yes   1. No

B6a. *(If 'no' in B6)* Have you ever been posted in your Home District?

    2. Yes   1. No   9. Not Applicable

Q3. Considering your own safety and your family's safety, how risky do you find this area? Very, somewhat, not much or not at all?   1. Very   2. Somewhat   3. Not much

    4. Not at all   8. No Response

Q4. Is the financial assistance given by the government to the family of a police personnel, in case of an injury or death while on duty- sufficient enough, somewhat sufficient, a little less or very less?   1. Sufficient enough   2. Somewhat sufficient   3. Little less   4. Very less

    5. There is no such scheme for us *(Silent option)*

    6. Not aware of any such scheme *(Silent option)*   8. No Response

Q5. In this area, what term is used for the persons who take up arms against the Government? *(Record answer, coding will be done at CSDS Delhi)* _____ **98.** No Response

Q6. In this area, do you have Naxalites who are helping Police after they surrendered?

    2. Yes   1. No   8. No Response

Q6a. *(If 'Yes' in Q6)* So how effective have they been to the Police in controlling the Naxalism activities - Very, Somewhat, Not much, or Not at all?

    1. Very   2. Somewhat   3. Not much

    4. Not at all   8. N.R.   9. Not applicable

Q7. How effective have local informers *(or Mukhbirs)* have been to the Police in controlling the Naxalism activities in this area- very, somewhat, not much or not at all?

    1. Very   2. Somewhat   3. Not much

    4. Not at all   5. There are no local informers here *(silent)*   8. N. R.

Q8. During this posting, how often have you faced the following situations—Many times, few times, rarely or never?

	Many times	Few times	Rarely	Never	NR
a. Naxalites committed a violent crime but your team was unable to reach the crime spot on time because of shortage of staff at the police station.	1	2	3	4	8
b. Naxalites committed a violent crime but your team could not go there as it was unsafe even for the Police to do so.	1	2	3	4	8
c. Attack on Police or on Police jeep/car by Naxalites.	1	2	3	4	8

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Q9. When was the last time you received training about the following things- in the last one year, two-three years ago, four-five years ago, even before that or never?

	Last 1 year	2-3 years ago	4-5 years ago	Even before that	Never	NR
a. About New technology	1	2	3	4	5	8
b. Weapons training	1	2	3	4	5	8
c. On Human rights	1	2	3	4	5	8
d. On Crowd Control	1	2	3	4	5	8
e. Physical training	1	2	3	4	5	8
f. On Sensitization towards Caste/Community/Tribe	1	2	3	4	5	8
g. About New law/rules/orders	1	2	3	4	5	8
h. On Sensitization towards Women	1	2	3	4	5	8
i. On Sensitization towards children/juveniles	1	2	3	4	5	8

Q10. What is the most common crime in this area? *(Note down answer and consult Codebook for coding)* _____ 98. No response

Q11. How common are the following crimes in your jurisdiction/area-Very, somewhat, not much, or not at all?

	Very	Somewhat	Not much	Not at all	No response
a. Abduction/Kidnapping	1	2	3	4	8
b. Extortion	1	2	3	4	8
c. Rape	1	2	3	4	8
d. Attacks on Police personnel	1	2	3	4	8
e. Minor offenses, like theft etc.	1	2	3	4	8

Q12. In your opinion, who is in a better position with regard to the following- 'Police' OR 'Paramilitary/Army'?

	Police	Paramilitary/Army	Both equal	None	NR
a. Better budgeted	1	2	3	4	8
b. Better staffed	1	2	3	4	8
c. Better facilities- like arms, ammunition and bullet-proof jackets	1	2	3	4	8

Q12d. And who is more effective in controlling Naxalism violence in this area- 'Police' OR 'Paramilitary/Army'?

1. Police 2. Paramilitary/Army 3. Both equally effective 4. None 8. No Response

Q13. To what extent do you support elimination of criminals in the following cases - Fully, Somewhat, Not much or Not at all?

	Fully	Somewhat	Not much	Not at all	NR
a. In cases of self defense for the police	1	2	3	4	8
b. In dealing with dangerous criminals	1	2	3	4	8
c. When the crime committed is brutal	1	2	3	4	8
d. When dealing with Naxalites	1	2	3	4	8

Q14. Now I will read out two statements, please tell me which of the two statements do you agree with the most? *(Read out the two statements)*

Statement 1: Since there is equality before law, naxalites should be punished just like the other criminals.

Statement 2: Even though there is equality before law, naxalites should be given much harsher punishment compared to the other criminals.

    1. Agree with 1st Statement   2. Agree with 2nd Statement   8. No Response

Q15. In your opinion, what is the most important step that the police should take to control the crime? *(Record exactly, consult code book and code later)* _____ 98. No response

Q16. In your opinion, what is the most important step that the police should take to control the Naxalism related activities? *(Record exactly, consult code book and code later)*

_____ 98. No response

Q17. In your opinion, how useful will the following measures be for reducing Naxalism activities- Very, somewhat, not much, or not at all?

	Very	Somewhat	Not much	Not at all	NR
a. Increasing the number of police personnel.	1	2	3	4	8
b. More preventive arrests of anti-social elements.	1	2	3	4	8
c. Improving the network of informers/*Mukhbirs*	1	2	3	4	8
d. Initiating peaceful dialogue/talk with Naxalites.	1	2	3	4	8
e. Appointing civilians as Special Police Officers (SPO).	1	2	3	4	8
f. Increasing the strength of Paramilitary Forces.	1	2	3	4	8
g. Elimination of Naxalites.	1	2	3	4	8
h. Finding a political solution to this problem.	1	2	3	4	8
i. Development and better facilities for the people of this area.	1	2	3	4	8

Q18. In your opinion, when Police and Paramilitary/Army, both are involved in separate cases of fake encounter, does the Government treat them in the same manner, or differently?

    1. Same   2. Different   8. NR

Q18a. *(If 'different')* So who does the Government support more- Police or Paramilitary/Army?

    1. Police   2. Paramilitary/Army   8. NR   9. NA

Q19. Considering that this is a Naxalism affected area, how much does being posted here affect you mentally - a lot, somewhat, not much or not at all?

    1. A lot   2. Somewhat   3. Not much   4. Not at all   8. No Response

Q20. In your opinion, who is more effective in controlling the Naxalism related activities - a Police personnel belonging to this district itself **OR** a Police personnel who has come here from some other district? 1. One belonging to this district   2. One belonging to some other district

    3. Both equally efficient / No difference   4. Both equally ineffective   8. N.R.

Q21. In your opinion, to what extent do people in this area trust the Naxalites - a lot, somewhat, not much or not at all? 1. A lot   2. Somewhat   3. Not much   4. Not at all   8. No Response

Q22. While investigating Naxalism cases, how much pressure do the Police feel from the following people/organizations - a lot, sometimes, rarely or never?

	A lot	Somewhat	Not much	Not at all	NR
a. Pressure from local public	1	2	3	4	8
b. Pressure from Media	1	2	3	4	8
c. Pressure from Human Rights Activists/NGO	1	2	3	4	8
d. Pressure from Courts	1	2	3	4	8

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Q23. People have different opinions on how to deal with Naxalites. Some say Police should be given free hand to control them; while some others say control of this area should be completely handed over to the Paramilitary/Army. What is your own opinion - Should the Police be given free hand **OR** should this area be handed over to the Paramilitary/Army completely?

    1. Free-hand to the Police   2. This area should be handed over to the Paramilitary/Army completely

    3. Increase the strength of police *(Silent option)*   4. No Change required *(Silent Option)*   8. NR

Q24. People have different opinions regarding the Naxalites. Now I will read out three statements, please tell me which one do you agree with the most? *(Read out three statements give below)*

Statement 1: The Naxalites spread unnecessary violence.

Statement 2: The Naxalites struggle for the rights of the poor.

Statement 3: Their demands are genuine but their methods are wrong.

    1. Agree with 1st Statement   2. Agree with 2nd Statement   3. Agree with 3rd Statement   8. NR

Q25. In your opinion what is the major reason for Naxalism activities in your area? *(Record exactly and use codebook for coding)*_____ 98. NR

Q26. In this area, do the Naxalites do the following?

	Yes	No	May be	No response
a. Illegally collect money/tax from people	2	1	3	8
b. Run their own rules and laws	2	1	3	8

Q27. Now I will read out two statements, please tell me which one do you agree with the most?

Statement 1: In order to control Naxalism activities, laws like (Name of the Security Act in force in the State), UAPA are important.

Statement 2: Such laws are very harsh, and should be repealed/removed

    1. Agree with 1st Statement   2. Agree with 2nd Statement

    3. Never heard about this law *(Silent option)*   8. No Response

Q28. For controlling Naxalism, do you support or oppose the following methods?
(Further probe for 'fully' and 'somewhat')

	Support		Oppose		NR
	Fully	Somewhat	Somewhat	Fully	
a. Tapping phones of common people.	1	2	3	4	8
b. Tapping phones of suspected Naxalites.	1	2	3	4	8
c. Surveillance through Drone cameras.	1	2	3	4	8
d. Arresting people for their posts on social media (Facebook, Whatsapp etc) that sympathise with Naxalites.	1	2	3	4	8
e. Complete ban on internet in places which are affected by Naxalism.	1	2	3	4	8

Q29. Now I will read out two statements, please tell me which one do you agree with the most?

Statement 1: National security is of primary importance, and Human Rights can be ignored to ensure national security.

Statement 2: It is wrong to ignore Human Rights in the name of national security.

    1. Agree with 1st Statement   2. Agree with 2nd Statement   8. N.R.

Q30. Because of the presence of Naxalites in your area, how much does the normal policing, such as maintaining law & order and crime investigation suffer - a lot, somewhat, not much or not at all?

    1. A lot   2. Somewhat   3. Not much   4. Not at all   8. NR

Q31. In your opinion, how much trust do people of this area have in the Police - a lot, somewhat, not much or not at all? 1. A lot 2. Somewhat 3. Not much 4. Not at all 8. NR

Q32. In this posting, how many times have you been in a situation where there is a violent conflict between the local people and the police force- never, once-twice, three-four times, or many times?

1. Never 2. Once-twice 2. Three-four times

4. Many times 5. Always *(Silent option)* 8. No Response

Q33. Do you consider these things right or wrong? *(Probe further- completely or somewhat)*

	Right		Wrong		NR
	Completely	Somewhat	Somewhat	Completely	
a. When for the safety and security of the society, Police gets violent with the arrested Naxalites.	1	2	3	4	8
b. When for the safety and security of the society, Police gets violent with the other criminals.	1	2	3	4	8

Q34. In this area, are there any particular people, or social group, which are more likely to get into Naxalism activities? 2. Yes 1. No 8. No Response

Q34a. *(If 'yes' in Q34)* So who are these people, or which is this social group? *(Note down answer and code from the code book)*_____98. N.R. 99. N.A.

Q35. If the children of the following age-groups get into Naxalism, should they be treated like Juveniles/Children **OR** just like adult criminals?

a. Children between 16-18 years of age

1. Like Juveniles/Children 2. Like adult criminals in extreme cases *(Silent option)*
3. Just like adult criminals 8. No response

b. Children between 7 to 15 years of age

1. Like Juveniles/Children 2. Like adult criminals in extreme cases *(Silent option)*
3. Just like adult criminals 8. No response

Q36. Now I will read out two statements, please tell me which one do you agree with the most?

Statement 1: For the greater good of the society sometimes, killing dangerous Naxalites is more effective than giving them a legal trial.

Statement 2: No matter how dangerous Naxalites are, Police should try to catch them and follow proper legal procedures.

1. Agree with 1st Statement 2. Agree with 2nd Statement 8. No Response

Q37. In your opinion, what is the one step that the government must take to ensure that police can do its job in a better way in Naxalism affected areas? *(Consult code book for coding)*

_____98. No Response

Q38. When you were posted here, were you given any special training in how to deal with Naxalism activities? 2. Yes 1. No 8. No Response

Q39. Suppose there is a peaceful protest going on in a public place on some regional issue involving a large number of people despite Sec. 144 of IPC being imposed and you are deployed along with your team to control the crowd. What would you do in such a situation- let it happen, try to disperse the crowd through appeal/persuasion, use force to disperse the crowd, or arrest the protestors? 1. Let it happen 2. Try to disperse the crowd through appeal/persuasion
3. Use force to disperse the crowd 4. Arrest the protestors 8. No Response

Q39a. *(If 'use force...' in Q39)* What kind of force would you use to disperse the crowd in such a situation? *(Record exact answer and Code from the Codebook)*

_____98. No Response 99.Not applicable

Q40. In your opinion, who is the police accountable or answerable to? *(Record exact answer and Code from the Codebook)* _____ 98. No Response

Personal Information

B7. What is your age? *(in completed years)* _____ 98. No Response *(Code 95 for 95 yrs & above)*

B8. Gender: 1. Male 2. Female 3. Other

B9. Up to what level have you studied? *(Record exactly and consult code book)* _____ 9. N.R.

B10. And what is your caste group? 1. Scheduled Caste (SC) 2. Scheduled Tribe (ST)
3. Other Backward Classes (OBC) 4. Other

B10a. What is your Caste/Jati-biradari/Tribe name? *(Consult code book for code)*

_____

B11. What is your religion? 1. Hindu 2. Muslim 3. Christian 4. Sikh 5. Buddhist/Neo Buddhist
6. Jain 7. Parsi 8. No religion 9. Others *(Specify)* _____

B12. Are you married? 1. Married 2. Married (No Gauna/not started living together)
3. Widowed 4. Divorced 5. Separated 6. Deserted
7. Unmarried/Single 8. Live with partner but not married 9. NR

B13. What kind of mobile phone do you have- a simple phone or a smart phone with a touch screen?
1. Simple phone 2. Smart phone 3. Do not have a phone 8. NR

B13a. *(If respondent has a mobile phone)* Does you phone have an internet connection?
2. Yes 1. No 8. NR 9. NA

B14. At your home, what language do you speak in the most while conversing with your family members? *(Note down answer and consult codebook for codes)*_____98. NR

Adults Children

B15. Total no. of family members living in the household?
Adults_____ Children_____ *(If more than 9, code 9)*

B16. Do you or members of your household have the following things?

		Yes	No
a.	Car/Jeep/Van	2	1
b.	Scooter/Motorcycle/Moped	2	1
c.	Airconditioner	2	1
d.	Computer/laptop/i-Pad	2	1
e.	Washing machine	2	1
f.	Fridge	2	1
g.	Television	2	1
h.	Bank/Post office account	2	1
i.	ATM/Debit/Credit card	2	1
j.	LPG gas	2	1
k.	Toilet inside the house	2	1

B17. Total monthly household income - putting together the income of all members of the houshold?
01. 10000 to 20000 02. 20001 to 30000 03. 30001 to 40000 04. 40001 to 50000
05. 50001 to 60000 06. 60001 to 70000 07. 70001 to 80000 08. 80001 to 90000
09. 90001 to 100000 10. 100001 and above 98. No response

B18. Mobile/ Telephone number of the respondent? **Mobile** _____

Images from the Field

Common Cause is a registered society dedicated to championing public causes, campaign for probity in public life and integrity of institutions. It seeks to promote democracy, good governance and public policy reforms thorough advocacy, interventions by formal and informal policy engagements. Common Cause is especially known for the difference it has made through a large number of Public Interest Litigations filed in the Courts, such as the recent ones on the cancellation of the entire telecom spectrum; cancellation of arbitrarily allocated coal blocks; Apex Court's recognition of individuals right to die with dignity and legal validity of living will.

The **Centre for the Study of the Developing Societies (CSDS)** is one of India's leading institutes for research in the social sciences and humanities. Since its inception in 1963, the Centre has been known for its critical outlook on received models of development and progress. It is animated by a vision of equality and democratic transformation. Lokniti is a research programme of the CSDS established in 1997. It houses a cluster of research initiatives that seek to engage with national and global debates on democratic politics by initiating empirically grounded yet theoretically oriented studies. The large volume of data collected by Lokniti on party politics and voting behaviour has gone a long way in helping social science scholars makings sense of Indian elections and democracy.